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# **(/is-every-speed-limit-too-low/)Is Every Speed Limit Too Low?**

By Alex Mayyasi (https://twitter.com/amayyasi)

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When Lieutenant Gary Megge of the Michigan State Police attends a meeting, he sometimes asks, "How many of you broke the speed limit on your way here?"

Hearing his question, you might assume that Lt. Megge is a particularly zealous police

officer. The type of person who walks half a city block to avoid jaywalking on an empty street. The model citizen who defers almost obnoxiously to the letter of the law. But that is not the point of Lt. Megge's question at all.

"We all speed, yet months and months usually pass between us seeing a crash," Lt. Megge tells us when we call to discuss speed limits. "That tells me that most of us are adequate, safe, reasonable drivers. Speeding and traffic safety have a small correlation."

Over the past 12 years, Lt. Megge has increased the speed limit on nearly 400 of Michigan's roadways. Each time, he or one of his officers hears from community groups who complain that people already drive too fast. But as Megge and his colleagues explain, their intent is not to reduce congestion, bow to the reality that everyone drives too fast, or even strike a balance between safety concerns and drivers' desire to arrive at their destinations faster. Quite the opposite, Lt. Megge advocates for raising speed limits because he believes it makes roads safer.

#### **Traffic Engineering 101**

Every year, **traffic engineers** review the speed limit on thousands of stretches of road and highway. Most are reviewed by a member of the state's **Department of Transportation**, often along with a member of the state **police**, as is the case in Michigan. In each case, the "survey" team" has a clear approach: they want to set the speed limit so that 15% of drivers exceed it and 85% of drivers drive at or below the speed limit.

#### This "nationally recognized method" (http://www.michigan.gov

 $/msp/0,4643,7-123-1593$   $30536$   $25802-87384-0.00$ .html) of setting the speed limit as the 85th percentile speed is essentially traffic engineering 101. It's also a bit perplexing to those unfamiliar with the concept. Shouldn't everyone drive at or below the speed limit? And if a driver's speed is dictated by the speed limit, how can you decide whether or not to change that limit based on the speed of traffic?

The answer lies in realizing that the speed limit really is just a number on a sign, and it has very little influence on how fast people drive. "Over the years, I've done many follow up studies after we raise or lower a speed limit," Megge tells us. "Almost every time, the 85th percentile speed doesn't change, or if it does, it's by about 2 or 3 mph."

As most honest drivers would probably concede, this means that if the speed limit on a highway decreases from 65 mph to 55 mph, most drivers will not drive 10 mph slower. But for the majority of drivers, the opposite is also true. If a survey team increases the speed limit by 10 mph, the speed of traffic will not shoot up 10 mph. It will stay around the same. Years of observing traffic has shown engineers that as long as a cop car is not in sight, most people simply drive at whatever speed they like.

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Luckily, there is some logic to the speed people choose other than the need for speed. The speed drivers choose is not based on laws or street signs, but the weather, number of intersections, presence of pedestrians and curves, and all the other information that factors into the principle, as Lt. Megge puts it, that "no one I know who gets into their car wants to crash."

So if drivers disregard speed limits, why bother trying to set the "right" speed limit at all?

One reason is that a minority of drivers do follow the speed limit. "I've found that about 10% of drivers truly identify the speed limit sign and drive at or near that limit," says Megge. Since these are the slowest share of drivers, they don't affect the 85th percentile speed. But they do impact the average speed -- by about 2 or 3 mph when a speed limit is changed, in Lt. Megge's experience -- and, more importantly, the variance in driving speeds.

This is important because, as noted in a U.S. Department of Transportation report (http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel.html), "the potential for being involved in an accident is highest when traveling at speed much lower or much higher than the majority of motorists." If every car sets its cruise control at the same speed, the odds of a fender bender happening is low. But when some cars drive 55 mph and others drive 85 mph, the odds of cars colliding increases dramatically. This is why getting slow drivers to stick to the right lane (http://www.vox.com/2014/6/16/5804590/why-you-shouldnt-drive-slowly-in-theleft-lane) is so important to roadway safety; we generally focus on joyriders' ability to cause accidents -- and rightly so -- but a car driving under the speed limit in the left (passing) lane of a highway is almost as dangerous.

Traffic engineers believe that the 85th percentile speed is the ideal speed limit because it leads to the least variability between driving speeds and therefore safer roads. When the speed limit is correctly set at the 85th percentile speed, the minority of drivers that do conscientiously follow speed limits are no longer driving much slower than the speed of traffic. The choice of the 85th percentile speed is a data-driven conclusion -- as noted Lt. Megge and speed limit resources like the Michigan State Police's guide (http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-1593\_30536\_25802-87384--,00.html) - that has been established by the consistent findings of years of traffic studies.

Yet most speed limits are set below the 85th percentile speed. We first investigated this topic at the urging of the National Motorists Association (http://www.motorists.org/), a "member-supported driver advocacy organization" that has made raising speed limits to the 85th percentile one focus of its efforts.

One member pointed us to a 1992 report by the U.S. Department of Transportation on the "Effects of Raising and Lowering Speed Limits," (http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/slirrel.html)which, beside making the same arguments described above, noted that the majority of highway agencies set speed limits below the 85th percentile, leading over 50% of motorists to drive "in technical violation of the speed limit laws." Lt. Megge believes the compliance rate in Michigan to be well under 50%.

It seems absurd that over half of drivers technically break the law at all times. It's also perplexing that speed limit policy so consistently ignore traffic engineering 101. So why do people like Lt. Megge need to spend their time trying to raise speed limits?

### **How Saudi Arabia Got Us All Driving 55 MPH**

*"When I drive that slow, you know it's hard to steer. And I can't get my car out of second gear. What used to take two hours now takes all day. Huh, it took me 16 hours to get to L.A."*

*~ Sammy Hagar's hit song "I Can't Drive 55"*

In 1973, the Egyptian military crossed the Suez Canal in a surprise attack on Israel. It was the start of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and also low speed limits in the United States.

When the United States began resupplying Israel with arms, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced an embargo against the United States and several other countries. Combined with other supply constraints, it led to a quadrupling of gas prices, shortages of gasoline, and long lines at the pump.

In an effort to reduce America's need for gas, President Nixon issued an executive order mandating a 55 miles per hour speed limit on American highways, which Congress made law the following year. States are officially in charge of setting their own speed limits, but national leaders (semi) successfully cajoled states by tying compliance to federal highway funds. Since driving at high speeds is less efficient, the policy is estimated to have saved 167,000 barrels of oil per day (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/automobiles /autospecial2/30speed.html?\_r=0), or around 1% of American motor oil consumption.

Even as the effects of the energy crisis drew down in the 1970s, the new federal speed limit remained. But rather than insist on the limit in order to reduce gasoline consumption, members of Congress maintained the policy because they believed it led to safer highways. This is shown by a debate over a measure passed in 1987, which allowed select states to raise the limit on certain roads to 65 mph. The *New York Times* reported (http://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/29/us/20-states-to-win-the-right-to-set-a-65-mphspeed.html) that "Critics immediately warned that there would be a surge in highway fatalities." The dissenting chairman of the Public Works and Transportation Committee called it "irresponsible, life-threatening legislation.''

Congress abolished the national federal speed limit in 1995. Many states increased their speed limits before they could even post new signs, but many speed limits remained low. Twenty years of a 55 miles per hour speed limit created a low baseline that drags down speed limits today.

### **Why Speed Limits Are Low**

If you peruse the websites of state's departments of transportation, you'll often find a very technocratic explanation (http://www.dot.state.fl.us/trafficoperations  $/faqs/speed$  limit faq.shtm  $#Q_4$ ) of the 85th percentile principle. Speed limits are

consistently lower than the 85th percentile speed across the country, however, because there are many limitations on following the principle. Florida's Department of Transportation, for example, extolls (http://www.dot.state.fl.us/trafficoperations /faqs/speedlimitfaq.shtm) the 85th percentile principle, yet the state legislature sets maximum limits for each type of roadway. Locally, officials can come under pressure from parents and other safety-conscious groups to lower speed limits.

Consistently, the 85th percentile loses out to the perception that faster roads are less safe, so speed limits should be low. It's a misconception, Lt. Megge says, that he faces often in his work. When he proposes raising a speed limit, the initial reaction is always "Oh my god! You can't do that. People are already going too fast." People think raising the limit 10 mph will lead people to drive 10 mph faster, when really changing the limit has almost no impact on the speed of traffic.

The same lack of understanding motivates public health pushes for lower speed limits that influence legislation. The World Health Organization, for example, advocates (http://www.who.int/violence\_injury\_prevention/publications/road\_traffic /world\_report/en/) low speed limits to prevent road fatalities, and cites studies showing that accidents and fatalities increase with traffic speed. "When you look at it from a pure physics standpoint," Megge says, "and ask would you rather hit a bridge abutment at 10 mph or 40 mph, you can't argue with that. But when I look at correcting a speed limit, I am not advocating driving faster, and that's the hard part to get over."

If someone could wave a wand and get every American to drive below 60 mph, roads would be safer. But since law enforcement can't keep over 50% of Americans from speeding, putting a low number on a sign can't make roads safer. Fortunately, American roadways are safer than ever, with highway fatalities at historic lows (http://www.nhtsa.gov /About+NHTSA/Press+Releases

/NHTSA+Data+Confirms+Traffic+Fatalities+Increased+In+2012). Roads can be dangerous, but the perception of roads getting increasingly dangerous is a false one.

Plenty of public safety advocates of lower speed limits, however, would disagree with the actions of individuals like Lt. Megge. Just as Megge can point to the results on hundreds or thousands of roads which have become more safe or equally safe when the speed limit increased, other researchers looking at data sets of speed limit changes have come to the opposite conclusion (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2724439/) and advise that raising speed limits comes with the price of thousands of roadway fatalities.

None of these studies mention the 85th percentile principle -- at least in our review of them -- and Lt. Megge expressed surprise at researchers coming to this conclusion. Given that

debates over speed limit laws often enlist experts who make clashing predictions about the effect of raising speed limits, we got the feeling that speed limit policy would be a lot more consistent if the public health community and traffic engineers collaborated more often.

The other reason speed limits may remain low, which John Bowman, Communications Director of the National Motorists Association strongly insists on, is that cities and police departments use traffic citations as a revenue generating tool. As Bowman says, when speed limits are artificially low, it's easier to give out citations and pull in fine revenue.

Due to concern about such "speed traps," Missouri passed a law in the 1990s that capped the amount of a town's revenue that could come from traffic tickets. In 2010, auditors discovered that Randolph, Missouri, generated 75% to 83% of its budget (http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/missouri-s-first-official-speed-trap-town-fingeredin-audit/article\_19e8a57e-c04c-11df-89fe-00127992bc8b.html) from traffic tickets. The tiny town of around 50 residents, which is located near several casinos, employed two fulltime and eight part-time police officers, turning it into a speed trap poster child.

Figuring out how common the tactics used by Randolph's police department are around the country is difficult, as is tying it to a conscious decision to keep speed limits low. Each town or city makes its own decisions, which makes it difficult to know how comprehensively speeding tickets are used as a revenue generator. Further, it is very easy for police departments to defend pushing officers to issue more tickets as a goal intended to further roadway safety -- as the LAPD did when found in violation (http://articles.latimes.com /2013/dec/10/local/la-me-ln-ticket-quota-20131210) of a state law banning traffic ticket quotas last year.

In our conversation, Lt. Megge stated that he believes speed traps to be a "big problem" and counter to police officers real role of altering dangerous behavior. In a *Detroit News*article (http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20100427/METRO05/4270380#ixzz38KQdTdlm) about a number of towns ignoring state law by not reviewing the speed limits on stretches of their roads, Megge said that he believes the communities did so in order to avoid revising speed limits upwards. This allows them to keep collecting ticket revenue on "artificially low" speed limits.

### **Slowing Down**

Given the inevitability with which most drivers speed, it's heartening that roadways can be made safer through the very achievable means of traffic engineers setting more realistic speed limits -- rather than the nearly impossible goal of getting everyone to drive ten to twenty miles per hour slower. But it also seems counter to other goals. Most people may

drive at a reasonable rate, but is that speed low enough to accommodate bikers, protect children at play, and make our cities more walkable?

"I don't want to lie to people," Lt. Megge tells us. It may make parents feel better if the speed limit on their street is 25 mph instead of 35 mph, but that sign won't make people drive any slower. Megge prefers speed limits that both allow people to drive at a safe speed legally, and that realistically reflect traffic speeds. People shouldn't have a false sense of safety around roads, he says.

If people and politicians do want to reduce road speeds to improve safety, or make cities more pedestrian friendly, Megge says "there are a lot of other things you can do from an engineering standpoint." Cities can reduce the number of lanes, change the parking situation, create wider bike paths, and so on. It's more expensive, but unlike changing the number on a sign, it's effective.

Raising speed limits up to the speed of traffic can seem like surrendering to fast, unsafe driving. But it would actually accomplish the opposite. If advocates like Megge are right, following the 85th percentile rule would make roads safer, and it would also mean taking speed limits seriously.

### In its 1992 report, the U.S. Department of Transportation cautioned

(http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel.html), "Arbitrary, unrealistic and nonuniform speed limits have created a socially acceptable disregard for speed limits." Lt. Megge has worked on roads with a compliance rate of nearly zero percent, and a common complaint among those given traffic citations is that they were speeding no more than anyone else. With higher speed limits, Megge says, police officers could focus their resources on what really matters: drunk drivers, people who don't wear seat belts, drivers who run red lights, and, most importantly, the smaller number of drivers who actually speed at an unreasonable

#### rate.

It seems counterintuitive, but it's a formula Americans should love: Raise speed limits, make roads safer.

*If you liked this blog post, you'll love our book → Everything Is Bullshit (http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00L9G96NG/?tag=priceonomic0c-20). This article first appeared July 23, 2014.*



Published Apr 25, 2017 by Alex Mayyasi (https://twitter.com/amayyasi)

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# **Effects of Raising and Lowering Speed Limits**

*(Part of the [Reasonable Drivers Unanimous](http://metalab.unc.edu/rdu/) site)*

### *[Full Text](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel/index.html)*

### [Plain Text Version](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irrel.txt)

### **Final Report**

(Abstract and Finding)

**Report No. FHWA-RD-92-084 October 1992**

U.S. Department of Transportation Besearch, Development, and Technology Federal Highway Administration Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center 6300 Georgetown Pike McLean, Virginia 22101-2296

The objectives of this research was to determine the effects of raising and lowering posted speed limits on driver behavior and accidents for non-limited access rural and urban highways. Speed and accident data were collected in 22 States at 100 sites before and after speed limits were altered. Before and after data were also collected simultaneously at comparison sites where speed limits were not changed to control for the time trends. Repeated measurements were made at 14 sites to examine short and long-term effects of speed limit changes.

The results of the study indicated that lowering posted speed limits by as much as 20 mi/h (32 km/h), or raising speed limits by as much as 15 mi/h (24 km/h) had little effect on motorist' speed. The majority of motorist did not drive 5 mi/h (8 km/h) above the posted speed limits when speed limits were raised, nor did they reduce their speed by 5 or 10 mi/h (8 or 16 km/h) when speed limits are lowered. Data collected at the study sites indicated that the majority of speed limits are posed below the average speed of traffic. Lowering speed limits below the 50th percentile does not reduce accidents, but does significantly increase driver violations of the speed limit. Conversely, raising the posted speed limits did not increase speeds or accidents.

# **Introduction**

This study was conducted to examine driver behavior and accident effects of raising and lowering posted speed limits on nonlimited access rural and urban highways. While much research in recent years has focused on the effects of the 55 and 65 mi/h (89 and 105 km/h) speed limits on limited access facilities, the major emphasis of this research is on streets and highways that were posted between 20 and 55 mi/h (32 and 89 km/h)

A maximum speed limit is posted or set by statute on a highway to inform motorists of the highest speed considered to be safe and reasonable under favorable road, traffic, and weather conditions.

A review of early vehicles speed legislation in the United States suggests that regulations were established to improve public safety. The rational for government regulation of speed is based on the fact that unreasonable speed may cause damage and injury. Speed laws also provide a basis for punishing the unreasonable behavior of an individual driver.

Every State has a basic speed statute requiring drivers to operate their vehicles at a speed that is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions. This law recognizes that the maximum safe speed varies due to traffic, roadway, weather, light and other conditions, and places the responsibility of selecting a safe and reasonable speed on the driver.

The majority of motorists select a speed to reach their destination in the shortest time possible and to avoid endangering themselves, others, and their property. In selecting their speed, motorist consider roadway, traffic, weather, and other conditions. The collective judgment of the majority of motorists represents the level of reasonable travel and acceptable risk. Prior research has shown that the upper region of acceptable risk is in the vicinity of the 85th percentile speed.

Most traffic engineers believe that speed limits should be posted to reflect the maximum speed considered to be safe and reasonable by the majority of drivers using the roadway under favorable conditions. Procedures used to set speed limits have evolved through years of experience and research. Most States and localities set safe and reasonable maximum speed limits based on the results of an engineering and traffic investigation. While all States and most jurisdictions use the 85th percentile speed as a major factor n selecting the appropriate speed limit for a given street or highway, other factors such as roadside development, accident experience, and design speed are often subjectively considered.

The lack of consensus on how to establish safe and reasonable speed limits has led to nonuniform limits. While newspapers and scientific articles dating to the early 1900's discuss the problem and need for uniform limits, engineers such as Bearwald, in 1964, criticized traffic engineers for using nonuniform limits in both rural and urban areas and called for the establishment of speed zones of a factual and scientific basis as opposed to opinion and political expediency. Bearwald's suggestion apparently received little attention. For example, Harkey recently examined speed limits in rural and urban areas in four States and found that speed limits were set from 6 to 14 mi/h (10 to 23 km.h) below the 85th percentile speed.

One primary reason for setting speed limits lower than speed considered safe and reasonable by the majority of motorists is based on the belief that lower speed limits reduced seeds and accidents. Also it has been frequently suggested that most motorists drive 5 to 10 mi/h (8 to 16 km/h) over the posted speed limit, so lower limits should be established to account for this condition.

Conversely, it is believed that raising the speed limit increases speeds and accidents. For example, following a severe accident, one of the most frequent requests made to highway jurisdictions is to lower the speed limit. These requests are founded on public knowledge that accident severity increases with increasing vehicle speed because in a collision, the amount of kinetic energy dissipated is proportional to the square of the velocity. Simply stated, when a vehicle is involved in a crash the higher the vehicle speed, the greater the chance of being seriously injured or killed. However, as noted by a number of researchers, the potential for being involved in an accident is highest when traveling at speed much lower or much higher than the majority of motorists.

Arbitrary, unrealistic and nonuniform speed limits have created a socially acceptable disregard for speed limits. Unrealistic limits increase accident risks for persons who attempt to comply with limit by driving slower or faster than the majority of road users, Unreasonably low limits significantly decrease driver compliance and give road users such as person not familiar with the road and pedestrians, a false indication of actual traffic speeds.

Unrealistically high speed limits increase accident risk for drivers who are inexperienced or who disregard the basic speed law. Unrealistic limits also place enforcement officials and judges in the position of subjectively selecting and punishing violators. This practice can result in punishing average drivers, as well as high-risk violators.

For years, traffic engineering texts have supported the conclusion that motorists ignore unreasonable speed limits. Both formal research and informal operational observations conducted for many years indicate that there is very little change in the mean or 85th percentile speed as the result of raising or lowering the posted limit. Very few accident studies have been conducted to determine the safety effects or altering posted speed limits.

Highway administrators, enforcement officials, the judiciary system, and the public need factual information concerning the effects of speed limits to address pertinent issues. For example, do lower posted speed limits reduce vehicle speeds and accidents? If the speed limit is raised, will speeds and accidents increase? Do most motorists driver 5 to 10 mi/h (8 to 16 km/h) above the posted speed limit. What are the effects or lowering and raising speed limits on driver compliance? Answers to these questions and related issues are addressed in this report.

# **Summary of Findings**

The pertinent findings of this study, conducted to examine the effects of lowing and raising posted speed limits on nonlimited access rural and urban highways, are listed below:

- Based on the free-flow speed data collected for a 24-h period at the experimental and comparison sites in 22 States, posted speed limits were set, on the average, at the 45th percentile speed or below the average speed of traffic
- Speed limits were posted, on average, between 5 and 16 mi/h (8 and 26 km/h) below the 85th percentile speed.
- Lowering speed limits by 5, 10, 15, or 20 mi/h  $(8, 16, 24, \text{ or } 26 \text{ km/h})$  at the study sites had a minor effect on vehicle speeds. Posting lower speed limits does not decrease motorist's speeds.
- Raising speed limits by 5, 10, or 15 mi/h  $(8, 16,$  or 25 km/h) at the rural and urban sites had a minor effect on vehicle speeds. In other words, an increase in the posted speed limit did not create a corresponding increase in vehicle speeds.
- The average change in any of the percentile speeds at the experimental sites was less than 1.5 mi/h (2.4 m/h), regardless of whether the speed limit was raised or lowered.
- Where speed limits were lowered, an examination of speed distribution indicated the slowest drivers (1st percentile) increased their speed approximately 1 mi/h (1/6 km/h). There were no changes on the high-speed drivers (99th percentile)
- At sites where speed limits were raised, there was an increase of less than 1.5 mi/h (2.4 km/h) for drivers traveling at and below the 75th percentile speed. When the posted limits were raised by 10 and 15 mi/h (16 and 24 km/h), there was a small decrease in the 99th percentile speed.
- Raising speed limits in the region of the 85th percentile speed has an extremely beneficial effect on drivers complying with the posted speed limits.
- Lowering speed limits in the 33rd percentile speed (the average percentile that speed were posted in this study) provides a noncompliance rate of approximately 67 percent.
- After speed limits were altered at the experimental sites, less than one-half of the drivers complied with the new posed limits.
- Only minor changes in vehicles following as headways less than 2s were found at the experimental sites.
- Accidents at the 58 experimental sites where speed limits were lowered increased by 5.4 percent. The level of confidence of this estimate is 44 percent. The 95 percent confidence limits for this estimate ranges from a reduction in accidents of 11 percent to an increase of 26 percent.
- Accidents at the 41 experimental sites where speed limits were raised decreased by 6.7 percent. The level of confidence of this estimate in 59 percent. The 95 percent confidence limits for this estimate ranges from a reduction in accidents of 21 percent to an increase of 10 percent.
- Lowering speed limits more than 5 mi/h (8 km/h) below the 85th percentile speed of traffic did not reduce accidents.
- The indirect effects of speed limit changes on a sample of contiguous and adjacent roadways was found to be very small and insignificant.

# **Conclusion**

The primary conclusion of this research is that the majority of motorist on the nonlimited access rural and urban highways examined in this study did not decrease or increase their speed as a result of either lowering or raising the posted speed



Figure 10. Maximum and average changes in the 85th percentile speeds at the experimental sites.

limit by 4, 10, or 15 mi/h (8, 16, or 24 km/h). In other words, this nationwide study confirms the results of numerous other observational studies which found that the majority or motorist do not alter their speed to conform to speed limits they perceive as unreasonable for prevailing conditions.

The data clearly show that lowering posted speed limits did not reduce vehicle speeds or accidents. Also, lowering speed limits well below the 86th percentile speed did not increase speeds and accidents. Conversely, raising the posted speed limits did not increase speeds and accidents. The majority of motorist did not drive 5 to 10 mi/h (8 to 16 km/h) above the posted speed limit when speed limits were raised, nor did they reduce their speed by 5 or 10 mi/h (8 to 16 km/h) when speed limits were lowered.

Because there were few changes in the speed distribution, it is not surprising that the overall effects of speed limit changes on accidents were minor. It is interesting to note that compliance decreased when speed limits were lowered and accidents tended to increase. Conversely, when compliance improved after speed limits are raised, accidents tended to decrease.

Based on the sites examined in 22 States, it is apparent that the majority of highway agencies set speed limits below the average speed of traffic as opposed to setting limits in the upper region of the minimum accident risk band or about 85th percentile speed. This practice means that more than one-half of the motorist are in technical violation of the speed limits laws.

Although there are variations from State to State, on average, speed limits were posed 5 and 16 mi/h (8 and 26 km/h) below the 85th percentile speed. As all States use the 85th percentile as a major criterion for establishing safe and reasonable speed limits, it is surprising that the new speed limits posted on the experimental sections examined in this study deviated so far from the 85th percentile speed. There are several plausible reasons. Once commonly cited reason for posting unreasonably low speed limits is public and political pressure. While individuals and politicians clearly influence some speed limit decision, there are other factors involved.

Although the 85th percentile speed is used as the major guideline in setting speed limits, other factors such as land use, pedestrian activity, accident history, etc., are often subjectively considered in the decision making process. Together, these factors can account for sped limits that are set 10 mi/h (16 km/h) below the 85th percentile speed. In addition, the 85th percentile speed is often estimated based on a minimum of 200 vehicles or 2 h sample. This process does not take into account the wide hourly fluctuations in the 85th percentile speed over a 24-h period. Furthermore, the vehicle selection process use of radar which is detected by motorist contribute to a bias sample, i.e., usually lower then the average 24-h 85th percentile speed.

Although the study sites could not be randomly selected, they represent a wide range of rural and urban conditions, traffic volume, and regional situations. As large changes in the posted speed limit did not create a meaningful increase or decrease in the motorists' speeds at the study sites, it is plausible that this effect would also be found on other nonlimited rural and urban access highways.

The data collected during this study indicate that there are no benefits, either from a safety or operational point of view, from establishing speed limits less than the 85th percentile speed. This does not mean that all speed limits should be raised. Traffic and engineer investigations should be conducted to obtain an accurate measure of the speed distribution. Greater emphasis should be placed on using the 85th percentile speed in setting safe and reasonable speed limits. These studies should be repeated as land use and traffic characteristics change.

The information provided in this report will be useful to highway agencies, enforcement officials, and other involved in establishing uniform safe and reasonable speed limits on the nation's highways. The graphics, such as figure 10 on p.15 [above], can be used to illustrate the effects of speed limit changes on vehicle speeds. As shown below, figure 41 (which shows the changes in accidents, as well as the 95th percentile confidence limits of the changes) can be used to illustrate the effects of lowering and raising speed limits in accidents. This figure should only be used by persons who have read the accident analysis section in this report and have a basic understanding of the analysis results.



Figure 41. Summary of accident effects of altering posted speed limits.

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*Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR)*: Howard H. Bissell, HSR-30 and Davey L. Warren, HSR-10. *Contract or Grant Number*: DTFH61-85-C-00136. *Type of report and dates covered*: Final, October 1985 - June 1992

*The entire report is 84 pages long. You can try calling the National Technical Information Service (general info 703-487-4770, sales 703-487-4650) and asking for this report. Even with the report number they won't be able to find it. It's being buried since it says things that certain organizations (both governmental and private) don't want to be made public. However, NMA is selling this report for \$15 plus \$4 shipping and handaling. They can be contacted at 608/849-6000; [nma@motorists.com](mailto:nma@motorists.com) ; or 6678 Pertzborn Road, Dane, Wisconsin 53529.*

This page is part of a larger [Reasonable Drivers Unanimous](http://metalab.unc.edu/rdu/) site. Be sure to check the rest of my site out if this is your first time visiting. You won't regret it!

# **Related Documents**

- [NMA's Model Speed Zoning Law](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/nma-zone.html)
- [Other studies on the effect of altering speed limits](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-studs.html)
- [Driver Speed Behavior on US Streets and Highways](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-irre0.html)
- [Did the 65 mph Speed Limit Save Lives?](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/65-lives.html)

# **Related Pages**

• [Speed Limits](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/p-sl.html)

[Back Home](http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/home2.html) | [Start](http://metalab.unc.edu/rdu/)



# Moving Citations in Sandy City: 2022

Total Number: 7,088





Produced by Sandy Public Works Date: 6/22/2023

Path: T:\PubWorks\Projects\\_Engineering\Britney Ward\2022 Traffic Maps for Presentation\Traffic Citations\2022citations.mxd



# SANDY CITY BICYCLE SAFETY **Sandy**



#### SANDY.UTAH.GOV/HIKEBIKETRAILS SANDY.UTAH.GOV/HIKEBIKETRAILS



*See Utah Code Sections 41-6A-1101 through 1115.5, Sandy City Code Title 14, and Bike Utah for complete laws and safety tips.*

- Obey all traffic control devices
- • Cyclists may NOT use sirens or whistles on their bikes
- A police officer may stop riders to inspect and test their bicycles
- • Cyclists over 16 years old may proceed through a red traffic signal which doesn't change after waiting 90 seconds, if no other vehicle or pedestrian is approaching or in the intersection
- Ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the road
- • Do not ride more than two side-by-side
- Do not impede the movement of traffic or pedestrians
- Yield to pedestrians and give an audible signal when passing them
- $\bullet$  Ride with the designated direction of traffic
- Unless designed to do so, bicycles are not to carry more than one person at a time
- Do not attach your bike or yourself to a moving vehicle
- • Keep at least one hand on the handle bars at all times
- Racing on the highway is prohibited except in events approved by legal authorities
- • Parked bicycles shall conform to the provisions of Stopping, Standing, and Parking of Vehicles.
- Children under the age of 8 may not operate an e-bike
- • Children between the ages of 8 and 15 must be supervised by a parent or guardian when operating an e-bike
- Vehicles may not travel or stop in bike lanes, except briefly to make a turning movement.
- Signal for at least 2 seconds before making turn or stop; continuous signaling through a turn or stop is not required



# **SAFETY TIPS FOR VARIOUS BIKE WAYS IN SANDY SANDY SANDY.UTAH.GOV/HIKEBIKETRAILS**





#### **Conventional Bike Lanes Bike Route Bike Route Bike Route Neighborhood Byways**

A conventional bike lane is one that is separated from the main roadway by painted line. When you ride in conventional bike lanes, make sure that you ride in the same direction as traffic, and exercise extreme caution when turning left, either by merging into the traffic lane and turning left like a vehicle, or by turning right and then making a U-Turn using a crosswalk or green bike queue box.

A bike route is where bike riders use the shoulder of the road as their riding space. It is not marked by bicycle paint in the road, but by signs. It is similar to a conventional bike lane but is not specifically marked to be a bike lane. When riding in a bike route, ride in the same direction as traffic, be cautious turning left, and make sure to follow traffic signs and signals.



#### **Shared Roadways**

Shared roadways are roadways shared by both bicycles and motor vehicles. When riding in a shared roadway, be extra cautious to watch for turning traffic. Make sure especially to watch for vehicles turning left so that they don't turn in front of you. Additionally, make sure to ride in the same direction as traffic, be cautious when making a left turn yourself, and remember to follow traffic signs and signals.



#### **Buffered Bike Lanes**

Buffered bike lanes are similar to conventional bike lanes but instead of only one solid line, the road is marked to provide a buffer between the roadway and the bikelane. When using a buffered bike lane, follow the same rules as conventional bike lanes by riding in the same direction as traffic, being cautious when making a left turn, and making sure to follow traffic signs and signals.



Neighborhood Byways are not marked by signs or paint, but are mapped. They provide connections through neighborhoods and between other bikeways. They function like shared roadways but without the lane markings. When using a neighborhood byway, ride in the same direction as traffic, be cautious when making a left turn, and make sure to follow traffic signs and signals.

#### **Additional Safety Tips**

It is usually safer to ride on the street than on the sidewalk.

Watch for turning traffic, and be extra cautious when you make a left-hand turn. Remember to use your turn signals.

When riding next to parked vehicles, avoid the car-door zone (3 ft extending from the vehicle to avoid being hit by a car door.)

#### **What to do if you crash**

1. If you are in serious pain, be careful not to move more than necessary; you could cause further injury to yourself. Injured people commonly suffer from shock, which is a loss of blood flow to vital organs. Lay the person down and elevate the legs and feet slightly, unless there is a leg injury. Keep the person still and don't move him/ her unless necessary. Loosen tight clothing and, if needed, cover the person with a blanket to prevent chilling. Don't let the person eat or drink anything.

2. If you think your injuries could be serious, particularly with a broken bone, concussion, bad scrapes or cuts, call 911, or ask someone to call for you, and consider going to the hospital. Wash scrapes and cuts with clean water and soap or alcohol, and get first aid or medical advice on injuries.

3. Document everything. If the crash involves a moving car, be sure to get the driver's contact information, license plate number, and insurance info. You may be able to file a claim against your own auto insurance policy, as well as seek coverage from your own health insurer if the other driver's policy will not cover your injuries and damages.

# **Traffic Calming**



# SUMMARY

To address potential pedestrian and motorist conflicts the City Transportation Engineer will quantify the problem with a traffic study. The study provides 24-hour traffic volumes and speed data that includes volumes, average speeds, and the speeds of the 85<sup>th</sup> percentile of the motorists. The Transportation Engineer will than calculate a severity score and if qualified for calming improvements, prioritize it for traffic calming measures.

# BACKGROUND

With the arrival of the warm summer weather, there is an increase in pedestrians and bicyclists outside enjoying the fresh air. This increase in non-motorized traffic creates potential conflicts with motorists. In residential areas this becomes particularly problematic since both the pedestrian and motorist believe the road belongs to 'them'. As a result of this conflict, the city receives many requests for traffic calming measures in residential areas.

# THE FACTS

- Sandy City has found that driver feedback signs (radar boards) and flashing beacons are very effective tools in reducing vehicle speeds. After installation a follow-up traffic study is conducted. Historically the new data has shown a marked decrease in average speeds.
- Motorist warning signs such as 'Children at Play', 'Deaf Child', 'Blind Child', 'Autistic Child' or any similar type sign are not recognized by the Federal Highway Administration as official traffic control signs, therefore Sandy City does not use this type of sign. Drivers should always expect the presence of children in residential areas. Signs that attempt to warn motorists of normal conditions, or conditions that are

not always present, fail to achieve the desired safety benefits. There is no evidence that these signs prevent accidents or reduce the speed of vehicles. Additionally, these signs create a false sense of security for parents and children who believe the signs provide an added degree of protection when motorists actually pay little or no attention to them.

• Speed humps provide a false sense of traffic calming. While speed humps slow down vehicles immediately at the hump, Sandy City has found that drivers will travel at a higher rate of speed in-between the humps. For any positive effect to counter that, humps would need to be installed every 200 feet, but this is not feasible because the humps will then significantly slow emergency response times. A single hump can increase emergency response time by 4 to 8 seconds. Multiple humps have the potential to add minutes to the response. An Austin, Texas, study showed an additional 37 cardiac arrest patients would die each year in Austin if emergency vehicles were delayed just 30 seconds by traffic calming speed humps. Additionally, speed humps can be problematic for snow removal, damaging equipment and slowing removal.



Observations:

o As the variability between the Posted Speed Limit, Average Speed, and 85th Percentile Speed, increases, the Severity Rating also increases.

o A Speed Score below zero means that the Average Speed and/or 85th Percentile Speed were less than the Posted Speed Limit.

o Warrant and Watch Lines are calculated with a formula that uses the variability between Posted Speed Limit, Average Speed, and 85th Percentile Speed, and then factors in Volume. As DFS's are installed and funding fluctuates, the Warrant and Speed lines are adjusted.

May 2018 Update



# **Choker**

#### **Description:**

- Curb extension is a lateral horizontal extension of the sidewalk into the street, resulting in a narrower roadway section
- If located at an intersection, it is called a corner extension or a bulb-out
- If located midblock, it is referred to as a choker
- Narrowing of a roadway through the use of curb extensions or roadside islands

#### **Applications:**

- Can be created by a pair of curb extensions, often landscaped
- Encourages lower travel speeds by reducing motorist margin of error
- One-lane choker forces two-way traffic to take turns going through the pinch point
- If the pinch point is angled relative to the roadway, it is called an angled choker
- Can be located at any spacing desired
- May be suitable for a mid-block crosswalk
- Appropriate for arterials, collectors, or local streets





(Source: City of An Arbor, Michigan) (Source: Delaware DOT)

#### *ITE/FHWA Traffic Calming EPrimer:* https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/traffic\_calm.cfm

#### **Design/Installation Issues:**

- Only applicable for mid-block locations
- Can be used on a one-lane one-way and two-lane two-way street
- Most easily installed on a closed-section road (i.e. curb and gutter)
- Applicable with or without dedicated bicycle facilities
- Applicable on streets with, and can protect, on-street parking
- Appropriate for any speed limit
- Appropriate along bus routes
- Typical width of 6 to 8 feet; offset from through traffic by approximately 1.5 feet
- Locations near streetlights are preferable
- Length of choker island should be at least 20 feet

#### **Potential Impacts:**

- Encourages lower speeds by funneling it through the pinch point
- Can result in shorter pedestrian crossing distances if a mid-block crossing is provided
- May force bicyclists and motor vehicles to share the travel lane
- May require some parking removal
- May require relocation of drainage features and utilities

#### **Emergency Response Issues:**

• Retains sufficient width for ease of use for emergency vehicles

#### **Typical Cost (2017 dollars):**

• Between \$1,500 and \$20,000, depending on length and width of barriers

May 2018 Update



# **Corner Extension/Bulb-Out**

#### **Description:**

- Horizontal extension of the sidewalk into the street, resulting in a narrower roadway section
- If located at a mid-block location, it is typically called a choker

#### **Applications:**

- When combined with on-street parking, a corner extension can create protected parking bays
- Effective method for narrowing pedestrian crossing distances and increase pedestrian visibility
- Appropriate for arterials, collectors, or local streets
- Can be used on one-way and two-way streets
- Installed only on closed-section roads (i.e. curb and gutter)
- Appropriate for any speed, provided an adequate shy distance is provided between the extension and the travel lane
- Adequate turning radii must be provided to use on bus routes





(Source: James Barrera, Horrocks, New Mexico) (Source: Delaware DOT)

#### *ITE/FHWA Traffic Calming EPrimer:* https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/traffic\_calm.cfm

#### **Design/Installation Issues:**

- Effects on vehicle speeds are limited due to lack of deflection
- Must check drainage due to possible gutter realignment
- Major utility relocation may be required, especially drainage inlets
- Typical width between 6 and 8 feet
- Typical offset from travel lane at least 1.5 feet
- Should not extend into bicycle lanes

#### **Potential Impacts:**

- Effects on vehicle speeds are limited due to lack of deflection
- Can achieve greater speed reduction if combined with vertical deflection
- Smaller curb radii can slow turning vehicles
- Shorter pedestrian crossing distances can improve pedestrian safety
- More pedestrian waiting areas may become available
- May require some parking removal adjacent to intersections

#### **Emergency Response Issues:**

- Retains sufficient width for ease of emergency-vehicle access
- Shortened curb radii may require large turning vehicles to cross centerlines

#### **Typical Cost (2017 dollars):**

• Cost between \$1,500 and \$20,000, depending on length and width of barriers

May 2018 Update



# **Median Island**

#### **Description:**

- Raised island located along the street centerline that narrows the travel lanes at that location
- Also called median diverter, intersection barrier, intersection diverter, and island diverter

#### **Applications:**

- For use on arterial, collector, or local roads
- Can often double as a pedestrian/bicycle refuge islands if a cut in the island is provided along a marked crosswalk, bike facility, or shared-use trail crossing
- If placed through an intersection, considered a median barrier



(Source: Delaware Department of Transportation) (Source: James Barrera, Horrocks, New Mexico)



#### *ITE/FHWA Traffic Calming EPrimer:* https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/traffic\_calm.cfm

#### **Design/Installation Issues:**

- Potential legal issues associated with blocking a public street (e.g., business or emergency access)
- Barriers may consist of landscaped islands, mountable facilities, walls, gates, side-by-side bollards, or any other obstruction that leave an opening smaller than the width of a passenger car
- Can be placed mid-block or on the approach to an intersection
- Typically installed on a closed-section roadway (i.e. curb and gutter)
- Can be applied on roads with or without sidewalks and/or dedicated bicycle facilities
- Maximum appropriate speed limits vary by locale
- Typically not appropriate near sites that attract large combination trucks

#### **Potential Impacts:**

- May impact access to properties adjacent to islands
- No significant impact on vehicle speeds beyond the island
- Little impact on traffic volume diversion
- Safety can be improved without substantially increasing delay
- Shortens pedestrian crossing distances
- Bicyclists may have to share vehicular travel lanes near the island
- May require removal of some on-street parking
- May require relocation of drainage features and utilities

#### **Emergency Response Issues:**

• Appropriate along primary emergency vehicle roads or street that provides access to hospitals/emergency medical services

#### **Typical Cost (2017 dollars):**

• Cost between \$1,500 and \$10,000, depending on length and width of island

May 2018 Update



# **On-Street Parking**

#### **Description:**

- Allocation of paved space to parking
- Narrows road travel lanes and increases side friction to traffic flow
- Can apply on one or both sides of roadway
- Can be either parallel or angled, but parallel is generally preferred for maximized speed reduction

#### **Applications:**

- High likelihood of acceptability for nearly all roadway functional classifications and street functions
- More appropriate in urban or suburban settings
- Can be combined with other traffic calming measures
- Can apply alternating sides of street for chicane effect
- Can combine with curb extensions for protected parking, including landscaping for beautification
- Can apply using time-of-day restrictions to maximize throughput during peak periods
- Can be used on one-way or two-way streets
- Preferable to have a closed-section road (i.e. curb and gutter)
- Appropriate along bus transit routes



(Source: PennDOT Local Technical Assistance Program) (Source: Google Earth, Fort Collins, CO)



#### *ITE/FHWA Traffic Calming EPrimer:* https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/traffic\_calm.cfm

#### **Design/Installation Issues:**

- Appropriate distance needed between travel lane and parking lane
- Impact is directly affected by demand; must have parked vehicles present to be effective
- If used for chicane effect, must verify parking demand to ensure that majority of spaces are occupied when effect is desired most during the day; can use parallel, angled, or combination
- Should not be considered near traffic circles nor roundabouts
- Should not be applied along median island curbs
- For lower-demand locations, can counteract negligible impact with curb extensions or other roadnarrowing features

#### **Potential Impacts:**

- Can be blocked in by snow during plowing operations; required vehicle removal
- May limit road user visibility and sight distance at driveways/alleys/intersections
- Can put bicyclists at risk of colliding with car doors
- May be impacted if other traffic calming measures are considered or implemented
- Provides buffer between moving vehicles and pedestrian facilities

#### **Emergency Response Issues:**

- Preferred by emergency responders to most other traffic calming measures
- Requires consideration of design of parking lanes near hydrants and other emergency features



#### **Typical Cost (2017 dollars):**

• Approximately \$6000 or less (factor of design specifics and length of application); can be much higher

March 2019 Update



# **Roundabout**

#### **Description:**

- Raised islands placed in unsignalized intersections around which traffic circulates
- Approaching motorists yield to motorists already in the intersection
- Requires drivers to slow to a speed that allows them to comfortably maneuver around them
- Different from traffic circles or mini-roundabouts; possible substitute for traffic signal control

#### **Applications:**

- Intersections of arterial and/or collector streets
- One or more entering lanes
- Can be used at intersections with high volumes of large trucks and buses, depending on design





(Source: Grant Kaye) (Source: PennDOT Local Technical Assistance Program)

#### *ITE/FHWA Traffic Calming EPrimer:* https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/traffic\_calm.cfm

#### **Design/Installation:**

- See NCHRP Report 672 for design details
- Design vehicle is determined specifically for each site ranging from emergency vehicles to over size/overweight vehicles
- Typically circular in shape but may be an oval shape
- Key physical elements are center islands, truck aprons, and splitter islands
- Controlled by YIELD signs on all approaches with pedestrian crosswalks, if included, one carlength upstream of YIELD bar
- Key design features include: fastest paths, swept paths, and path alignment
- Large vehicles circulating around the center island for all movements may traverse the apron
- Landscaping needs to be designed to allow adequate sight distance per NCHRP 672
- Preferable to have a closed-section road (i.e. curb and gutter)
- Bicycle facilities, if provided, must be separate from the circulatory roadway with physical barriers; cyclists using the circulatory roadway must merge with vehicles. Bicycle facilities are prohibited in the circulatory roadway to prevent right-hook crashes.

#### **Potential Impacts:**

- Limited impact on access, except for access points immediately adjacent to intersection
- Limited impact on roadways with on-street parking
- May draw additional traffic but with reduced delays and queues

#### **Emergency Response:**

- Appropriate for emergency vehicle routes or streets that provide access to hospitals
- Emergency vehicles may traverse the apron

#### **Typical Cost**

Cost varies widely by site, but is usually comparable to a traffic signal

#### Running head: TRAFFIC CALMING - SPEED HUMPS EFFECT

**Traffic Calming - Speed Humps** 

**Effect on Emergency Response Times** 

Randel R. Jaeger

Des Plaines Fire Department, Des Plaines, Illinois

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#### **CERTIFICATION STATMENT**

I hereby certify that this paper constitutes my own product, that where language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and appropriate credit is given where I have used language, ideas, expressions, or writings of another.

#### Abstract

In the past several years, the City of Des Plaines has received numerous requests from citizens and public officials for the installation of speed humps. They are viewed as the solution to control speeding vehicles and relieve traffic congestion in residential neighborhoods. The public's lack of knowledge of traffic calming methods has led to the requests for speed humps; when other methods may be more appropriate or beneficial to use. Since the City has no formal traffic calming policy, the requests have been denied, even though they may be valid. As more requests are being received, pressure from the public is increasing for their installation. The fire department is concerned that City will begin to approve the use of speed humps, which have a negative effect on fire apparatus response times to emergencies. Through descriptive research, this study identified the purposes for traffic calming and the most popular methods used in the Chicagoland area. The effects traffic calming has on fire apparatus response times were examined along with criteria required to develop a traffic calming policy. Literature review was conducted to better understand the subject. Surveys were conducted of Chicagoland fire departments to ascertain their experience with traffic calming. Interviews were conducted with individuals that have experience with traffic calming in their municipality. The research results concluded that traffic calming is effective and provides the regulations required to reduce the speed of vehicles and cut-through traffic in targeted areas. It also determined that speed humps absolutely effect response time of fire apparatus. The research outlines what a traffic calming policy should include to provide the desired results for all stakeholders and it is recommended that the City of Des Plaines draft a traffic calming policy.

### Traffic Calming 3

#### **Table of Contents**

### Page



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#### Introduction

When a citizen calls 911 with a fire or medical emergency, they expect and deserve a prompt response from the fire department. Most requests are time sensitive and a delay in response may be detrimental to the outcome of the incident. It is the responsibility of the fire department to analyze their response procedures and make them as effective and efficient as possible.

The term "traffic calming" has become the buzzword in the last decade throughout the nation. Speeding vehicles and/or excessive traffic traveling through residential neighborhoods in an attempt to find ways to avoid congested arterial roadways, has citizens in Des Plaines concerned for the safety of their children. For that reason, traffic calming, specifically speed humps, are being requested as a solution to control these issues.

Although traffic calming has been used and accepted in Europe for decades, its use in the United States has been limited. In recent years, the use of traffic calming has become a topic of debate and concern in many communities.

Since the City of Des Plaines has no formal traffic calming policy, the fire department is concerned that the use of traffic calming could cause delays to fire apparatus responding to emergency incidents. A delay in response could result in an undesirable outcome of the emergency and will affect the department's response time performance goals.

Several municipalities in the nation and the Chicagoland area have implemented the use of traffic calming. It appears that some communities have successfully implemented programs with all concerned parties satisfied with the outcome. While
others communities have installed traffic calming in a haphazard process, which seems to have created undesirable results for the citizens in the neighborhood and are problematic to fire department response times.

Using descriptive research practices, the intent of this study is to answer the following questions: (1) for what purposes should traffic calming measures be utilized, (2) what types of traffic calming measures are the most commonly used in the Chicagoland area, (3) what types of traffic calming are the most disruptive to emergency response times of fire apparatus, and (4) what contents should be included in a policy to implement traffic calming measures in the City of Des Plaines?

A survey of fire departments in the Chicagoland area will be conducted to collect data concerning the implementation, use, and the issues of traffic calming used in their communities. Interviews will be performed with individuals responsible for traffic calming within their municipalities to understand their approach and to ascertain what guidelines they used for their decisions to utilize traffic calming. A literature review will be conducted to better understand the use and benefits of traffic calming, the impact on emergency response times of fire apparatus, and any unexpected issues - either positive or negative - that resulted from its use.

In summary, it appears that the public considers traffic calming as a solution to provide safer streets in their neighbors from speeding vehicles and increased traffic. The fire department is concerned about the negative influence speed humps may have upon emergency apparatus response times. The intent of this research is to determine the purpose of traffic calming, when and where it should be used, what methods, if any, are disruptive to emergency response, and what guidelines should be used for the City

of Des Plaines to create a policy that will provide a sound traffic calming program for the community.

# **Background and Significance**

The City of Des Plaines was incorporated in 1835 and is located in the northwest suburbs of Chicago and abuts O'Hare International Airport on its northern border. The City is comprised of manufacturing, office, retail, and residential districts. The City is densely populated with approximately 57,008 people in a 16 square mile area (CityData.com).

Over the past twenty years, the Des Plaines Fire Department (DPFD) has experienced a dramatic increase in emergency responses primarily due to emergency medical requests. The number is expected to increase in the future due to the aging baby boomers and an expected increase in population in the city over the next twenty years. As noted in the DPFD Annual Report (2007), In 2003, the fire department responded to a total of 6681 emergency calls, of which 4790 were medical requests, compared to 2007, when total emergency response were 7648 calls, of which 5038 were medical requests (p. 14).

The City of Des Plaines established in 1989, the Staff Traffic Advisory Committee (STAC). The purpose of STAC is to review traffic and parking issues within the City and make recommendations to correct any and all issues pertaining to those matters. The membership of STAC is made up of the Director of Engineering (Chairman), Police Chief, Fire Chief, Director of Public Works, and the City Attorney.

In recent years, STAC has received numerous requests from citizens and public officials for the installation of speed humps throughout the City. It is apparent to the

#### Traffic Calming 7

members of STAC that the public's lack of knowledge of other types of traffic calming measures available has led to the increased requests for speed humps, in which case, other types of traffic calming methods may be more appropriate or beneficial to use.

To further complicate the issue is the limited knowledge that STAC members have concerning traffic calming and the lack of guidance they have to make decisions to employ its use. STAC is reluctant to suggest traffic calming measures even though the request may be valid. This is due in part, to the City not having a traffic calming policy in place. However, in two areas of the City, STAC has recommended and approved the use of lane striping in an attempt to reduce vehicle speeds on an experimental basis.

As more requests are being received by STAC for speed humps, pressure from the community is increasing for their installation. Since the fire department has only one vote on the STAC committee, the fire department is concerned that STAC will begin to approve the use of speed humps and other traffic calming methods without analyzing the impact they may have upon fire apparatus response times.

The fire department agrees that in certain instances traffic calming measures could be beneficial. The fire department would like STAC to develop a comprehensive traffic calming policy that will address all aspects of the issues and are not detrimental to the response times of fire apparatus.

In 2005, the City of Des Plaines contracted with Emergency Services Consultants Incorporated (ESCI) to perform a study that would analyze current staffing, apparatus, and fire station locations based upon a response objective of six minutes or less to ninety percent of all emergency requests.

In 2006, ESCI issued their report, Des Plaines Fire Department Deployment Study, and recommended five different scenarios that offered various solutions and costs in an attempt to achieve the desired response time objectives. The fire department staff recommended to the City Council, one of the five recommended solutions to utilize. Currently, the fire department response time performance is six minutes or less to seventy-four percent of all calls and the proposed solution estimated an achievable response time of six minutes or less to eighty-three percent of all calls (Kouwe, 2006, p. 89).

Another concern to the fire department is the amount of rail and motor vehicle traffic within the city limits. There are three major rail lines that dissect the City of Des Plaines. All three handle a large volume of the rail traffic that enters the Chicagoland area. This accounts for thirty-two active at grade rail crossings located within the Des. Plaines community. Fire apparatus regularly experiences time delays caused by rail traffic.

The ESCI study confirmed the anticipated increase in rail traffic in the coming years and the associated projected delays to vehicular traffic. Specifically stated was "the City's fire department experiences a total of 2,476 minutes of delay annually, a figure that is equivalent to over forty-one hours of annual delay" (Kouwe, 2006, p. 64). The study further projects that by the year 2020, "the City's fire department will experience a total of 5,519 minutes of response delay annually, a figure equivalent to over ninety-two hours of delay annually" (Kouwe, 2006, p. 64).

Motor vehicle traffic congestion experienced in the City of Des Plaines is also a concern of the fire department. Two major Interstate Highways I-94 and I-294 both

travel through the City, as does state routes, 12, 14, 45, 58, and 83. Traffic congestion within the City of Des Plaines is becoming unbearable which is also adding to the fire department concerns with response times.

The fire department has made some conscious efforts to counteract response time delays due to increased traffic congestion. Over the past 15 years, traffic preemptive devices (opti-com) have been installed throughout the City on most traffic signals and the last few are scheduled to be completed at the end of 2008. This system allows fire apparatus, equipped with the emitters, to control traffic signals that they are approaching. This turns the light green in the direction of travel and clears the intersection of traffic prior to the fire apparatus entering the crossing. This increases safety at the intersection for motorist and pedestrians. It also allows the responding fire apparatus to proceed through the intersection at a reasonable rate of speed, which results in an improved response times.

The significance of this research project to the Des Plaines Fire Department is clear. Since the fire apparatus are already experiencing unreasonable response time delays due to rail traffic and motor vehicle congestion, the possibility of compounding that delay by using inappropriate traffic calming is inconceivable. If traffic calming measures are going to be approved by STAC for the Des Plaines community, it is imperative that the type of methods used will have no impact or be the least disruptive to the response times of fire apparatus responding to emergencies. Furthermore, the City of Des Plaines should benefit by the development of a comprehensive traffic calming policy, which should address all of issues of concerned parties.

This study directly relates to and supports the USFA operational objective, to promote within the community a comprehensive, multihazard, risk reduction plan, and responding in a timely manner to emerging issues.

# Literature Review

Traffic calming encompasses many different methods and can incorporate various types of devices in an effort to provide safer streets for pedestrians and motorists. Traffic calming has been defined by a subcommittee of the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) as "Traffic calming is the combination of mainly physical measures that reduce the negative effects of motor vehicle use, alter driver behavior, and improve conditions for non-motorized street users" (Ewing, 1997, p. 2). Furthermore, "Traffic calming measures rely on the laws of physics rather than human psychology to slow down traffic" (Ewing, 1997, p. 3).

In the City of Des Plaines, the majority of requests for speed humps come from citizens concerned about motorized vehicles exceeding the posted speed limit in their residential neighborhoods. Many citizens are taking a proactive stance rather than a reactive one regarding traffic calming. This was noted by Noyes & Associates:

Traffic calming addresses the too many cars, going too fast past my house, concern expressed by an increasing number of residents. This concern includes the blatant disregard for posted speed limits on residential streets, drivers diverting off congested arterial streets onto neighborhood streets; safety concerns associated with speed and cut-through traffic issues; environmental impacts of speed and volume (primarily noise); and the desire to address these issues in a manner that will improve neighborhood quality of life (1998, p. 1).

However, traffic calming is not limited to residential neighborhoods. In the United States, roads are generally classified as arterials, collectors, and local streets. "Area wide traffic calming schemes seek to calm both main roads and the residential roads in areas so as to ameliorate the impact of any traffic transfer as a consequence of traffic calming" (Siu, 2002, ¶1.4).

It is important to note that traffic calming differs from traffic regulations. "Traffic control devices, notably stop signs and speed limit signs, are regulatory measures that require enforcement. By contrast, traffic calming measures are intended to be selfenforcing" (Ewing, 1999, p. 2).

There are usually several issues of concern that evoke a request for traffic calming. Speeding vehicles racing down local streets, traffic cutting through neighborhoods attempting to avoid traffic congestion on arterials that cannot handle the traffic demand or to circumvent construction areas, and traffic collision reduction. Depending upon the climate in the area some of those issues are cyclical. According to Beaubien (1998) "the Northern Hemisphere climates will automatically see a reduction in speeding vehicles on local street because of the winter months between November and March" (p. 4)

Once a traffic issue is identified and analyzed, then a course of action can be considered. There are three major categories of traffic calming measures used to control speed; vertical measures, horizontal measures, and narrowing or the perception of narrowing of the roadway (Ewing, 1999, p.31).

"Vertical deflections include raised crosswalks, raised intersections, sidewalk extensions, speed humps and tables, and textured crosswalks. Reducing traffic speed

is a more likely result of vertical deflections than is a reduction of traffic volume" (American Public Works Association [APWA], 2007, p. 11). Horizontal deflections causes a driver to reduce speed by limiting the driver's line of sight and making them steer around horizontal curves. Horizontal deflections include; chicanes traffic circles, and curb extensions. (APWA, 2007, p.21).

Narrowing of roadways cause a driver to reduce speed because of the perceived limited area they create for the vehicle and distractions they cause to the human senses usually caused by "plantings, street furniture, or other vertical elements to draw attention to the constriction and visual bound space" (Ewing, 1999, p.39).

By far the most common type of traffic calming is the speed hump. Ewing and Kooshiam (2008) found "The predominance of speed humps, as traffic calming measures, is confirmed by a recent ITE survey in which 84 of 165 responding agency's throughout North America, indicated their use of humps" (p. 4). Speed humps are easily installed, cost effective, and are proven to cause a reduction in speed to vehicles approaching and traveling over the device. The most common speed hump is usually 12 feet in length and 3 to 4 inches tall with a rounded, flat, or parabolic shaped top (Johnson & Nedzesky, 2004). This is most commonly installed on residential streets and is intended to maintain the speed of vehicles within the 15 to 25 MPH range. A survey conducted by McCourt (1998), indicated that speed humps appear to produce the greatest speed reduction followed by traffic circles and narrowed streets (p. 3). However, "regular repetition of calming devices at 400 ft and 600 ft intervals is required to maintain slower speeds along the length of a street" (Walter, 1995, p. 48).

Portland Oregon has successfully tested a program to use speed humps on arterials and collector streets as well as local streets. Oregon law permits fire and emergency vehicles to use any portion of the street they need when responding to an emergency, including using the opposing traffic lanes. The City successfully tested a chicane using two halves of a 22-foot speed hump, separated by a distance that allowed fire vehicles to maneuver around the speed humps and into on-coming traffic (West, 2000, p. 2).

The main public opponent to traffic calming is usually the local fire departments. The trend in the fire service is the adoption of response time performance standards. It is common knowledge in the fire service that an expedient response to fire and medical emergencies increases the successful intervention of services provided.

A study was conducted by the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue, and Emergency Services (1996) where speed humps and traffic circles are commonly used. The results of their research found that, traffic circles caused a delay of 1.3 to 10.7 seconds, 14 foot humps caused delays of 1.0 to 9.4 seconds, and 22 foot humps caused 0.0 to 9.2 seconds of delay for each hump encountered and depending on the length and weight of the apparatus (p. 4). The Phoenix, Arizona Fire Department also had concerns when traffic calming was being introduced into their City. The traffic calming policy that was adopted by the City does not permit the use of traffic calming on arterials and collector streets, or streets that are routinely used by emergency vehicles (Dittberner, 1998, p. 5).

There is another group that is also concerned with traffic calming. Americans Against Traffic Calming (AATC) – is a website produced in Austin, Texas and promotes that citizens from all walks of life put out the call for much needed traffic calming

"reform". This site has many different websites links to people and organizations against the use of traffic calming because of the negative affects it has upon the handicapped, people with medical conditions, and emergency response times (AATC, Website, Homepage).

When a community is looking to implement a traffic calming solution, they must address two basic issues, "Identify the nature and extent of traffic related issue on a given street or in a given area" and "selecting and implementing cost-effective measures for solving identified problems" (Ewing, 1999, p. 17). The City of West Palm Beach identified that traffic calming was an important part of their city's redevelopment plan, which also contributed to a reduction in crimes related to drugs and prostitution. "Slower speeds on streets, increase in pedestrian traffic caused a natural surveillance to occur in the traffic calming areas" (Lockwood, & Stillings, 1998).

There are other devices that can compensate for the negative impact caused by speed humps and should also be considered to some extent when developing a traffic calming program. A study conducted by the Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue, & Emergency Services (1996) stated "Traffic signal preemption devices, the locating of new fire stations, fire vehicle modifications to minimize weight-to-horsepower ratios, securing and cushioning certain pieces of equipment, and improving vehicle suspensions" (p. 5).

Many local police departments are using portable speed trailers, photo radar detectors, and installing red light camera enforcement. All three are becoming very popular to enforce motor vehicle laws (McCourt 1998). In Gwinnett County, Georgia, speed watch programs are being used to enforce speed limits in residential

neighborhoods. This program relies on citizen in a specific neighborhood to work together and enforce speed limits through community effort and peer pressure (Womble, 1990, p.16 & 17).

In summary, traffic calming is self enforcing and provides for pedestrians safety by reducing speeding vehicle and cut-through traffic. Although mainly used on local streets in residential neighborhoods, it can be used on arterials and collector streets as well. Prior to implementing traffic calming, studies should be conducted to validate the need. There are three major categories of traffic calming: vertical measures, horizontal measures, and narrowing of the roadway. By far the most common type of traffic calming is the vertical deflection (speed hump). Fire Departments are concerned that traffic calming will negatively effect emergency response times as illustrated in the study conducted by the Portland Fire Department. Other opponents against traffic calming are the disabled and people with medical conditions that it affects. The use of newer traffic devices and technology can be used in place of traffic calming and/or to compensate for the delays it causes. Requests for traffic calming have to be evaluated and justified prior to the installation of a traffic calming method.

# Procedures

This project began with the author's review of various literature regarding the development and use of traffic calming methods. The literature was obtained through the Learning Resource Center at the National Fire Academy, Des Plaines Public Library, and through extensive searching on the Internet.

A survey was developed and sent to fire chiefs of 50 fire departments in the Chicagoland area via an on-line survey provider, Survey Monkey (see Appendix A).

The questions will attempt to ascertain information needed to answer the research questions (see Appendix B, & C).

This study investigated speed humps used in the neighboring communities of Mt. Prospect and Park Ridge, Illinois. Time studies were not conducted to determine the extent of delay caused, because it was self evident. The speed limit on the street where the tests were conducted is 25 MPH and the speed limit to traverse the speed hump is posted at 15 MPH.

Rather, a test was conducted to determine if fire apparatus could safely drive over the speed humps at the posted speed limits indicated for the hump. A 2005, ford explorer, a 1994, Darley fire engine which weighs 53,000 pounds and carries 750 gallons of water, and a 2000, ford E-450 ambulance were used to drive over the speed humps at the posted speed of 15 MPH on streets with a posted speed limit of 25 MPH.

In the Mt. Prospect test, the vehicles were driven on See Gwun Avenue between Lonnquist and Golf Road. The Park Ridge study was conducted on Meacham Avenue between N.W. Highway and Elm Street.

On Wednesday, October 22, 2008, at 1:45 P.M., Mathew Lawrie, traffic engineer of the Village of Mount Prospect was interviewed. Questions were asked to ascertain the history of traffic calming in his community and the effectiveness of the speed humps installed on See Gwun Avenue (see Appendix D).

On Thursday, October 23, 2008, at 3:15 P.M., Wayne Zingshiem, Director of Public Works of Park Ridge was interviewed. The same questions were asked to determine the history of traffic calming in his community and the issues regarding the speed hump installed on Meacham Avenue.

The same three vehicles used in the Mt. Prospect and Park Ridge experiments were used in the City of Des Plaines to determine if the traffic circle located at Golf Road and Wolf Road had any effective on response times, as well as the lane striping that was installed on Thacker Street between First Street and Wolf Road.

This research project was limited by the author's inability to fully analyze the entire scope of the project. Only speed humps, lane striping, and a traffic circle were evaluated. Since there are so many different methods of traffic calming, this study concentrated on these three because: (a) two of the three, humps and striping, are the most commonly used traffic calming devices in the Chicagoland area and (b) a traffic circle exists in the City of Des Plaines. Many of the other types of traffic calming methods, e.g., chicanes, raised intersections, and roundabouts, were not located in the Chicagoland area so their effects on fire apparatus response could not be analyzed.

### **Results**

Through descriptive research, the results of a survey of fifty fire departments in the Chicagoland area, tests conducted by the author on speed humps, lane striping, and a traffic circle, information and evidence was obtained to answer the research questions.

The results confirmed that traffic calming in the Chicagoland area is primarily used for two reasons: (a) to be a self enforcing traffic regulating method used to control the speed of vehicles and (b) used to discourage drivers from using certain roadways as a cut-through to avoid traffic congestion on major arterials streets. Of the 50 departments surveyed, the results indicated that 19 of the 25 communities that responded to the survey use some form of traffic calming for this purpose.

The research also indicated that traffic calming methods are primarily used on local streets in residential neighborhoods. This is consistent with the research, which indicated that the majority of the requests for traffic calming originated from residents. Mathew Lawrie, traffic engineer for Mt. Prospect, indicated that the majority of the residents on See Gwun Avenue requested speed humps to be installed to reduce cut through traffic and the speeding of vehicles on their street. After the humps were installed, studies were conducted and revealed that there was a 50% displacement of traffic to parallel streets that did not have traffic calming in place and residents found the speed humps to be a nuisance. Within one-year of there installation, an over whelming number of the citizens that requested the speed humps changed there mind and are now requesting that they be removed. The City of Mt. Prospect is in the process of evaluating other traffic calming methods, narrowing of the roadway, e.g., extended curbs, lane striping, and the use of extensive vegetation to replace the speed humps.

Wayne Zingshiem, Public Works Director of Park Ridge confirmed that the majority of the residents living in areas where speed humps were installed requested the installations. Park Ridge is in the process of analyzing their impact on the community.

The traffic circle in the City of Des Plaines is one instance where traffic calming is used on and arterials and collectors streets. This circle has been in place since 1928 and two main arterials converge as well as three collector streets. The survey results indicated that the City of Evanston prohibited the use of traffic calming methods on designated emergency traffic routes. These are paths that are used frequently by

emergency response vehicles and are generally arterial and collector streets or routes to hospitals.

The results of the survey indicated that 68% of the departments who responded to the survey indicated that speed humps and lane striping are the two most common methods of traffic calming used in the Chicagoland area. Curb extensions and raised medians each accounted for 47%, followed by traffic circles at 21%.

The results of this study indicated that speed humps is the most disruptive traffic calming device to emergency apparatus response times in comparison to a traffic circles and lane striping. In the studies conducted, the ford explorer could safely travel over the speed hump at the posted indicated speed limit of 15 MPH, however, there was some minor discomfort to the vehicle occupants and loose objects in the back of the vehicle were tossed about slightly. The fire engine went over the speed hump at the posted limit, which was much too fast for that size and weight of vehicle. The suspension of the apparatus did not absorb the shock of the hump as expected. This resulted in the driver of the vehicle, who was secured by a three point seatbelt, to experience extreme discomfort. Items in the vehicle that were not secured were tossed about the cab and within the storage compartments. The same results were experienced using the ambulance. On a second attempt at 10 MPH, the engine and ambulance were still affected by the hump to only a slightly less degree. On a third attempt at 5 MPH the engine and ambulance drove over the speed hump and the results were satisfactory and the shock to the driver and apparatus were within acceptable limits.

The research concluded that speed humps will cause fire apparatus response times to increase for two reason, (a) the speed limit of the street is 25 MPH and the posted speed limit to travel over the hump is 15 MPH, and (b) the humps appear to be designed for cars to travel over the hump at the posted speed limit, not for the weight and size of the fire apparatus.

The research as revealed the due to the weight and size of fire apparatus there was increased wear and tear on the vehicles suspension and in extreme circumstances have injured firefighters riding on the vehicles. Two of the survey respondents, Hoffman Estates and the City of Evanston reported severe damage (over \$1,000) to fire apparatus, specifically ladder truck suspension, due to speed humps. The City of Evanston and Village of Mount Prospect each reported one minor injury to personnel who hit their heads on the roof of the apparatus cab due to traveling over a speed hump.

The City of Des Plaines has a traffic circle located on Golf Road that is classified as and arterial roadway. Although this circle creates traffic back-ups during rush hour, studies conducted demonstrated that it had no more of an impact on response times than any other arterial intersection. In fact, when approaching the circle the driver's line of sight to crossing traffic is much better then a typical intersection. All three test vehicles slowed down approaching the circle to 15 MPH and proceed through without any issues. It appears that the traffic circle is a very efficient traffic device. The City of Naperville's survey response indicated their time studies demonstrated that traffic circles have little to no impact on response times in residential areas.

The perception of and the narrowing of roadways appears to be one of the most desired and common methods of traffic calming in the Chicagoland area. The survey results indicated that 65% of communities use lane striping. Since fire department personnel are well acquainted with their communities, this method of traffic calming has little, if any effect, on response times. Tests conducted in Des Plaines with the Explorer, fire engine, and ambulance demonstrated that a driver acquainted with these methods can navigate them without a reduction in the posted speed limit.

What was interesting and also alarming in the survey results was the answer to the question that asked if departments evaluated the effect traffic calming is having on response times. Only 21% of the department's stated they did conduct test compared to 79% that didn't.

Concerning the establishment of a traffic calming policy, the survey indicated that of the 19 communities that use traffic calming, only seven (37%) have a formal traffic calming policy in place. Of those seven, all defined what methods and types of traffic calming devices can be used and also indicated departments within their community that need to be consulted prior to installing a traffic calming method. Six stated who can request traffic calming and where it can be used, five had policies that prioritize requests for the implementation of traffic calming, defined who paid for the study and installation, and what studies needed to be conducted prior to the implementation.

# **Discussion**

Traffic calming is a very complex topic because it touches on so many different and various issues. The human factor is the first, and by far, the most complicated subject of all. Citizens want to feel safe in their neighborhoods. They should not have to worry about their children safety and fear that a speeding vehicle may strike them. Nor should not have to tolerate the increased volume of traffic that is created by cut through traffic in their area because of arterial and collector streets that can't handle the traffic demands of the municipality as noted by Noyes & Associates (1998, p. 1).

Fire departments are concerned with the negative effects certain types of traffic calming methods have on response times, the possible damage to expense apparatus, and possible injury to personnel riding on responding vehicles. This research has demonstrated that speed humps are detrimental to all of the above and are the most widely used in the Chicagoland area. Lane striping appears to cause no time delays.

Concerning traffic circles, the result of this research conflicts with the time studies performed by Portland Bureau of Traffic Management (1996), which indicated fire apparatus, experienced delays of up to a 10.7 seconds. This illustrates that each community must use caution when considering the use of this method and project time studies on the design and size of traffic circle it wishes to use.

Another note of concern speed humps cause is that pertaining to the transportation of the sick and injured. The AATC is very concerned about the methods of traffic calming used and the affects they have on people with spinal and cervical injuries. I would agree with their concerns. Ambulances transporting patients, especially on backboards with suspected back or spinal injuries should avoid streets with speed humps. If that is not possible, the driver should first come to a complete stop prior to the hump and then proceed over at the lowest speed possible.

There is also the issue of how to deal with the requests for traffic calming from the citizens and elected officials. Realistically, there would be no need for such devices if everyone obeyed the posted speed limits and/or waited in traffic. However, such is not the case; hence traffic calming is a man-made problem that will cost citizens throughout the United States that choose to pursue this option, millions of dollars to implement.

It is apparent from the research conducted that for a municipality to successfully implement a traffic calming program, a comprehensive traffic calming policy must be developed prior to implementation. This policy should address all stakeholder concerns and define parameters of the program as noted in the publication, Traffic Calming: "State of the Practice" (Ewing, 1999, p. 17).

Other types of self regulatory devices are starting to appear, such as the police department's use of speed trailers, camera radar, and red light enforcement (McCourt, 1999, p. 5). This is a very effective tool that is being utilized at arterial and collector street intersections to help increase pedestrian safety and reduce the number of accidents. This could become a popular method used for traffic calming in residential neighborhoods in the future that also provides a crime prevention aspect at the same time.

# Recommendations

The research suggests that traffic calming is an issue that many municipalities are or will have to address. Traffic calming can be successfully implemented and provide the desired results if approached in a sensible manner with all stake holders concerns addressed. To provide a successful traffic calming program there has to be both citizen and local government involvement in the development and implementation of a policy.

It is recommended that the City of Des Plaines STAC committee members first educate themselves with all aspects of traffic calming. Once this is accomplished, the committee should draft a policy for traffic calming for the Des Plaines community. Based on the research, the policy should include the following criteria:

- 1. Public education the majority of citizens are not aware of the pros and cons to using traffic calming. Moreover, there is a lack of knowledge of the many different traffic calming methods available. Municipalities should take the time to ensure that their residents understand traffic calming in its entirety.
- 2. Request/Application process their needs to be a formal means to request a traffic study in a designated neighborhood.
- 3. Evaluation process Once an application is received, there must be a formal evaluation process in place to determine if the request is valid. Time and volume studies need to be conducted to demonstrate a need for this type of intervention.
- 4. Approved devices what type of devices will the municipality approve and not approve and the reasons for the decisions. Fire department concerns pertaining to traffic calming methods that are detrimental to response time objectives need to be addressed.
- 5. Installation process a time line for installation needs to be addressed. There may be a need for a prioritization process depending on the funds available, and based on the severity of the need.
- 6. Funding source how is the project going to be funded?

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- 7. Evaluation period is the traffic calming method producing the effects desired?
- 8. Procedure for removal Parameters must be established to address request for the removal of installed traffic calming methods.
- 9. Future development incorporate anticipated traffic calming needs into future City developments.

Once this policy is drafted, it will be extremely important to educate the elected officials and citizens regarding all aspects of the policy. At this time, it is in draft form, meetings should take place to receive input from the elected officials, citizens, business community, and other concerned parties. Once this is completed, the draft policy should be finalized and implemented.

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# Appendix A

# **Fire Departments Surveyed**

**Addision Fire Department** Arlington Heights Fire Department **Aurora Fire Department Bolingbrook Fire Department Buffalo Grove Fire Department Crystal Lake Fire Department** Downers Grove Fire Department **Elgin Fire Department Elk Grove Fire Department** Elk Grove Township Fire Department **Evanston Fire Department** Geneva Fire Department **Glencoe Public Safety Glenview Fire Department Gurnee Fire Department** Hanover Park Fire Department **Highland Park Fire Department Highwood Fire Department Hoffman Estates Fire Department Itasca Fire Protection District Joliet Fire Department** LaGrange Fire Department LaGrange Fire Protection District Libertyville Fire Department **Lincolnwood Fire Department** Lisle Woodridge Fire Protection District Morton Grove Fire Department **Mount Prospect Fire Department Mundelein Fire Department** Naperville Fire Department **Niles Fire Department** North Maine Fire Protection District Northbrook Fire Department Northfield Fire Department Oak Park Fire Department Oaklawn Fire Department **Orland Park Fire Protection District Palatine Fire Department** 

**Palatine Rural Fire Protection District** Park Ridge Fire Department Rolling Meadows Fire Department **Rosemont Public Safety** Saint Charles Fire Department **Schaumburg Fire Department Skokie Fire Department Wheaton Fire Department Wheeling Fire Department Wilmette Fire Department** Winnetka Fire Department **Wood Dale Fire Protection District** 

# Traffic Calming 30

Appendix B

**Survey Questions** 

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# **Traffic Calming- Fire Departments**

#### **Explaining Schiffin**

My name is Randy Jaeger, Fire Chief for the Des Plaines Fire Department in Illinois. Currently, I am enrolled in the Executive Fire Officer Program (EFOP) at the National Fire Academy and I am conducting a survey on traffic calming measures used by municipalities for a research project. The purpose of this research is to: a) analyze the various types of traffic calming methods available and used by municapalities, b) determine if municipalities have traffic calming policies, and c) determine what issues, both positive and negative, that are associated with traffic calming.

The results of this research will also be used by the City of Des Plaines Fire Department to make recommendations to the City's "Staff Traffic Advisory Committee" concerning the use of traffic calming measures within the City.

Your response is highly appreciated and I will forward a copy of the results to you in a timely manner. Please complete this survey no later than August 15, 2008.

Definition of "Traffic Calming" according to the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) - "Traffic calming is the combination of mainly physical measures that reduce the negative effects of motor vehicle use, alter driver behavior, and improve conditions for non-motorized street users". Furthermore, "Traffic calming measures rely on the laws of physics rather than human psychology to slow down traffic".



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# Traffic Calming 37

Appendix C

**Survey Results** 

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#### **Traffic Calming- Fire Departments**







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#### Appendix D

## **Interview Questions**

- 1. For what purpose is traffic calming used in your municipality?
- 2. What types of traffic calming methods is used in your community?
- 3. Did your fire department have input concerning the type of traffic calming used?
- 4. Does the fire department have any issues concerning the traffic calming in place?
- 5. Have studies been performed to determine if traffic calming is having an effect on emergency apparatus response times?
- 6. Does your city have a comprehensive traffic calming policy?
- 7. What does your traffic calming policy include?
- 8. What unanticipated benefits or detriments, if any, have occurred because of traffic calming?

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# Safety Effects of Marked Versus Unmarked Crosswalks at Uncontrolled Locations

Final Report and Recommended Guidelines

FHWA PUBLICATION NUMBER: HRT-04-100 SEPTEMBER 2005







**U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration** 

Research, Development, and Technology Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center 6300 Georgetown Pike McLean, VA 22101-2296



#### **FOREWORD**

The Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety Research Program's overall goal is to increase pedestrian and bicycle safety and mobility. From better crosswalks, sidewalks, and pedestrian technologies to expanding public educational and safety programs, FHWA's Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety Research Program strives to pave the way for a more walkable future. The following document presents the results of a study that examined the safety of pedestrians at uncontrolled crosswalks and provides recommended guidelines for pedestrian crossings. The crosswalk study was part of a large FHWA study, "Evaluation of Pedestrian Facilities," that has produced a number of other documents regarding the safety of pedestrian crossings and the effectiveness of innovative engineering treatments on pedestrian safety. It is hoped that readers also will read the reports documenting the results of the related pedestrian safety studies. The results of this research will be useful to transportation engineers, planners, and safety professionals who are involved in improving pedestrian safety and mobility.

> Michael F. Trentacoste Director, Office of Safety Research and Development

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\*SI is the symbol for the International System of Units. Appropriate rounding should be made to comply with Section 4 of ASTM E380.<br>(Revised March 2003)

# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

# Page





# **LIST OF FIGURES**







# **LIST OF TABLES**



# **CHAPTER 1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION**

<span id="page-89-0"></span>Pedestrians are legitimate users of the transportation system, and they should, therefore, be able to use this system safely and without unreasonable delay (figure 1). Pedestrians have a right to cross roads safely, and planners and engineers have a professional responsibility to plan, design, and install safe and convenient crossing facilities. Pedestrians should be included as design users for all streets.

As a starting point, roads should be designed with the premise that there will be pedestrians, that they must be able to cross the street, and that they must be able to do it safely. The design question is, "How can this task best be accomplished?"

Providing marked crosswalks traditionally has been one measure used in an attempt to facilitate crossings. Such crosswalks commonly are used at uncontrolled locations (i.e., sites not controlled by a traffic signal or stop sign) and sometimes at midblock locations. However, there have been conflicting studies and much controversy regarding the safety effects of marked crosswalks. This study evaluated marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations and offers guidelines for their use.



**Figure 1. Pedestrians have a right to cross the road safely and without unreasonable delay.** 

# **HOW TO USE THIS STUDY**

Marked crosswalks are one tool used to direct pedestrians safely across a street. When considering marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations, the question should not be simply, "Should I provide a marked crosswalk or not?" Instead, the question should be, "Is this an appropriate tool for directing pedestrians across the street?" Regardless of whether marked crosswalks are used, there remains the fundamental obligation to get pedestrians safely across the street.

In most cases, marked crosswalks are best used in combination with other treatments (e.g., curb extensions, raised crossing islands, traffic signals, roadway narrowing, enhanced overhead lighting, traffic calming measures). Marked crosswalks should be one option in a progression of design treatments. If one treatment does not accomplish the task adequately, then move on to the next one. Failure of one

<span id="page-90-0"></span>particular treatment is not a license to give up and do nothing. In all cases, the final design must accomplish the goal of getting pedestrians across the road safely.

#### **WHAT IS THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A CROSSWALK?**

The 2000 *Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance* (Uniform Vehicle Code) (Section 1-112) defines a crosswalk as:  $(1)$ 

- (a) "That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a sidewalk on one side of the roadway, the part of a roadway included within the extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk at right angles to the centerline.
- (b) Any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface."

Thus, a crosswalk at an intersection is defined as the extension of the sidewalk or the shoulder across the intersection, regardless of whether it is marked or not. The only way a crosswalk can exist at a midblock location is if it is marked. Most jurisdictions have crosswalk laws that make it legal for pedestrians to cross the street at any intersection, whether marked or not, unless the pedestrian crossing is specifically prohibited.

According to Section 3B.17 of the *Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices* (MUTCD), crosswalks serve the following purposes: $^{(2)}$ 

"Crosswalk markings provide guidance for pedestrians who are crossing roadways by defining and delineating paths on approaches to and within signalized intersections, and on approaches to other intersections where traffic stops.

Crosswalk markings also serve to alert road users of a pedestrian crossing point across roadways not controlled by traffic signals or STOP signs.

At intersection locations, crosswalk markings legally establish the crosswalk."

The MUTCD also provides guidance on marked crosswalks, including:

- Crosswalk width should not be less than 1.8 meters (m) (6 feet (ft)).
- Crosswalk lines should extend across the full width of the pavement (to discourage diagonal walking between crosswalks).
- Crosswalks should be marked at all intersections that have "substantial conflict between vehicular and pedestrian movements."
- Crosswalk markings should be provided at points of pedestrian concentration, such as at loading islands, midblock pedestrian islands, and/or where pedestrians need assistance in determining the proper place to cross the street.

The MUTCD further states that: "Crosswalk lines should not be used indiscriminately. An engineering study should be performed before they are installed at locations away from traffic signals or STOP signs." <span id="page-91-0"></span>However, the MUTCD does not provide specific guidance relative to the site condition (e.g., traffic volume, pedestrian volume, number of lanes, presence or type of median) where marked crosswalks should or should not be used at uncontrolled locations. Such decisions have historically been left to the judgment of State and local traffic engineers.

Furthermore, practices on where to mark or not mark crosswalks have differed widely among highway agencies, and this has been a controversial topic among researchers, traffic engineers, and pedestrian safety advocates for many years. More specific safety research and guidelines have been needed on where to mark or not mark crosswalks at uncontrolled locations.

Designated marked or unmarked crosswalks are also required to be accessible to wheelchair users if an accessible sidewalk exists. The level of connectivity between pedestrian facilities is directly related to the placement and consistency of street crossings.

#### **Why Are Marked Crosswalks Controversial?**

There has been considerable controversy in the United States about whether marked crosswalks increase or decrease pedestrian safety at crossing locations that are not controlled by a traffic signal or stop sign. Many pedestrians consider marked crosswalks as a tool to enhance pedestrian safety and mobility. They view the markings as proof that they have a right to share the roadway, and in their opinion, the more the better. Many pedestrians do not understand the legal definition of a crosswalk and think that there is no crosswalk unless it is marked. They may also think that a driver can see the crosswalk markings as well as they can, and they assume that it will be safer to cross where drivers can see the white crosswalk lines.

When citizens request the installation of marked crosswalks, some engineers and planners still refer to the 1972 study by Herms as justification for not installing marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations.<sup>(3)</sup> That study found an increased incidence of pedestrian collisions in marked crosswalks, compared to unmarked crosswalks, at 400 uncontrolled intersections in San Diego, CA. Questions have been asked about the validity of that study, and the study results have sometimes been misquoted or misused. Some have misinterpreted the results of that study. The study did not conclude that all marked crosswalks are unsafe, and the study also did not include school crosswalks. A few other studies have also tried to address this issue since the Herms study was completed. Some were not conclusive because of their methodology or sample size problems, while others have fueled the disagreements and confusion on this matter.

Furthermore, most of the previous crosswalk studies have analyzed the overall safety effects of marked crosswalks but did not investigate their effects for various numbers of lanes, traffic volumes, or other roadway features. Like other traffic control devices, crosswalks should not be expected to be equally effective or appropriate under all roadway conditions.

#### **Where Are Crosswalks Typically Installed?**

The practice of where to install crosswalks differs considerably from one jurisdiction to another across the United States, and engineers have been left with using their own judgment (sometimes influenced by political and/or public pressure) in reaching decisions. Some cities have developed their own guidelines on where marked crosswalks should or should not be installed. At a minimum, many cities tend to install marked crosswalks at signalized intersections, particularly in urban areas where there is pedestrian crossing activity. Many jurisdictions also commonly install marked crosswalks at school crossing locations (especially where adult crossing guards are used), and they are more likely to mark crosswalks at intersections controlled by a stop sign. At uncontrolled locations, some agencies rarely, if ever, choose to install marked crosswalks; other agencies install marked crosswalks at selected pedestrian crossing locations, particularly in downtown areas. Some towns and cities have also chosen to supplement selected marked crosswalks with advance overhead or post-mounted pedestrian warning signs, flashing

<span id="page-92-0"></span>lights, "Stop for Pedestrians in Crosswalk" signs mounted at the street centerline (or mounted along the side of the street or overhead), and/or supplemental pavement markings.

# **STUDY PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE**

Many highway agencies routinely mark crosswalks at school crossings and signalized intersections. While questions have been raised concerning marking criteria at these sites, most of the controversy on whether to mark crosswalks has pertained to the many uncontrolled locations in U.S. towns and cities. The purpose of this study was to determine whether marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations are safer than unmarked crosswalks under various traffic and roadway conditions. Another objective was to provide recommendations on how to provide safer crossings for pedestrians. This includes providing assistance to engineers and planners when making decisions on:

- Where marked crosswalks may be installed.
- Where an existing marked crosswalk, by itself, is acceptable.
- Where an existing marked crosswalk should be supplemented with additional improvements.
- Where one or more other engineering treatments (e.g., raised median, traffic signal with pedestrian signal) should be considered instead of having only a marked crosswalk.
- Where marked crosswalks are not appropriate.

The results of this study should not be misused as justification to do nothing to help pedestrians cross streets safely. Instead, pedestrian crossing problems and needs should be identified routinely, and appropriate solutions should be selected to improve pedestrian safety and access. Deciding where to mark or not mark crosswalks is only one consideration in meeting that objective.

This final report is based on a major study for the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) on the safety effects of pedestrian facilities. The report titled, "Safety Effects of Marked versus Unmarked Crosswalks at Uncontrolled Locations: Executive Summary and Recommended Guidelines" also was prepared as a companion document. $(4)$ 

#### **PAST RESEARCH**

Studies of the effects of marked crosswalks have yielded contradictory results. Some studies reported an association of marked crosswalks with an increase in pedestrian crashes. Other studies did not show an elevated collision level associated with marked crosswalks, but instead showed favorable changes. As to the negative findings, assertions were made that marked crosswalks somehow induced incautious behavior on the part of pedestrians, triggered perhaps by what they thought the markings signified. The following paragraphs describe the findings of some of these studies.

#### **Crash Studies**

An early and oft-quoted study in California performed by Herms investigated pedestrian crash risk at marked and unmarked crosswalks.<sup>(3)</sup> This study evaluated pedestrian crashes at 400 intersections where at least 1 crosswalk was painted and another was not. There are thousands of other intersections in San Diego, CA, where neither crosswalk was painted or both were painted, but those were not included in the Herms study. That study rightly emphasizes the difficulty of "maintaining equivalent conditions" in comparing marked and unmarked crosswalks, and lists 12 factors to try to address such difficulties. Since the study was confined to intersections that had one marked and one unmarked crosswalk across the same main thoroughfare, it is not surprising that the vehicle traffic exposure was quite similar between the

marked and unmarked crosswalks. However, pedestrian volume was three times as high on the marked crosswalks as on the unmarked crosswalks. Herms stated:

"Evidence indicates that the poor crash record of marked crosswalks is not due to the crosswalk being marked as much as it is a reflection on the pedestrian's attitude and lack of caution when using the marked crosswalk.<sup> $(3)$ </sup>

The Herms study, however, does not say what evidence the author had in mind regarding incautious pedestrian behavior. No behavioral data was presented. Other authors have advanced similar assertions with regard to pedestrian behavior in marked crosswalks.

One of the issues involved in this crosswalk controversy relates to questions on the warrants used in San Diego, CA, to determine where to paint crosswalks. Specifically, the warrant directive for San Diego (January 15, 1962), established a point system calling for painting crosswalks when: (1) traffic gaps were fewer rather than more numerous; (2) pedestrian volume was high; (3) speed was moderate (not low, not high); and (4) other prevailing factors were present, such as previous crashes. Thus, it is possible that crosswalks may have been more likely to be painted in San Diego, CA, where the conditions were most ripe for pedestrian collisions (compared to sites which were unmarked). This could at least partly explain the increase in pedestrian crashes at marked crosswalks in the Herms study. Furthermore, the city of San Diego did not eliminate the use of marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations based on the results of this study. The study recommended against the indiscriminate use of markings at uncontrolled locations. It should be mentioned that the Herms study did not distinguish whether the results would have differed, for example, for two-lane versus multilane roads, or for low-volume versus high-volume roads.

Gibby et al. later revisited the issue.<sup>(5)</sup> Their report contains a thorough review of the literature and also includes an analysis of pedestrian crashes at 380 highway intersections in California. These intersections were picked after a detailed, multistep selection process in which more than 10,000 intersections were initially considered, and all but 380 were excluded. Their results showed that pedestrian crash rates at these 380 unsignalized intersections were 2 or 3 times higher in marked than in unmarked crosswalks when expressed as crash rates per unit pedestrian-vehicle volume. This study had the advantage of including a relatively large sample of intersections in cities throughout California, which may have minimized any data bias resulting from crosswalk marking criteria. However, it should be mentioned that, as with the Herms study, the Gibby study also did not determine how the results (between marked and unmarked crosswalks) might have differed for two-lane versus multilane roads, and/or for roads with low average daily traffic (ADT) compared to high ADT.

Other studies have been conducted to address this issue. Gurnett described a project to remove painted stripes from some crosswalks following a bad crash experience.<sup>(6)</sup> This was a before-after study of three locations that were selected for crosswalk removal because they had a recent bad crash record. After removing the crosswalks, crashes decreased. Such results do not show the effect of removing the paint, but are very likely the result of the well-known statistical phenomenon of regression to the mean. It is also not clear whether pedestrian crossing volumes may have dropped after the marked crosswalks were removed $(6)$ 

Another study of marked crosswalks at unsignalized intersections was reported by the Los Angeles, CA, County Road Department in July 1967.<sup> $(7)$ </sup> The county reported results of a before-after study of 89 intersections. Painted crosswalks were added at each site, but the basis for selecting those sites was not mentioned. Pedestrian crashes increased from 4 during the before period to 15 in the after period. The before-after design in this study is preferable to a treatment-control model in this instance, and better takes the selection effect into account. All sites that showed crash increases were intersections with an ADT rate above 10,900. Thus, at sites with a lower ADT rate, no change in pedestrian crashes was seen. Also, rear-end collisions increased from 31 to 58 after marked crosswalks were added. The report stated that rear-end collisions increased as traffic volume increased. Nevertheless, the study showed more

<span id="page-94-0"></span>pedestrian crashes after painting the crosswalks than before for the sites with ADT rates above 10,500. The study could have been enhanced by including an analysis of crashes within a comparison group of unpainted sites during the same time period. It is not clear whether pedestrian volumes may have increased at the crosswalks after they were marked. $(7)$ 

In contrast to the studies described above, Tobey et al. reported *reduced* crashes associated with marked crosswalks.(8) They examined crashes at marked and unmarked crosswalks as a function of pedestrian volume (*P*) multiplied by vehicle volume (*V*). When the *P* times *V* product was used as a denominator, crashes at unmarked crosswalks were found to be considerably overrepresented; crashes at marked crosswalks were underrepresented considerably. Communication with the authors indicates that this study included controlled (signalized) as well as uncontrolled crossings. It seems likely, therefore, that more marked crosswalks than unmarked crosswalks were present at controlled crossings, which could at least partially explain the different results compared to other studies. The study methodology was quite useful for determining pedestrian crash risk for a variety of human and locational features. However, the study results were not intended to be used for quantifying the specific safety effects of marked versus unmarked crosswalks for various traffic and roadway situations.<sup>(8)</sup>

In 1996, Ekman conducted an analysis of pedestrian crashes at zebra crossings compared to crossings with traffic signals and also to crossings with no facilities.<sup>(9)</sup> Zebra crossings in Sweden (figure 2) consist of high-visibility crosswalk markings on the roadway, accompanied by zebra crossing signs (figure 3). The study included 6 years of collected pedestrian crash data from crossings in five cities in southern Sweden along with pedestrian counts, traffic volume, and other information for each of the three types of pedestrian crossings.





**Figure 2. A zebra crossing used in Sweden. Figure 3. Sign accompanying zebra crossings in Sweden.** 

The rate of pedestrian crashes was found to be higher (approximately twice as high) at intersections which had zebra crossings, compared to locations that were signalized or had no facilities. Further, pedestrians age 60 and above were most at risk, followed by pedestrians below age 16 (see figure 4). The author also controlled for motor vehicle traffic and found similar results.<sup>(9)</sup>

<span id="page-95-0"></span>

**Figure 4. Pedestrian crash rates for the three crossing types by age group.** 

In a 1999 study involving the relationship between crashes or conflicts and exposure, Ekman and Hyden compared intersections with and without zebra crossings on major streets in the cities of Malmö and Lund, Sweden. Among other conclusions, the study found that "Zebra crossings seem to have higher crash rate than approaches without zebra," and "The increased crash rate for approaches with zebra crossings is only valid on locations where the car flow is larger than 10 cars per hour." Conflict rates were about twice as high with zebra crossings compared to crossings with no control. The authors reported that the dataset did not include enough sites with car exposure greater than 250 cars per hour. The study also found that the positive effects of pedestrian refuge islands "seem to be stronger than the negative effect of zebra crossing, at least in the lower region of car exposure." This finding supports the safety benefit of having a raised pedestrian refuge island at pedestrian crossings.<sup>(10)</sup>

Yagar reported the results of introducing marked crosswalks at 13 Toronto, Canada intersections.<sup>(11)</sup> The basis for selecting the particular intersections was not described. A before-after study was conducted, and it was found that crashes had been increasing during the before period and continued to increase after crosswalks were installed. It is not apparent from the graphs that there was any change in slope associated with the time of painting the crosswalks; it would appear that marking the crosswalks did not have much of an effect on crashes. However, the author points to an increase in tailgating crashes at the intersections after crosswalk painting. He also reports that the increased crashes during the after phase seemed to be entirely explained by an increase in crashes involving out-of-town drivers. Perhaps the increase in crashes by out-of-town motorists was because they were not expecting any change in pedestrian or motorist behavior of the local residents, who may have been more familiar with the new markings. However, no behavioral data was included in the study.

In summary, there are no clear-cut results from the studies reviewed to permit concluding with confidence that either marked or unmarked crosswalks are safer. The selection bias (on where crosswalks are marked) could certainly affect the results of a given study. Units of pedestrian crash experience were also inconsistent from one study to another. Another important question relates to whether analyzing sites

<span id="page-96-0"></span>separately by site type (e.g., two-lane versus multilane road, high volume versus low volume) would produce different results on the safety effects of marked versus unmarked crosswalks.

#### **Behavioral Studies Related to Marked Crosswalks**

In addition to crash-based studies, it is also important to review studies that evaluate the effects of crosswalk marking on pedestrian and motorist behavior. Such review can reveal changes in behavior, which can lead to crashes for different crosswalk conditions. The following paragraphs discuss some of these behavioral studies.

Katz et al. conducted an experimental study of driver and pedestrian interaction when the pedestrian crossed a street.(12) The pedestrians in question were members of the study team, and they crossed a street under a variety of conditions (960 trials). It was found that drivers stop for pedestrians as a function of several variables. Drivers stop more frequently when the vehicle's approach speed is low, when the pedestrian is in a marked crosswalk, when the distance between vehicle and pedestrian is greater rather than less, when pedestrians are in groups, and when the pedestrian does not make eye contact with the driver. Thus, the marked crosswalk is a specific factor in positive driver behavior in this study.

A study by Knoblauch et al. was conducted to determine the effect of crosswalk markings on driver and pedestrian behavior at unsignalized intersections.<sup>(13)</sup> A before-after evaluation of crosswalk markings was conducted at 11 locations in 4 U.S. cities. The observed behaviors included pedestrian crossing location, vehicle speed, driver yielding, and pedestrian crossing behavior. It was found that drivers approach a pedestrian in a crosswalk somewhat more slowly, and that crosswalk usage increases, after markings are installed. No evidence was found indicating that pedestrians are less vigilant in a marked crosswalk. No changes were found in driver yielding or pedestrian assertiveness as a result of adding the marked crosswalk. Marking pedestrian crosswalks at relatively low-speed, low-volume, unsignalized intersections was not found to have any measurable negative effect on pedestrian or motorist behavior at the selected sites (which were all two- or three-lane roads with speed limits of 56 or 64 kilometers per hour (km/h) or 35 or 40 miles per hour (mi/h)).

In a comparison study to the one discussed above, Knoblauch and Raymond conducted a before-after evaluation of pedestrian crosswalk markings in Maryland, Virginia, and Arizona.<sup>(14)</sup> Six sites that had been recently resurfaced were selected. All sites were at uncontrolled intersections with a speed limit of 56 km/h (35 mi/h). The before data were collected after the centerline and edgeline delineations were installed but before the crosswalk was installed. The after data were collected after the crosswalk markings were installed. Speed data were collected under three conditions: no pedestrian present, pedestrian looking, and pedestrian not looking. All pedestrian conditions involved a staged pedestrian. The results indicate a slight reduction in vehicle speed at most, but not all, of the sites. Overall, there was a significant reduction in speed under both the no pedestrian and the pedestrian not looking conditions. (Note: This study and the 2001 behavioral study by Knoblauch et al. mentioned above were both conducted as part of the larger FHWA study conducted in conjunction with the current study described here.)

These studies found pedestrian behavior to be, if anything, slightly better in the presence of marked crosswalks compared to unmarked crosswalks. Certainly the results showed no indication of an increase in reckless or incautious pedestrian behavior associated with marked crosswalks. All of the sites used in the Knoblauch studies were two-lane and three-lane roads, and all had speed limits of 56 or 64 km/h (35 or 40 mi/h). No formal behavioral studies were found which have studied pedestrian and motorist behaviors and conflicts on roads with four or more lanes with and without marked crosswalks. Such multilane situations may pose different types of risks for pedestrians, particularly where high traffic volume exists and/or where vehicle speeds are high.

<span id="page-97-0"></span>Finally, Van Houten studied factors that might cause motorists to yield for pedestrians in marked crosswalks.<sup>(15)</sup> He measured several behaviors at intersections in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, where interventions were introduced sequentially to increase the "vividness" of crosswalks. Researchers added signs, then a stop line, and then amber lights activated by pedestrians and displayed to motorists. The percentage of vehicles stopping when they should increased by up to 50 percent. Conflicts dropped from 50 percent to about 10 percent at one intersection, and from 50 percent to about 25 percent at another. The number of motorists who yielded increased from about 25 percent to 40 percent at one intersection, and from about 35 percent to about 45 percent at another.<sup> $(15)$ </sup>

## **Behavioral Studies Related to Crosswalk Signs and Other Treatments**

The preceding discussion of the literature has dealt primarily with the safety and behavioral effects of marked versus unmarked crosswalks at uncontrolled intersections. Of course, a wide variety of supplemental measures have been used with or without marked crosswalks at pedestrian crossing locations in the United States. Examples of these treatments include:

- Pedestrian warning signs on the approach and/or at the crossing.
- Advance stop lines with supplemental signs (e.g., "Stop Here for Crosswalk").
- Rumble strips on the approaches to the crosswalk.
- Pedestrian crossing pavement stencils on the approach to the crosswalk.
- In-pavement flashing lights (activated by push-button or by automatic pedestrian detectors).
- Flashing beacons.
- Variations of overhead pedestrian crosswalk signs. Such signs may be warning or regulatory and may be illuminated and/or convey a message when activated (examples of such signs are shown in figures  $5-10$ ).
- Crosswalk lighting.
- Raised medians or refuge islands.
- Flat-topped speed humps (sometimes called speed tables) where pedestrians may cross the street on the raised flat top.
- Traffic-calming measures such as curb extensions and lane reductions.
- Various combinations of these and other measures.
- Traffic signals (with pedestrian signals) are sometimes added at pedestrian crossings when warranted.

Numerous research studies have been conducted in the United States and abroad in recent years to evaluate such treatments and/or to summarize research results. Some of these include:

- *A Review of Pedestrian Safety Research in the United States and Abroad.*<sup>(16)</sup>
- *Pedestrian Safety in Sweden* (www.walkinginfo.org/rd/international.htm).<sup>(17)</sup>
- *Research, Development, and Implementation of Pedestrian Safety Facilities in the United Kingdom* ([www.walkinginfo.org/rd/international.htm\).](http://www.walkinginfo.org/) $^{(18)}$  $^{(18)}$  $^{(18)}$
- *Canadian Research on Pedestrian Safety* [\(www.walkinginfo.org/rd/international/htm\).](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)<sup>(19)</sup>
- *Pedestrian Safety in Australia* (www.walkinginfo.org/rd/international.htm).<sup>(20)</sup>
- *Dutch Pedestrian Safety Research Review* ([www.walkinginfo.org/rd/inernational.htm\).](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)<sup>[\(21\)](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)</sup>

In addition to these research summaries, several other documents, which describe a wide range of pedestrian and traffic calming measures, include:

- *Pedestrian Facilities User Guide: Providing Safety and Mobility* ([www.walkinginfo.org/rd/international.htm\).](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)[\(22\)](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)
- *Alternative Treatments for At-Grade Pedestrian Crossings* (http://www.ite.org/bookstore/index.asp).(23)
- *Traffic Calming: State of the Practice* (http://www.ite.org/traffic/tcstate.htm#tcsop).<sup>(24)</sup>

The study described in this report was primarily intended to compare the safety effects of marked versus unmarked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations. It did not focus on evaluating various signs, traffic calming, or other measures and devices. Instead, several companion studies were conducted as part of the larger FHWA effort, which presents evaluation results of innovative devices. These research reports may be found at [www.walkinginfo.org/rd/devices.htm.](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)

<span id="page-99-0"></span>

**Figure 5. High visibility crossing with pedestrian crossing signs in Kirkland, WA.** 



**Figure 7. Overhead crosswalk sign in Clearwater, FL.** 



**Figure 9. Example of overhead crosswalk sign used in Canada.** 



**Figure 6. Experimental pedestrian regulatory sign in Tucson, AZ.** 



**Figure 8. Overhead crosswalk sign in Seattle, WA.** 



**Figure 10. Regulatory pedestrian crossing sign in New York State.** 

**Figures 5–10. Examples of crosswalk signs.(25)**

# **CHAPTER 2. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY**

<span id="page-101-0"></span>For the purpose of assessing pedestrian safety, an ideal study design would involve removing all crosswalks in several test cities, then randomly assigning sites for crosswalk markings and to serve as unmarked control sites. However, due to liability considerations, it would be impossible to get the level of cooperation needed from the cities to conduct such a study. Also, such random assignment of crosswalk marking locations would result in many crosswalks not being marked at the most appropriate locations.

Given such real-world constraints, a treatment and matched comparison site methodology was used to quantify the pedestrian crash risk in marked and unmarked crosswalks. This study design allowed for selection of a large sample of sites in cities throughout the United States where marked crosswalks and similar unmarked comparison sites were available. At intersections, the unmarked crosswalk comparison site was typically the opposite leg of the same intersection as the selected marked crosswalk site. For each marked midblock crosswalk, a nearby midblock *crossing* location was chosen as the comparison site on the same street (usually a block or two away) where pedestrians were observed to cross. (Even though an unmarked midblock crossing is not technically or legally a crosswalk, it was a suitable comparison site for a midblock crosswalk). The selection of a matched comparison site for each crosswalk site (typically on the same route and very near the crosswalk site) helped to control for the effects of vehicle speeds, traffic mix, and a variety of other traffic and roadway features.

A before-after study design was considered impractical because of regression-to-the-mean problems, limited sample sizes of new crosswalk installations, and other factors. A total of 1,000 marked crosswalk sites and 1,000 matched unmarked (comparison) crossing sites in 30 cities across the United States (see figure 11) were selected for analysis. In this study, no attempt was made to actually paint any of the 1,000 unmarked crosswalks to determine any crash effects in a before and after study. Instead, a separate (companion) study was conducted to monitor the effects of marking crosswalks on pedestrian and motorist behaviors. These study results are discussed in chapter 3 of this report.



**Figure 11. Cities and States used for study sample.** 

Test sites were chosen without any prior knowledge of their crash history. School crossings were not included in this study because the presence of crossing guards and/or special school signs and markings could increase the difficulty of quantifying the safety effects of crosswalk markings.

Test sites were selected from the following cities:

- East: Cambridge, MA; Baltimore, MD (city and county); Pittsburgh, PA; Cleveland, OH; Cincinnati, OH.
- Central: Kansas City, MO; Topeka, KS; Milwaukee, WI; Madison, WI; St. Louis, MO (city and county).
- South: Gainesville, FL; Orlando, FL; Winter Park, FL; New Orleans, LA; Raleigh, NC; Durham, NC.
- West: San Francisco, CA; Oakland, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; Portland, OR; Seattle, WA.
- Southwest: Austin, TX; Ft. Worth, TX; Phoenix, AZ; Scottsdale, AZ; Glendale, AZ; Tucson, AZ; Tempe, AZ.

Detailed information was collected at each of the 2,000 sites, including pedestrian crash history (average of 5 years per site), daily pedestrian volume estimates, ADT volume, number of lanes, speed limit, area type, type of median, type and condition of crosswalk marking patterns, location type (midblock or intersection), and other site characteristics. It was recognized that pedestrian crossing volumes would likely be different in marked and unmarked crosswalks. This study design involved collecting pedestrian volume counts at each of the 2,000 sites, and controlled for differences in pedestrian crossing exposure. The study computed pedestrian crashes per million crossings to normalize the crash data for pedestrian crossing volumes, as described below in more detail.

All of the 1,000 marked crosswalks had one of the marking patterns shown in figure 12 (i.e., none had a brick pattern for the crosswalk). Of the 2,000 crosswalks, 1,622 (81.2 percent) were at intersections; the others were at midblock. Very few of the marked crosswalks had any type of supplemental pedestrian warning signs. While not much information currently exists on the safety effects of various types of warning signs (under various conditions), a behavioral evaluation of several innovative signs performed in 2000 by Huang et al. may be found at [www.walkinginfo.org/rd.](http://www.walkinginfo.org/)<sup> $(25)$ </sup> Furthermore, none of the test sites had traffic-calming measures or special pedestrian devices (e.g., in-pavement flashing lights). Estimates of daily pedestrian volumes at each crosswalk site and unmarked comparison site were determined based on pedestrian volume counts at each site, which were expanded to estimated daily pedestrian volume counts based on hourly adjustment factors. Specifically, at each of the 2,000 crossing locations, trained data collectors conducted onsite counts of pedestrian crossings and classified pedestrians by age group based on observations.

<span id="page-103-0"></span>

**Figure 12. Crosswalk marking patterns.** 

Pedestrian counts were collected simultaneously for 1 hour at each of the crosswalk and comparison sites. Full-day (8- to 12-hour) counts were conducted at a sample of the sites and were used to develop adjustment factors by area type (urban, suburban, fringe) and by time of day. The adjustment factors were then used to determine estimated daily pedestrian volumes in a manner similar to that used by many cities and States to expand short-term traffic counts to average annual daily traffic (AADT). Performing the volume counts simultaneously at each crosswalk site and its matched comparison site helped to control for time-related influences on pedestrian exposure. Further details of the data collection methodology are given in appendix A.

# **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

# **Analysis Approach**

This study was structured to address a variety of questions related to crosswalks and pedestrian crashes. The primary analysis question was, "What are the safety effects of marked versus unmarked crosswalks?"

Several other analysis questions needed to be answered as well, including:

- What traffic and roadway features have a significant effect on pedestrian cashes? Specifically, how are pedestrian crashes affected by traffic volume, pedestrian volume, number of lanes, speed limit, presence and types of median, area type, type of crosswalk marking, condition of marked crosswalks, and other factors?
- Do pedestrian crashes differ significantly in different cities and/or regions of the country?
- How does pedestrian crash risk differ by pedestrian age group?

The amount of pedestrian crash data varied somewhat from city to city and averaged approximately 5 years per site (typically from about January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1998). Police crash reports were obtained from each of the cities except for Seattle, WA, (where detailed computerized printouts were obtained for each crash). Crashes were carefully reviewed to assign crash types to ensure accurate matching of the correct location and to determine whether the crash occurred at the crossing location (i.e., at or within 6.1 m (20 ft) of the marked or unmarked crossing of interest).

Standard pedestrian crash typology was used to review police crash reports and determine the appropriate pedestrian crash types (e.g., multiple threat, midblock dartout, intersection dash), as discussed later in this <span id="page-104-0"></span>report. All treatment (crosswalk) and comparison sites were chosen without prior knowledge of crash history. All sites used in this study were intersection or midblock locations with no traffic signals or stop signs on the main road approach (i.e., uncontrolled approaches). This study focused on pedestrian safety and, therefore, data were not collected for vehicle-vehicle or single-vehicle collisions, even though it is recognized that marking crosswalks may increase vehicle stopping, which may also affect other collision types.

The selected analysis techniques were deemed to be appropriate for the type of data in the sample. Due to relatively low numbers of pedestrian crashes at a given site (many sites had zero pedestrian crashes in a 5 year period), Poisson modeling and negative binomial regression were used to analyze the data. Using these analysis techniques allowed determination of statistically valid safety relationships. In fact, there were a total of 229 pedestrian crashes at the 2,000 crossing sites over an average of 5 years per site. This translates to an overall average of one pedestrian crash per crosswalk site every 43.7 years.

While this rate of pedestrian crashes seems small on a per-site basis, it must be understood that many cities have hundreds or thousands of intersections and midblock locations where pedestrians regularly cross the street. Considering that pedestrian collisions with motor vehicles often result in serious injury or death to pedestrians, it is important to better understand what measures can be taken by engineers to improve pedestrian safety under various traffic and roadway conditions.

All analyses of crash rates at marked and unmarked crosswalks took into account traffic volume, pedestrian exposure, and other roadway features (e.g., number of lanes). To supplement the pedestrian crash analysis, a corresponding study was conducted on pedestrian and driver behavior before and after marked crosswalks were installed at selected sites in California, Minnesota, New York, and Virginia, as discussed earlier.<sup> $(13,14)$ </sup>

#### **Statistical Techniques**

The Poisson and negative binomial regression modeling were conducted in two ways in terms of how the comparison sites were handled. These were:

- Including all of the comparison (unmarked) crosswalk sites in one group and all of the treated (marked) crosswalks in another group. In other words, no direct matching of sites was used in the modeling.
- Analyzing 1,000 site pairs; each pair had a marked crosswalk and an unmarked, matched comparison site.

Analyses were conducted using both assumptions to insure that the results were not influenced merely by the manner in which the matching was conducted.

The analyses revealed very similar results using either of the assumptions listed above in terms of:

- The variables found to be significantly related to pedestrian crashes.
- The individual and interaction effects.
- The magnitude of the effects of each traffic and roadway variable on pedestrian crashes, including the effect of marked versus unmarked crosswalks.

<span id="page-105-0"></span>In short, using either analysis approach—grouping comparison sites or using an analysis that matches marked and unmarked sites—produced nearly identical results. The discussion below includes results of both analysis approaches.

## **Estimation of Daily Pedestrian Volume**

At each of the 2,000 crossing sites, at least 1 hour-long count of pedestrian street crossings was conducted. Based on the time of day of the count, an expansion factor was used to compute an approximate pedestrian ADT. At a given observation site,  $i$ , a count  $n_i$  is made of pedestrians crossing the street during some interval of time *Ti*. Now, from a standard pedestrian volume by time of day distribution, the proportion  $p_i$  of daily pedestrian traffic expected during  $T_i$  can be determined. If  $n_i \neq 0$ , an estimate of the daily total pedestrian volume is made by,  $N_i = n_i/p_i$ .

This estimate has the property that if *Ni* was known, then the estimated pedestrian volume during the interval  $T_i$  would be  $N_i p_i = n_i$ , the observed number.

A detailed discussion of how pedestrian ADTs were determined based on short-term pedestrian crossing counts is given in appendix A.

## **Calculation of Pedestrian Crash Rates**

Assuming that motor vehicle volumes, speeds, and other site features remain constant, it is reasonable to expect that the number of pedestrian crashes will increase as the number of pedestrians crossing the street (pedestrian exposure) increases. When comparing sites to see which has the greatest risk of a pedestrian crash, it is necessary to control for the number of pedestrians. The pedestrian crash rate is a more appropriate measure of safety than the total number of pedestrian crashes for comparing the relative safety of marked and unmarked crosswalks, particularly since pedestrian crossing volumes differ at marked and unmarked crosswalks. In this study, crash rates were calculated in terms of crashes per million pedestrian crossings. For example, if an average of 1,000 pedestrians cross an intersection every day, then there will be 365,000 (or 0.365 million) pedestrian crossings in a year. The number of pedestrian crashes in a year is then divided by 0.365 million times the number of years to get the pedestrian crash rate.

#### **Determination of Crash-Related Variables**

The following analysis was conducted to determine which traffic and roadway variables have a significant effect on pedestrian crashes. Table 1 shows some summary values of pedestrian volumes and crashes for marked and unmarked crosswalks categorized by number of lanes.

For each marked crosswalk, a closely matched unmarked comparison site was chosen—usually a nearby site on the same street. Quite often, the comparison site was the opposite approach to the same intersection (on the same road). As a result of this matching, the distributions of site characteristics, including traffic volumes, should be essentially the same for marked and unmarked sites. Pedestrian volumes were recorded at a marked crosswalk and its matched unmarked location at essentially the same time of day and for an equal period of time. Thus, pedestrian volumes were free to vary between marked and unmarked sites but were collected in such a way as to represent equal proportions of expected daily pedestrian traffic at the respective locations.

<span id="page-106-0"></span>

<b>No. of Lanes</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Sites</b>	Ped.	Avg. Ped.	Number of	Avg.
			Vol.*	<b>ADT/site</b>	Ped. Crashes	$Yrs.**$
$\overline{2}$	Marked	456	176,345	387	37	4.81
	Unmarked	458	104,922	229	23	4.81
3 or 4	Marked	401	104,237	260	94	4.59
	Unmarked	395	37,941	96	12	4.60
5 or more	Marked	143	31,266	219	57	4.65
	Unmarked	147	11,955	81	6	4.60
All	Marked	1,000	311,848	312	188	4.70
	Unmarked	1,000	154,818	155	41	4.70

**Table 1. Pedestrian crashes and volumes for marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

\*Ped. Vol. = Sum of the pedestrian ADT at sites within a given grouping (by number of lanes).

\*\*Avg. Yrs. = Average number of years of crash data per site.

The pedestrian ADT per site was 312 at marked crosswalks and 155 at unmarked crosswalks, as shown in table 1. Thus, 66.8 percent of this pedestrian volume occurred at marked crosswalk sites. A total of 229 pedestrian crashes were recorded at these 2,000 sites over a period of roughly 5 years. If marked and unmarked crosswalks were equally safe (or unsafe), then given that 229 crashes occurred, it would be expected that 66.8 percent of them (153 crashes) would have occurred at marked crosswalk sites. This expected number is considerably smaller than the actual number of 188 observed at marked crosswalks. Under the hypothesis of equal safety, and conditional on 229 total crashes, the probability of observing 188 or more crashes at the marked sites can be obtained from the binomial distribution with parameters,  $p = .668$  and  $p = .229$ , as

$$
P(A \ge 188 \mid p, n) = .000002 \tag{1}
$$

Thus, the hypothesis of equal safety across the entire set of sites would be rejected.

On the other hand, there may be subsets defined by various site characteristics where such a hypothesis would not be rejected. For example, consider the first two rows of table 1, which refer to sites on streets having two lanes. At these sites, 62.7 percent of the pedestrian volume occurred on marked crosswalks. Of the 60 crashes that occurred at these sites, 37.6 crashes would be expected at the marked crosswalk sites compared with the observed count of 37. Clearly, the hypothesis of equal safety could not be rejected for this subset of sites. In other words, for the two-lane road sites in the database, there was no significant difference in pedestrian crashes between marked and unmarked crosswalks.

From the rows of table 1 corresponding to three- or four-lane roads and roads with five or more lanes, the observed crash frequencies for the marked crosswalk sites are 94 and 57, respectively. Both totals considerably exceed the expected values of 77.6 and 45.7 based on proportions of pedestrian exposure at these sites. The probabilities of observing values this extreme by chance are:

$$
P(A \ge 94 \mid p_1 = .7324, n_1 = 106) = .0001 \tag{2}
$$

and

$$
P(A \ge 57 | p_2 = .7256, n_2 = 63) = .0005
$$
 (3)

<span id="page-107-0"></span>In the expressions given above, the parameters  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  represent proportions of pedestrian volumes at marked sites adjusted for slight differences in exposure times over which crash data were obtained. These results suggest that, in general, marked crosswalks are less safe than unmarked crosswalks on streets having more than two lanes, but that the two types do not differ significantly on streets with two lanes. Note that the analysis described above did not require adjustment for motor vehicle volume, since matched pairs of marked and unmarked sites typically were selected at or near the same intersection where vehicle volumes were similar.

To investigate the relationship between other factors and combinations of factors on crosswalk pedestrian crashes, generalized linear regression models were fit to the data to predict crashes as functions of these variables. Consider a model based on pedestrian volumes (ADP); traffic volumes (ADT); and two indicator variables, one which indicates one or two travel lanes  $(L_2)$ , and the other which indicates three or four travel lanes  $(L_4)$ . The resulting model has the form

$$
E (\text{Accs}_{i}) = \text{yrs}_{i} e^{\beta_0} (\text{ADP}_{i})^{\beta_1} (\text{ADT}_{i})^{\beta_2} e^{\beta_2 L_{2i}} e^{\beta_2 L_{4i}}
$$
(4)

where  $E$  (Accs<sub>i</sub>) is expected pedestrian crashes at site *i*, yrs<sub>i</sub> is the number of years over which crash data was available for site *i*, and  $\beta_0$ ,  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_4$  are parameters to be estimated. Models of this form were fit to data from marked and unmarked crosswalks separately. The models were fit by maximum likelihood methods using Procedure for General Models (PROC GENMOD) software, as developed by the SAS Institute. Crashes were assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution.



Parameter estimates for these basic models are shown in table 2.

**Table 2. Parameter estimates for basic marked and unmarked crosswalk models.** 

 $*S.E.$  = Standard Error

For marked crosswalks, the results in table 2 show that expected crashes increased to a significant degree with both increasing pedestrian volume and increasing traffic volumes, with a much steeper increase for traffic volume. The lane variables compare two-lane roads with roads having five or more lanes, and three- or four-lane roads with roads having five or more lanes. The two-lane variable is marginally significant, while the three- or four-lane variable is not. The overall lanes effect (not shown) is significant (*p*-value of .0262). In subsequent models, a two-level lanes effect comparing two lanes with three or more is used. This variable is usually significant at a level of about .02.

The results for unmarked crosswalks show the only statistically significant effect to be for pedestrian volume. Thus, expected crashes on unmarked crosswalks increased consistently with increasing pedestrian volumes (at a somewhat higher rate than that at marked crosswalks), but did not change consistently with increasing traffic volumes or with number of lanes. These results suggest that multilane streets with low traffic volumes might represent another subset of the data where marked and unmarked crosswalks might not differ significantly with respect to safety. This issue is addressed in more detail later in the report.
In addition to the variables included in the models presented above, data were available for several other factors potentially associated with crosswalk safety. These included:

- Speed limit.
- Location of crosswalk (intersection or midblock).
- Presence and type of median.
- Type of crosswalk marking (marked only).

Neither speed limit nor crosswalk location (intersection or midblock) had a significant effect in the models for marked or unmarked crosswalk crashes. Initially, three types of medians were compared with no median. These were:

- Raised medians
- Painted medians.
- Two-way left turn lanes.

Several specific types of crosswalks were represented in the data, but the primary comparison came down to a comparison between the standard markings (two parallel lines) versus designs with more markings (e.g., continental or ladder patterns shown in figure 12).

In attempting to estimate these more detailed models, it was also a concern to consider effects due to specific locations (i.e., cities, States, regions) from which the data were obtained since crashes, types of medians and crosswalks, and other variables were not uniformly distributed across these locations. To this end, two sets of regions were identified (North-South and East-Midwest-West), and class variables indicating these regions were included in the models. A second approach was to estimate a model using data from all locations, then to re-estimate the model while omitting the data from each of the eight cities where the most data had been obtained, one step at a time, to see how the estimates changed. These eight cities and the total number of observation sites at each are listed below.

- Seattle,  $WA(204)$ .
- San Francisco, CA (182).
- New Orleans, LA  $(160)$ .
- Milwaukee, WI (136).
- Cleveland, OH (110).
- Cambridge, MA (92).
- $\bullet$  Oakland, CA (90).
- Gainesville, FL (90).

A few iterations of this process resulted in a model for marked crosswalk crashes summarized in table 3. The model for table 3 contains no variable pertaining to crosswalk type, a single variable indicating a raised median as opposed to no median or another median type, and another variable indicating the western region of the country as opposed to the East or Midwest.

In some preliminary models, there was an indication that the crosswalk types with more markings were associated with slightly lower crash rates than the standard type. These results were not consistent across models and became quite nonsignificant when regional variables were included. Similarly, preliminary models indicated that raised medians were marginally better (associated with lower crash rates) than crosswalks having no median or painted medians, while two-way left turn lanes were significantly worse than the other types. With the addition of the East-Midwest-West regional variables, the two-way left turn lane effect became nonsignificant, and the raised median effect became more significant. All of the

two-way left turn lanes in the study sample were in the western region. The two-way left turn lanes did not account for the estimated West effect, however, since this estimate remained virtually unchanged when the data from the two-way left turn lane sites were deleted from the model.

<b>Parameter</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	$S.E.*$	95% Confidence Limits	<i>p</i> -Value
Intercept	$-15.09$	1.65	$(-18.33, -11.86)$	< 0.001
Log (ADP)	.33	.06	(.20, .45)	< 0.001
Log (ADT)	.99		(.65, 1.19)	< 0.001
Two lanes	$-.68$	.26	$(-1.19, -18)$	.0074
Raised median	$-.58$	.27	$(-1.12, -0.04)$	.0338
West region	.77	.19	(.40, 1.14)	< 0.001
Dispersion	l.48	.41	(.85, 2.55)	

**Table 3. Results for a marked crosswalk pedestrian crash model.** 

 $*S.E.$  = Standard Error

The North-South regional variable was not statistically significant. East-to-West effects were modeled as two variables, one comparing West to East, and the other comparing Midwest to East. The West-to-East comparison was significant, while the Midwest-to-East comparison was not. These variables were then collapsed to a single variable contrasting West with Midwest and East combined, which is the form used in the model of table 3. The apparent effect due to the western region was investigated further to see if this effect could be attributed to differing distributions of speed limits and/or numbers of lanes. This did not prove to be the case.

Table 4 shows estimates of the same model parameters on the data subsets obtained by leaving out the data from each of the major cities. In general, the estimates are quite consistent across the subsets. All estimates listed were statistically significant at a .05 level with the exception of the two marked with an asterisk. These were the raised median effects on the datasets that omitted data from New Orleans, LA, and from Milwaukee, WI. The *p*-values for these estimates were .10 and .08, respectively.

Results from the more detailed crash modeling on unmarked crosswalks are presented in tables 5 and 6. In contrast to the results of table 2, table 5 shows that when a variable indicating the presence of a median was included in the model, the effect of traffic volume (ADT) became statistically significant. As with marked crosswalks, various median types were also considered; in this case, a variable indicating a median of any type versus no median was the most relevant characterization. For unmarked crosswalks, the East, Midwest, and West comparisons showed the eastern region to have significantly lower crash rates than either the West or Midwest. Thus, a two-level variable contrasting east with the other two regions was used. The North-South comparison was again not significant.

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<b>Parameters</b>	<b>Estimates on Subsets</b>									
	<b>Seattle</b>	Oakland San <b>New</b>				<b>Cleveland</b>	<b>Gainesville</b>	Cambridge		
		<b>Francisco</b>		<b>Orleans</b>						
Intercept	$-15.16$	$-15.22$	$-15.07$	$-14.91$	$-15.52$	$-14.97$	$-14.99$	$-15.54$		
Log (ADP)	.32	.34	.36	.31	.34	.30	.34	.34		
Log (ADT)	1.01	1.00	.97	.95	1.04	1.00	.98	1.05		
Two lanes	$-.68$	$-.77$	$-.69$	$-.96$	$-.64$	$-.69$	$-.65$	$-.53$		
Raised median	$-.59$	$-.71$	$-.59$	$-.49*$	$-.50*$	$-.60$	$-.58$	$-.60$		
Western region	.86	.75	.58	.87	.71	.77	.70	.70		

**Table 4. Parameter estimates for marked subset models.** 

*\**Not statistically significant at .05 level.

<b>Parameter</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	$S.E.*$	95% Confidence Limits	<i>p</i> -Value
Intercept	$-12.11$	2.59	$(-17.18, -7.04)$	< 0.001
Log (ADP)	.64	.13	(.37, .90)	< 0.001
Log (ADT)	.55	.26	(.04, 1.05)	.0319
Median	$-1.27$	.45	$(-2.14, -0.39)$	.0047
Eastern region	$-1.31$	.48	$(-2.25, -0.38)$	.0060
Dispersion	.18	1.30	(14, 10.23)	

**Table 5. Results for an unmarked crosswalk model.** 

\*S.E. = Standard Error

Table 6 shows the estimates of these model parameters were again consistent across the eight data subsets. The estimates marked with an asterisk (which were not significant at a .05 level) were the ADT effect on the subset with Seattle, WA, data omitted, and the ADT effect and eastern region effects on the subset with New Orleans, LA, data omitted. The *p*-values for these estimates were .06 in each case.



Eastern region  $\vert$  -1.28  $\vert$  -1.23  $\vert$  -1.25  $\vert$  -.93\*  $\vert$  -1.56  $\vert$  -1.29  $\vert$  -1.03  $\vert$  1.03

**Table 6. Parameter estimates for unmarked subset models.** 

*\** Not statistically significant at .05 level.

While the models presented above examine the effects of medians, crosswalk designs, and other factors on pedestrian crashes, the primary factors associated with these crashes were shown to be pedestrian volumes and traffic volumes. Analyses based on the data shown in table 1 indicated no significant difference in the safety of marked and unmarked crosswalks on streets having two or fewer lanes, while marked crosswalks were less safe overall on multilane roads. The models suggest a further examination of multilane roads as a function of varying traffic volumes and the presence of raised medians.

Table 7 shows pedestrian volumes, crashes, and average exposure years for a number of categories defined by number of lanes, traffic volumes, and median type. Using the same approach as for table 1, a marked crosswalk exposure proportion, *pmi*, was computed for category *i*, as

$$
P_{mi} = \frac{X_{mi}}{X_{mi} + X_{umi}}
$$
 (5)

where

$$
X_{mi} = \sum \left( \text{marked pedestrian volume} \right)_s X \text{ years} \tag{6}
$$
  

$$
S=1
$$

where the sum extends over all sites  $(S)$  in category *i*,  $X_{mi}$  is the total exposure for marked crosswalks in category *i*, and *Xumi* is similarly defined as the total exposure for unmarked crosswalks in category *i*.

<b>Lanes</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Traffic Volume</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Sites</b>	<b>Pedestrian</b>	<b>Crashes</b>	Avg.
					<b>Volume</b>		Yrs.*
Two	None	$\leq 8,000$	Marked	248	110,697	15	4.85
			Unmarked	252	67,793	10	4.86
Two	None	> 8,000	Marked	199	62,530	19	4.74
			Unmarked	200	35,957	13	4.75
Multi	No raised	< 3,000	Marked	10	1,446	$\theta$	3.80
	median		Unmarked	13	998	$\theta$	4.08
Multi	No raised	$3,000 - 6,000$	Marked	33	6,382	3	4.58
	median		Unmarked	29	3,298		4.48
Multi	No raised	$6,000 - 9,000$	Marked	37	20,608	$\theta$	4.43
	median		Unmarked	39	5,397	$\overline{2}$	4.49
Multi	No raised	$9,000 - 12,000$	Marked	47	23,024	12	4.87
	median		Unmarked	52	6,721	4	4.90
Multi	No raised	12,000-15,000	Marked	76	20,719	23	4.82
	median		Unmarked	73	7,825	$\overline{2}$	4.79
Multi	No raised	> 15,000	Marked	210	39,835	91	4.57
	median		Unmarked	207	12,700	6	4.57
Multi	With raised	< 9,000	Marked	30	5,024	$\overline{2}$	4.87
	median		Unmarked	23	1,182	$\theta$	4.83
Multi	With raised	9000-15,000	Marked	22	4,924	3	4.18
	median		Unmarked	25	1,671	$\Omega$	4.28
Multi	With raised	> 15,000	Marked	88	16,659	20	4.60
	median		Unmarked	87	11,276	3	4.56

**Table 7. Pedestrian crashes and volumes for marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

\*Avg. Yrs. = Average number of years of crash data per site.

Then conditional on total crashes, *Ni* in category *i*, expected marked crosswalk crashes under the hypothesis of equal safety were estimated as  $\hat{A}_{mi} = N_i p_{mi}$ . The probability under this hypothesis of observing as many or more crashes in marked crosswalks as actually occurred was obtained from the binomial distribution with parameters  $p_i$  and  $N_i$ . Table 8 lists these quantities for the various crosswalk categories.

The results in table 8 suggest that on two-lane roads, multilane roads without raised medians and traffic volumes below 12,000 ADT, and multilane roads having raised medians and traffic volumes below 15,000 ADT, the hypothesis of equal safety for marked and unmarked crosswalks cannot be rejected.

In other words, there was no significant effect of marked versus unmarked crosswalks on pedestrian crashes under the following conditions:

- Two-lane roads.
- Multilane roads without raised medians and with ADTs below 12,000.
- Multilane roads with raised medians and with ADTs below 15,000.

For multilane roads with ADTs above these values, there was a significant increase in pedestrian crashes on roads with marked crosswalks, compared to roads with unmarked crosswalks (after controlling for traffic ADT and pedestrian ADT).

<b>Number of</b>	<b>Median</b>	binomiai probabintits for tategories of marked crosswams. <b>Traffic Volume</b>	$A_m$		$E(A_m)$	$P(a \geq A_m)$
Lanes	<b>Type</b>	(ADT)		$p_m$		
Two		< 8,000	15	.6173	15.43	.6541
Two		> 8,000	19	.6382	20.42	.7631
Multi	Not raised	< 3,000	$\theta$	.6443	$\theta$	
Multi	Not raised	$3,000 - 6,000$	3	.6612	2.64	.8529
Multi	Not raised	$6,000 - 9,000$	0	.7985	1.60	1.00
Multi	Not raised	$9,000 - 12,000$	12	.7741	12.39	.7149
Multi	Not raised	12,000-15,000	23	.7383	18.46	.0242
Multi	Not raised	> 15,000	91	.7535	73.08	.000002
Multi	Raised	< 9,000	$\overline{2}$	.8035	1.61	.6456
Multi	Raised	$9,000 - 15,000$	3	.7500	2.25	.4219
Multi	Raised	> 15,000	20	.5919	13.61	.0041

**Table 8. Crashes, exposure proportions, expected crashes, and binomial probabilities for categories of marked crosswalks.** 

*pm*= Proportion of pedestrian exposure at marked crosswalks.

 $A_m$  = Actual number of pedestrian crashes at the marked crosswalks.

 $E(A_m)$  = Estimated (predicted) number of pedestrian crashes at marked crosswalks.

 $P(a \geq A_m)$  = Binomial probabilities.

#### **Comparisons of Pedestrian Age Distribution Effects**

Each pedestrian in both the crash and exposure samples was classified into one of seven age categories: 12 and under, 13–18, 19–25, 26–35, 36–50, 51–64, and 65 and over. Across the entire set of sites, the two age distributions differed substantially, with a considerably higher proportion of young adults (19– 35) in the exposure sample (compared to other age groups), and a much higher proportion of the oldest age group in the crash sample. The difference was statistically significant,  $\chi^2_{\text{6df}} = 216.86$ ,  $p = .001$ .

The data were then partitioned into four subsets determined by marked or unmarked crosswalks on streets having two lanes or having three or more lanes. The same general pattern of the exposure and crash age distributions tended to hold on the subsets. In particular, the crash distribution tended to always be higher for the oldest pedestrian group. The relatively small sample sizes of crashes in some of the subsets necessitated combining some of the age categories to obtain a valid statistical comparison of the distributions.

**Marked crosswalks on two-lane roads.** There were 33 crashes in this subset. With seven age categories, several cells had expected counts of fewer than five, so the two youngest and the two oldest age groups were combined. It might be noted, however, that 7 of the 33 crashes (21.2 percent) involved pedestrians in the 65-and-over age group, compared to 3.4 percent in the exposure sample. The fivecategory collapsed distributions differed significantly ( $\chi^2_{\text{4df}} = 11.00$ ,  $p = .027$ ). Of the crash-involved pedestrians, 30.3 percent were in the 51-and-over age category, compared to 13.2 percent in the exposure sample.

**Unmarked crosswalks on two-lane roads.** Only 21 pedestrian crashes occurred in this subset. Again, five-category age distributions were used for the statistical test. While the percentage of crash-involved pedestrians in the oldest age category (51 and older) was higher than that of the exposure sample (19.1 percent versus 10.8 percent), the distributions overall did not differ significantly ( $\chi^2 = 4.40$ ,  $p =$ 0.354).

**Marked crosswalks on multilane roads.** Nearly 70 percent of the pedestrian crosswalk crashes occurred in this subset. Comparison of the seven-category age distributions was quite similar to that of the overall samples, with the proportion of young adults being lower in the crash sample and the proportion in the 65+ age group being much higher in the crash sample (18.1 percent versus 2.2 percent. The distributions differed significantly ( $\chi^2_{\text{6df}}$  = 166.88, *p* = .001).

**Unmarked crosswalks on multilane roads.** Only 16 pedestrian crashes occurred at unmarked crosswalks on multilane roads, 6 of which involved pedestrians 51 years old or older. A simple comparison of this age category versus younger pedestrians between the two samples yielded a significant result  $(\chi^2_{\text{1df}} = 18.48, p = .001)$ . There were 37.5 percent of crashes involving pedestrians 51 and older in the crash sample compared with 8.1 percent of this age group in the exposure sample.

The multilane marked crosswalk subset was further subdivided on the basis of traffic volume (ADT). In the subset with ADT < 15,000, there were 39 pedestrian crashes; 10 (25.6 percent) of these involved pedestrians more than 50 years old. Only 13.9 percent of the exposure sample was over 50. A onedegree-of-freedom chi-square test indicated a significant difference  $(\chi^2_{\text{1df}} = 4.51, p = .034)$ .

Lowering the ADT cutoff to 12,000 reduced the size of the crash sample to 15. The percentages of pedestrians over 50 in the two samples were essentially unchanged (26.7 percent versus 13.9 percent), but with the smaller sample size the difference was no longer significant  $(\chi^2_{\text{1df}} = 2.04, p = .1540)$ .

In summary, older pedestrians were more at risk than younger pedestrians on virtually all types of crosswalks. This difference seemed most pronounced for marked crosswalks on multilane roads with high traffic volumes (ADT above 12,000), where crash occurrence was highest.

#### **COMPARISONS OF CROSSWALK CONDITIONS**

Data were collected on the condition of marked crosswalks. Conditions were coded as E (excellent), G (good), F (fair), and P (poor). This variable was entered as a class variable in the model for crashes on marked crosswalks to assess its effect on crashes. The estimated effect was not statistically significant  $(p=.1655)$ .

Furthermore, there is no assurance that the condition of the crosswalk markings was consistent over the data collection period.

#### **Pedestrian Crash Severity on Marked and Unmarked Crosswalks**

Overall, crashes tended to be more severe in marked crosswalks on multilane roads, but sample sizes were too small to draw any firm conclusions in that regard. In particular, there were six fatal crashes in marked crosswalks and none in unmarked crosswalks. The fatal crashes all occurred on multilane roads with traffic volumes greater than 12,000 ADT (5 with ADT > 15,000). Crash severity distributions did not differ significantly between marked and unmarked crosswalks on two-lane roads, based on a  $\chi^2$ -statistic comparing A or B level injury crashes with lesser or no injuries ( $\chi^2_{\text{1df}}$  = .268,  $p$  = .604). Similarly, on multilane roads with ADT < 12,000, the  $\chi^2$ -statistic and *p*-value ( $\chi^2_{1df}$  = .210, *p* = .647) showed no significant difference.

#### **FINAL PEDESTRIAN CRASH PREDICTION MODEL**

Previous models shown in this report used subgroups of the 2,000 crosswalks and modeled marked and unmarked separately. A final model (which incorporates the aforementioned results) also was fitted to all 2,000 crosswalks, and it includes direct correlation or matching of marked and unmarked crosswalks. To

develop the final model form, generalized estimating equations (GEEs) were used, since they provide a practical method to analyze correlated data with reasonable statistical efficiency. PROC GENMOD uses GEE and permits the analysis of correlated data. Another feature of the final model is that the distribution of pedestrian crashes at a crosswalk is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution. The negative binomial is a distribution with an additional parameter (*k*) in the variance function. PROC GENMOD estimates *k* by maximum likelihood. (Refer to McCullagh and Nelder (chapter 11),<sup>(26)</sup> Hilbe,<sup>(27)</sup> or Lawless<sup> $(28)$ </sup> for discussions of the negative binomial distribution.)

The final model is a negative binomial regression model that was fitted with the observed number of pedestrian crashes as the dependent measure. A negative binomial model is an extension of traditional linear models that allows the mean of a population to depend on a linear predictor through a nonlinear link function and allows the response probability distribution to be a negative binomial distribution. PROC GENMOD is capable of performing negative binomial regression GENMOD using GEE methodology. $(29)$ 

The final model uses the observed number of pedestrian crashes at a crosswalk as the dependent measure. The independent measures are estimated average daily pedestrian volume (pedestrian ADT), average daily traffic volume (traffic ADT), an indicator variable for marked crosswalks  $(C_M)$ ; two indicator variables for number of lanes (one that indicates two travel lanes, *L2*; the other indicates three or four travel lanes, L4); and two indicators for median type (no raised median, *Mnone*, and raised median, *Mraised*).

There are two interactions in the model. The first interaction in an interaction between pedestrian ADT and the indicator for marked crosswalk, ADP<sup>\*</sup>*C<sub>M</sub>*. The second interaction in the model is between traffic ADT and the indicator for marked crosswalk, ADT\**CM*.

The linear predictor has the form:

$$
\eta_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1} * ADP_{i} + \beta_{2} * ADT_{i} + \beta_{3} * C_{Mi} + \beta_{4} * L_{2,i} + \beta_{5} * L_{4,i} + \beta_{6} * M_{none,i} + \beta_{7} * M_{raisedi} + \beta_{8} * ADP_{i} * C_{Mi} + \beta_{9} * ADT_{i} * C_{Mi}
$$
\n(7)

where  $\eta_i$  is the linear predictor for site  $i = 1, 2, ..., 2,000$ . The number of years of accident data available for a site is used as an offset.  $\beta_0$ ,  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_9$  are parameters to be estimated. The estimates of the parameters were obtained using PROC GENMOD. Parameter estimates for the final model are shown in table 9.

<b>Parameter</b>		<b>Marked</b>							
	<b>Estimate</b>	$S.E.*$	<i>p</i> -Value						
Constant $(\beta_0)$	$-8.2455$	0.4633	${}< 0.0001$						
ADP $(\beta_1)$	0.0011	0.0004	0.0149						
ADT $(\beta_2)$	0.0000	0.0000	0.7842						
$C_M(\beta_3)$	0.3257	0.3988	0.4141						
$L_2(\beta_4)$	$-0.4786$	0.3180	0.1323						
$L_4(\beta_5)$	0.0053	0.2638	0.9840						
$M_{none}$ ( $\beta_6$ )	0.1541	0.2090	0.4610						
$M_{raised}(\beta_7)$	$-0.5439$	0.3064	0.0759						
ADP* $C_M(\beta_8)$	$-0.0008$	0.0004	0.0780						
ADT* $C_M(\beta_9)$	0.0001	0.0000	0.0016						
Dispersion $*$ $\alpha$ $\Gamma$ $\alpha$ $\beta$ $\alpha$ $\beta$ $\Gamma$ $\beta$	2.1970	0.5898							

**Table 9. Parameter estimates for final model combining marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

\*S.E. = Standard Error

The final model provides a framework to test the hypothesis of whether marked crosswalks have the same expected number of pedestrian crashes in 5 years controlling for the effects of pedestrian ADT, vehicle traffic ADT, number of lanes, and presence of a raised median. Because the interaction between traffic ADT and the indicator for marked crosswalk,  $ADT*C_M(\beta_9)$ , was statistically significant, it was concluded that the presence of a marked crosswalk increases the expected number of pedestrian crashes in 5 years; however, the effect size is dependent on the traffic ADT and number of lanes.

There is also a statistically significant interaction between pedestrian volume and the indicator for marked crosswalk, which was interpreted as the effect size of the presence of a marked crosswalk as dependent on the pedestrian volume. The lane indicator variables compare two lanes with five or more, and three or four lanes with five lanes or more. A two-degrees-of-freedom test for any lane effect has an associated *p*value of 0.1071. The two median variables compare no median with other median, and raised median with other median. A two-degrees-of-freedom test for any median effect has an associated *p*-value of 0.0531. The number of lanes, type of median, pedestrian volume, and ADT are all intracorrelated. This correlation is evidenced by the fact that ADT increases as the number of lanes increases. Also, sites with two lanes do not have a median. The number of lanes was also included in the model and probably is expressed indirectly through ADT and median type. In the final model form, the regional effect was only marginally significant, and including the regional variables (i.e., western versus eastern region) into the model had virtually no influence on the crash effects of the other variables. Thus, the regional variable was not included in the final model.

Further discussion of the final model relative to the goodness-of-fit measures, residuals, and possible biases of multicollinearity is contained in appendix B. In short, the final model was found to be valid and appropriate for the available database. A considerable amount of data exploration was also conducted during the analysis phase of study before developing the final model.

#### **Pedestrian Crash Plots**

The final pedestrian crash prediction model can be illustrated by inputting various values of pedestrian ADT, traffic ADT, number of lanes (two lanes, four lanes, or more), and median type (raised median or no raised median). All values used in the following figures (and in appendix B) are well within the actual distributions of the data sample.

Figures 13 through 17 and the figures in appendix C (figures 45 through 64) all contain plots of response curves based on the final negative binomial prediction model. Each of these graphs shows a solid line for both marked and unmarked locations. For each solid line, there is a dashed line above and below it representing the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent confidence intervals.

The relationship of pedestrian crashes in a 5-year period is shown in figure 13 for a range of pedestrian ADTs for traffic ADT of 5,000 using the final crash prediction model. Notice that there is no difference in predicted pedestrian crashes in marked versus unmarked crosswalks for these conditions.

Plots of pedestrian crashes in a 5-year period from the model are shown for two-lane roads as a function of traffic ADT in figure 14 (where pedestrian ADT =  $300$ ). Note that there is little if any difference in pedestrian crashes between marked and unmarked crosswalks, even for traffic ADTs as high as 15,000. In fact, for marked crosswalks with traffic ADT of 15,000 and 300 pedestrians per day, expected pedestrian crashes are 0.10 per 5 years, or 1 pedestrian crash per 50 years per site.

Figure 15 illustrates the predicted pedestrian crashes for a five-lane pedestrian crossing with no median and a pedestrian ADT of 250. As traffic ADT increases, pedestrian crashes stay relatively consistent on

unmarked crosswalks (approximately 0.10 or less per 5 years). However, on marked crosswalks, pedestrian crashes increase as traffic ADT increases.

Plots of the final model are given for five-lane crosswalks with a raised median in figures 16 and 17. Average pedestrian ADT is plotted versus pedestrian crashes in figure 16 for traffic ADT of 10,000, and there is little difference in pedestrian crashes at marked versus unmarked crosswalks. Note in figure 17, however, that marked crosswalks have an increasingly greater number of pedestrian crashes than unmarked crosswalks, as ADT increases from 15,000 to 50,000.

Two Lanes with No Median

Average Daily Traffic (Motor Vehicle)=5,000



**Figure 13. Predicted pedestrian crashes versus pedestrian ADT for two-lane roads based on the final model.**

Two Lanes with No Median

Average Daily Pedestrian Volume=300



**Figure 14. Predicted pedestrian crashes versus traffic ADT for two-lane roads based on the final model (pedestrian ADT = 300).**

**Five Lanes with No Median** 

Average Daily Pedestrian Volume=250



**Figure 15. Predicted pedestrian crashes versus traffic ADT for five-lane roads (no median) based on the final model.**

**Five Lanes with Median** Average Daily Traffic (Motor Vehicle) = 10,000



**Figure 16. Predicted pedestrian crashes versus pedestrian ADT for five-lane roads (with median) based on the final model.** 



**Figure 17. Predicted pedestrian crashes versus traffic ADT for five-lane roads (with median) based on the final model (pedestrian ADT = 250).** 

**Number of Crashes in 5 Years**

Additional plots of pedestrian crashes using the final crash prediction model are given in appendix C for various combinations of the input variables. Tables of estimated pedestrian crashes per 5-year period are given in appendix D using the final model and inputting various combinations of traffic ADT, pedestrian ADT, numbers of lanes, and median type. Table 10 provides estimated pedestrian crashes for marked and unmarked five-lane crossings with a raised median. For example, from table 10, consider a marked crosswalk on a five-lane road (with a raised median) with 150 pedestrian crossings per day and a traffic ADT of 28,000. There would be 0.20 expected pedestrian crashes per 5-year period, or 1 pedestrian crash every 25 years, unless a pedestrian crossing improvement (e.g, traffic signals with pedestrian signals if warranted) is installed. In all cases, values of input variables are chosen well within actual ranges of the study database. A detailed discussion of potential pedestrian safety improvements at uncontrolled locations is in chapter 4 of this report.

			<b>Five Lanes with Median</b>									
Average	Average	<b>Unmarked</b>	<b>Unmarked</b>	<b>Unmarked</b>	<b>Marked</b>	<b>Marked</b>	<b>Marked</b>					
<b>Daily</b>	<b>Daily</b>	Lower 95%	<b>Predicted</b>	Upper 95%	Lower 95%	<b>Predicted</b>	<b>Upper 95%</b>					
<b>Pedestrian</b>	<b>Traffic</b>											
<b>Volume</b>	(Motor											
	Vehicle)											
150	9,000	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.11					
150	10,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.12					
150	11,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.12					
150	12,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.13					
150	13,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.14					
150	14,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.15					
150	15,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.15					
150	16,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.16					
150	17,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.17					
150	18,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.18					
150	19,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.11	0.19					
150	20,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.12	0.20					
150	21,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.13	0.21					
150	22,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.13	0.22					
150	23,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.14	0.24					
150	24,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.15	0.25					
150	25,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.16	0.26					
150	26,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.11	0.17	0.28					
150	27,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.12	0.19	0.30					
150	28,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.13	0.20	0.31					
150	29,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.13	0.21	0.33					
150	30,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.14	0.23	0.35					
150	31,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.15	0.24	0.37					
150	32,000	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.26	0.40					
150	33,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.18	0.27	0.42					
150	34,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.19	0.29	0.45					
150	35,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.20	0.31	0.48					
150	36,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.22	0.33	0.51					
150	37,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.23	0.36	0.54					
150	38,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.25	0.38	0.58					
150	39,000	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.27	0.40	0.62					
150	40,000	0.01	0.02	0.07	.028	0.43	0.66					

**Table 10. Estimated number of pedestrian crashes in 5 years based on negative binomial model.** 

#### **CHAPTER 3. STUDY RESULTS**

#### **SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES**

Poisson and negative binomial regression models were fit to pedestrian crash data from marked and unmarked crosswalks. These analyses showed that several factors in addition to crosswalk markings were associated with pedestrian crashes. Traffic and roadway factors found to be related to a greater frequency of pedestrian crashes included higher pedestrian volumes, higher traffic ADT, and a greater number of lanes (i.e., multilane roads with three or more lanes had higher pedestrian crash rates than two-lane roads). For this study, a center two-way left-turn lane was considered to be a travel lane and not a median.

Surprisingly, after controlling for other factors (e.g., pedestrian volume, traffic volume, number of lanes, median type), speed limit was not significantly related to pedestrian crash frequency. Certainly, one would expect that higher vehicle speed would be associated with an increased probability of a pedestrian crash (all else being equal). However, the lack of association between speed limit and pedestrian crashes found in this analysis may be due to the fact that there was not much variation in the range of vehicle speed or speed limit at the study sites (i.e., 93 percent of the study sites had speed limits of 40.2 to 56.3 km/h (25 to 35 mi/h). Another possible explanation, as hypothesized by Garder, is that pedestrians may be more careful when crossing streets with higher speed limits; that is, they may avoid short gaps on highspeed roads, which may minimize the effect of vehicle speed on pedestrian crash rates.<sup>(30)</sup> In terms of speed and crash severity, the analysis showed that speed limits of 56.3 km/h (35 mi/h) and greater were associated with a higher percentage of fatal and type A (serious or incapacitating) injuries (43 percent) compared to sites having lower speed limits (23 percent of the crashes resulting in fatal or type A injuries).

The presence of a raised median or raised crossing island was associated with a significantly lower pedestrian crash rate at multilane sites with both marked and unmarked crosswalks. These results were in basic agreement with a major study by Bowman and Vecellio<sup>(31)</sup> and also a study by Garder<sup>(32)</sup> that found safety benefits for pedestrians due to raised medians and refuge islands, respectively. Furthermore, on multilane roads, medians that were painted (but not raised) and center two-way left-turn lanes did not offer significant safety benefits to pedestrians, compared to multilane roads with no median at all.

There did appear to be some regional effect. Marked and unmarked crosswalks in western U.S. cities had a significantly higher pedestrian crash rate than eastern U.S. cities (after controlling for pedestrian exposure, number of lanes, median type, and other site conditions). The reason(s) for these regional differences in pedestrian crash rate is not known, although it could be related to regional differences in driver and pedestrian behavior, higher vehicle speeds in western cities, differences in pedestrian-related laws or enforcement levels, variations in roadway design features, and/or other factors. However, this effect was only marginally significant in the final crash prediction model, and excluding it from the model had little effect on the model results.

All of the variables related to pedestrian crashes (i.e., pedestrian volume, traffic ADT, number of lanes, existence of median and median type, and region of the country) then were included in the models for determining the effects of marked and unmarked sites. Factors having no significant effect on pedestrian crash rate included: area (e.g., residential, central business district (CBD)), location (i.e., intersection versus midblock), speed limit, traffic operation (one-way or two-way), condition of crosswalk marking (excellent, good, fair, or poor), and crosswalk marking pattern (e.g., parallel lines, ladder type, zebra stripes). One may expect that crosswalk marking condition may not necessarily be related to pedestrian crash rate, since the condition of the markings may have varied over the 5-year analysis period, and the condition of the markings was observed only once. Furthermore, in some regions, the crosswalk markings may be less visible during or after rain or snow storms. It is also recognized, however, that

some agencies may maintain and restripe crosswalks more often than other agencies included in the study sample.

#### **MARKED AND UNMARKED CROSSWALK COMPARISONS**

The results revealed that on two-lane roads, there were no significant differences in pedestrian crashes for marked and unmarked crosswalk sites. In other words, pedestrian safety on two-lane roads was not found to be different, whether the crosswalk was marked or unmarked. This conclusion is based on a sample size of 914 crossing sites on two-lane roads (out of 2,000 total sites). Specifically, binomial comparison of pedestrian crash rates were computed for marked and unmarked sites within subsets by ADT, median type, and number of lanes, as shown in figure 18.

On multilane roads with ADT of 12,000 or less, there were also no differences in pedestrian crash rates between marked and unmarked sites. On multilane roads with no raised medians and ADTs greater than 12,000, sites with marked crosswalks had higher pedestrian crash rates than unmarked crossings. On multilane roads (roads with three to eight lanes) with raised medians and vehicle ADTs greater than 15,000, a significantly higher pedestrian crash rate was associated with marked crosswalk sites compared to unmarked sites.

Best-fit curves for multilane undivided roads were produced for pedestrian crashes (per million pedestrian crossings) at marked and unmarked crosswalks as a function of vehicle volume (ADT), as shown in figure 19. The data points of figure 19 were obtained by aggregating sites into traffic volume categories. Since each marked crosswalk site and its matched comparison (unmarked) site usually had the same traffic volume, each traffic volume category usually contained the same number of marked and unmarked sites (there were a few exceptions). Pedestrian crash rates were computed based on total pedestrian crashes and total pedestrian crossings within each traffic volume category. In figure 19, these rates are plotted at the midpoints of the traffic volume categories. Smooth curves were then fit to the data points. Similar analyses were conducted for multilane divided roads. A final negative binomial model was also developed. The analysis for multilane undivided roads revealed that:

- For traffic volumes (ADTs) of about 10,000 or less, pedestrian crash rates were about the same (i.e., less than 0.25 pedestrian crashes per million pedestrian crossings) between marked and unmarked crosswalks.
- For ADTs greater than 10,000, the pedestrian crash rate for marked crosswalks became increasingly higher as the ADTs increased. The pedestrian crash rate at unmarked crossings increased only slightly as the ADTs increased.



**Type of Crossing**

**Figure 18. Pedestrian crash rate versus type of crossing.** 



**Figure 19. Pedestrian crash rates by traffic volume for multilane crossings with no raised medians—marked versus unmarked crosswalks.** 

Note that each point on the graph in figure 19 represents dozens of sites, that is, all of the sites corresponding to the given ADT group. For example, the data point for marked crosswalks with ADTs greater than 15,000 corresponds to more than 400 sites. All analyses in this study took into account differences in pedestrian crossing volume, traffic volume, and other important site variables.

These results may be somewhat expected. Wide, multilane streets are difficult for many pedestrians to cross, particularly if there is an insufficient number of adequate gaps in traffic due to heavy traffic volume and high vehicle speed. Furthermore, while marked crosswalks in themselves may not increase measurable unsafe pedestrian or motorist behavior (based on the Knoblauch et al. and Knoblauch and Raymond studies<sup> $(13,14)$ </sup>) one possible explanation is that installing a marked crosswalk may increase the number of at-risk pedestrians (particularly children and older adults) who choose to cross at the uncontrolled location instead of at the nearest traffic signal.

The pedestrian crossing counts at the 1,000 marked crosswalks and 1,000 unmarked comparison crossings in this study may partially explain the difference. Overall, 66.1 percent of the observed pedestrians crossed at marked crosswalks, compared to 33.9 percent at unmarked crossings. More than 70 percent of pedestrians under age 12 and above age 64 crossed at marked crosswalks, while about 35 percent of pedestrians in the 19- to 35-year-old range crossed at unmarked crossings, as shown in figure 20. The age group of pedestrians was estimated based on site observation.

An even greater percentage of older adults (81.3 percent) and young children (76.0 percent) chose to cross in marked crosswalks on multilane roads compared to two-lane roads. Thus, installing a marked crosswalk at an already undesirable crossing location (e.g., wide, high-volume street) may increase the chance of a pedestrian crash occurring at such a site if a few at-risk pedestrians are encouraged to cross where other adequate crossing facilities are not provided. This explanation might be evidenced by the many calls to traffic engineers from citizens who state, "Please install a marked crosswalk so that we can cross the dangerous street near our house." Unfortunately, simply installing a marked crosswalk without other more substantial crossing facilities often does not result in the majority of motorists stopping and yielding to pedestrians, contrary to the expectations of many pedestrians.

On three-lane roads (i.e., one lane in each direction with a center two-way left-turn lane), the crash risk was slightly higher for marked crosswalks compared to unmarked crosswalks, but this difference was not significant (based on a sample size of 148 sites).

#### **CRASH TYPES**

The greatest difference in pedestrian crash types that occurred at marked and unmarked crosswalks involved multiple-threat crashes. A multiple-threat crash involves a driver stopping in one lane of a multilane road to permit pedestrians to cross, and an oncoming vehicle (in the same direction) strikes the pedestrian who is crossing in front of the stopped vehicle. This crash type involves both the pedestrian and driver failing to see each other in time to avoid the collision (see figure 21). To avoid multiple-threat collisions, drivers should slow down and look around stopped vehicles in the adjacent travel lane, and pedestrians should stop at the outer edge of a stopped vehicle and look into the oncoming lane for approaching vehicles before stepping into the lane.



**Figure 20. Percentage of pedestrians crossing at marked and unmarked crosswalks by age group and road type.** 

40



**Figure 21. Illustration of multiple-threat pedestrian crash.** 

A total of 17.6 percent (33 out of 188) of the pedestrian crashes in marked crosswalks were classified as multiple threat. None of the 41 pedestrian crashes in unmarked crosswalks was a multiple-threat crash. This finding may be the result of one or more of the following factors:

- Drivers may be more likely to stop and yield to pedestrians in marked crosswalks compared to unmarked crossings, since at least one motorist must stop for a pedestrian to set up a multiple-threat pedestrian collision. Also, pedestrians may be more likely to step out in front of oncoming traffic in a marked crosswalk than at an unmarked location in some instances.
- A second explanation is related to the fact that most of the total pedestrians who are crossing multilane roads are crossing in a marked crosswalk (66.1 percent), as shown earlier in figure 14. Furthermore, of the pedestrian age groups most at risk (the young and the old), an even greater proportion of these pedestrians are choosing to cross multilane roads in marked crosswalks (76 percent and 81.3 percent, respectively).
- Another possible explanation could be that some pedestrians crossing in a marked crosswalk may be less likely to search properly for vehicles (compared to an unmarked crossing) when stepping out past a stopped vehicle and into an adjacent lane (i.e., pedestrians not realizing that they need to search for other oncoming vehicles after one motorist stops for them).

Further research on pedestrian and motorist behavior could help to gain a better understanding of the causes and potential effects of countermeasures (e.g., advance stop lines) related to these crashes. There is also a need to examine the current laws and level of police enforcement (and a possible need for changes in the laws) on motorist responsibility to yield to pedestrians and how these laws differ between States. A distribution of pedestrian crash types, which includes all of the 229 pedestrian collisions at the 2,000 study sites, is shown in figure 22.

Motorists failing to yield (on through movements) represented a large percentage of pedestrian crashes in marked crosswalks (41.5 percent) and unmarked crosswalks (31.7 percent). Likewise, vehicle turn and merge crashes, also generally the fault of the driver, accounted for 19.2 percent (marked crosswalks) and 12.2 percent (unmarked crosswalks) of such crashes (see figure 22). These results indicate a strong need

for improved driver enforcement and education programs that emphasize the importance of yielding or stopping for pedestrians. More pedestrian-friendly roadway designs may also be helpful in reducing such crashes by slowing vehicles, providing pedestrian refuge (e.g., raised medians), and/or better warning to motorists about pedestrian crossings.



**Figure 22. Pedestrian crash types at marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

A substantial proportion of pedestrian crashes involved dartout, dash, and other types of crashes in which the pedestrian stepped or ran in front of an oncoming vehicle at unmarked crosswalks (23 of 41, or 56.1 percent) and a lesser proportion occurred at marked crosswalks (41 of 188, or 21.8 percent). Police officers sometimes unjustifiably assign fault to the pedestrian, which suggests the need for more police training. Specifically, it may be questioned why so many pedestrian crashes were designated by the police officer as "pedestrian fails to yield," since in most States, motorists are required legally to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians who are crossing in marked or unmarked crosswalks. Of course, some State ordinances do specify that pedestrians also bear some responsibility for avoiding a collision by not stepping out into the street directly into the path of an oncoming motorist who is too close to the crosswalk to stop in time to avoid a collision. It is likely that police officers often rely largely on the statement of the motorist (e.g., "the pedestrian ran out in front of me" or "came out of nowhere") in determining fault in such crashes, particularly when the driver was not paying proper attention to the road, the pedestrian is unconscious, and there are no other witnesses at the scene. However, it is also true that a major contributing factor is the unsafe behavior of pedestrians. Dartouts, dashes, and failure of the pedestrians to yield were indicated by police officers as contributing causes in 27.9 percent (64 of 229) of the pedestrian crashes at the study sites. These results are indicative of a need for improved pedestrian educational programs, which is in agreement with recommendations in other important studies related to improving the safety of vulnerable road users.<sup> $(33)$ </sup> Furthermore, speeding drivers often contribute to

dartout crashes, in addition to unsafe pedestrian behaviors. Creating more pedestrian-friendly crossings by including curb extensions, traffic-calming measures, and other features may also be useful in reducing many of these crashes. It should be mentioned that alcohol use by pedestrians and motorists may also contribute to pedestrian crash experience. However, reliable information on alcohol involvement was not available from local crash reports; therefore, such analysis was not possible for this study.

#### **CRASH SEVERITY**

An analysis was conducted to compare pedestrian crash severity on marked and unmarked crosswalks (figure 23). Crash severity did not differ significantly between marked and unmarked crosswalks on twolane roads. On multilane roads, there was evidence of more fatal (type K) and type A injury pedestrian crashes at marked crosswalks compared to unmarked crosswalks, although the sample sizes were too small for statistical reliability. This result probably is due to older pedestrians being more likely than other age groups to walk in marked rather than unmarked crosswalks. Furthermore, older pedestrians are much more likely to sustain fatal and serious injuries than younger pedestrians. As mentioned earlier, speed limits of 56.3 km/h (35 mi/h) and higher were associated with a greater percentage of fatal and/or type A injuries (43 percent), whereas sites with lower speed limits had 23 percent of pedestrian crashes resulting in fatal and/or type A injuries.





#### **LIGHTING AND TIME OF DAY**

Nighttime pedestrian crash percentages were about the same at marked and unmarked crosswalks (approximately 30 percent). In terms of time of day, the percentage of pedestrian crashes in marked crosswalks tended to be higher than for unmarked crosswalks during the morning (6 to 10 a.m.) and afternoon (3 to 7 p.m.) peak periods, but lower in the midday (10 a.m. to 3 p.m.) and evening (7 p.m. to midnight) periods (figure 24). This is probably because pedestrians are more likely to cross in marked crosswalks than in unmarked crossings during peak traffic periods (e.g., walking to and from work) than at other times. As shown in figure 25, little difference is noticeable between pedestrian collisions for marked and unmarked crosswalks with respect to light condition. However, it is apparent that adequate nighttime lighting should be provided at marked crosswalks to enhance the safety of pedestrians crossing at night.



**Figure 24. Distribution of pedestrian collisions by time of day for marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 



**Figure 25. Pedestrian collisions by light condition for marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

#### **AGE EFFECTS**

A separate analysis of pedestrian crashes and crossing volumes by age of pedestrian was conducted (figure 26). For virtually every situation studied, pedestrians age 65 and older were overrepresented in pedestrian crashes compared to their relative crossing volumes. Figures 27–30 show the relative proportion of crashes and exposure for various age groups for marked crosswalks on two-lane and multilane roads. For a given age group, when the proportion of crashes exceeds the proportion of exposure, then crashes are overrepresented; that is, pedestrians in that population group are at greater risk of being in a pedestrian crash than would be expected from their volume alone.

The pedestrian age groups younger than 65 showed no clear increase in crash risk compared to their crossing volumes. One possible reason that young pedestrians were not overly involved in crash occurrences is the fact that many crashes involving young pedestrians (particularly ages 5 to 9) occur on residential streets, whereas this study did not include school crossings; most sites were drawn from collector and arterial streets (where marked crosswalks exist) that are less likely to be frequented by unescorted young children. Also, some of the young children counted in this study were crossing with their parents or other adults, which may have reduced their risk of a crash. Some of the possible reasons that older pedestrians are at greater risk when crossing streets compared to other age groups are that older adults are more likely (as an overall group) than younger pedestrians to have:

- Slower walking speeds (and thus greater exposure time).
- Visual and/or hearing impairments.
- Difficulty in judging the distance and speed of oncoming traffic.
- More difficulty keeping track of vehicles coming from different directions, including turning vehicles.
- Inability to react (e.g., stop, dodge, or run) as quickly as younger pedestrians in order to avoid a collision under emergency conditions.



**Figure 26. Age distribution of pedestrian collisions for marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 



**Figure 27. Two-Lane Roads, Marked Crosswalks. Figure 28. Two-Lane Roads, Unmarked Crosswalks.**





**Figures 27–30. Percentage of crashes and exposure by pedestrian age group and roadway type at uncontrolled marked and unmarked crosswalks.** 

#### **DRIVER AND PEDESTRIAN BEHAVIOR AT CROSSWALKS**

A companion study was conducted by Knoblauch et al. on pedestrian and motorist behavior and on vehicle speed before and after crosswalk installation at sites in Minnesota, New York, and Virginia (on two-lane and three-lane streets) to help gain a better understanding of the effects of marked crosswalks versus unmarked crosswalks.<sup>(13)</sup> The study results revealed that very few motorists stopped or yielded to pedestrians either before or after marked crosswalks were installed. After marked crosswalks were installed, there was a small increase in pedestrian scanning behavior before stepping out into the street. Also, there was approximately a 1.6-km/h (1-mi/h) reduction in vehicle speed after the marked crosswalks were installed.<sup>(13)</sup> These behavioral results tend to contradict the false sense of security claims attributed to marked crosswalks, since observed pedestrian behavior actually improved after marked crosswalks were installed at the study sites. However, measures such as pedestrian awareness and an expectation that motorists will stop for them cannot be collected by field observation alone. **Installing marked crosswalks** or other measures can affect pedestrian level of service if the measures increase the number of motorists who stop and yield to pedestrians. Furthermore, a greater likelihood of motorist stopping can also setup more multiple threat crashes on multilane roads. Future studies using focus groups of pedestrians and questionnaires completed by pedestrians in the field could shed light on such measures.

### **CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Pedestrians are legitimate users of the transportation system, and their needs should be identified routinely —and appropriate solutions selected—to improve pedestrian safety and access. Deciding where to mark crosswalks is only one consideration in meeting that objective.

The study results revealed that under no condition was the presence of a marked crosswalk alone at an uncontrolled location associated with a significantly lower pedestrian crash rate compared to an unmarked crosswalk. Furthermore, on multilane roads with traffic volumes greater than 12,000 vehicles per day, having a marked crosswalk was associated with a higher pedestrian crash rate (after controlling for other) site factors) compared to an unmarked crosswalk. Therefore, adding marked crosswalks alone (i.e., with no engineering, enforcement, or education enhancement) is not expected to reduce pedestrian crashes for any of the conditions included in the study. On many roadways, particularly multilane and high-speed crossing locations, more substantial improvements often are needed for safer pedestrian crossings, such as providing raised medians, installing traffic signals (with pedestrian signals) when warranted, implementing speed-reducing measures, and/or other practices. In addition, development patterns that reduce the speed and number of multilane roads should be encouraged.

Street crossing locations should be routinely reviewed to consider the three following available options:

- 1. No special provisions needed.
- 2. Provide a marked crosswalk alone.
- 3. Install other crossing improvements (with or without a marked crosswalk) to reduce vehicle speeds, shorten the crossing distance, or increase the likelihood of motorists stopping and yielding.

### **GUIDELINES FOR CROSSWALK INSTALLATION**

Marked pedestrian crosswalks may be used to delineate preferred pedestrian paths across roadways under the following conditions:

- At locations with stop signs or traffic signals to direct pedestrians to those crossing locations and to prevent vehicular traffic from blocking the pedestrian path when stopping for a stop sign or red light.
- At nonsignalized street crossing locations in designated school zones. Use of adult crossing guards, school signs and markings, and/or traffic signals with pedestrian signals (when warranted) should be considered in conjunction with the marked crosswalk, as needed.
- At nonsignalized locations where engineering judgment dictates that the number of motor vehicle lanes, pedestrian exposure, average daily traffic (ADT), posted speed limit, and geometry of the location would make the use of specially designated crosswalks desirable for traffic/pedestrian safety and mobility.

Marked crosswalks alone (i.e., without traffic-calming treatments, traffic signals and pedestrian signals when warranted, or other substantial crossing improvement) are insufficient and should not be used under the following conditions:

- Where the speed limit exceeds 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h).
- On a roadway with four or more lanes without a raised median or crossing island that has (or will soon have) an ADT of 12,000 or greater.
- On a roadway with four or more lanes with a raised median or crossing island that has (or soon will have) an ADT of 15,000 or greater.

#### **GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS**

Since sites in this study were confined to those having no traffic signal or stop sign on the main street approaches to the crosswalk, it follows that these results do not apply to crossings controlled by traffic signals, stop or yield signs, traffic-calming treatments, or other devices. These results also do not apply to school crossings, since such sites were purposely excluded from the site selection process.

The results of this study have some clear implications on the placement of marked crosswalks and the design of safer pedestrian crossings at uncontrolled locations.

Pedestrian crashes are relatively rare at uncontrolled pedestrian crossings (1 crash every 43.7 years per site in this study); however, the certainty of injury to the pedestrian and the high likelihood of a severe or fatal injury in a high-speed crash make it critical to provide a pedestrian-friendly transportation network.

Marked crosswalks alone (i.e., without traffic-calming treatments, traffic signals with pedestrian signals when warranted, or other substantial improvement) are not recommended at uncontrolled crossing locations on multilane roads (i.e., four or more lanes) where traffic volume exceeds approximately 12,000 vehicles per day (with no raised medians) or approximately 15,000 ADT (with raised medians that serve as refuge areas). This recommendation is based on the analysis of pedestrian crash experience, as well as exposure data and site conditions described earlier. To add a margin of safety and/or to account for future increases in traffic volume, the authors recommend against installing marked crosswalks alone on twolane roads with ADTs greater than 12,000 or on multilane roads with ADTs greater than 9,000 (with no raised median). This study also recommends against installing marked crosswalks alone on roadways with speed limits higher than 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h) based on the expected increase in driver stopping distance at higher speeds. (Few sites were found for this study having marked crosswalks where speed limits exceeded 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h).) Instead, enhanced crossing treatments (e.g., traffic-calming treatments, traffic and pedestrian signals when warranted, or other substantial improvement) are recommended. Specific recommendations are given in table 11 regarding installation of marked crosswalks and other crossing measures. It is important for motorists to understand their legal responsibility to yield to pedestrians at marked and unmarked crosswalks, which may vary from State to State. Also, pedestrians should use caution when crossing streets, regardless of who has the legal rightof-way, since it is the pedestrian who suffers the most physical injury in a collision with a motor vehicle.

On two-lane roads and lower volume multilane roads (ADTs less than 12,000), marked crosswalks were not found to have any positive or negative effect on pedestrian crash rates at the study sites. Marked crosswalks may encourage pedestrians to cross the street at such sites. However, it is recommended that crosswalks alone (without other crossing enhancements) not be installed at locations that may pose unusual safety risks to pedestrians. Pedestrians should not be encouraged to cross the street at sites with limited sight distance, complex or confusing designs, or at sites with certain vehicle mixes (many heavy trucks) or other dangers unless adequate design features and/or traffic control devices are in place.

At uncontrolled pedestrian crossing locations, installing marked crosswalks should not be regarded as a magic cure for pedestrian safety problems. However, marked crosswalks also should not be considered as a negative measure that will necessarily increase pedestrian crashes. Marked crosswalks are appropriate at some locations (e.g., at selected low-speed, two-lane streets at downtown crossing locations) to help channel pedestrians to preferred crossing locations, but other roadway improvements are also necessary (e.g., raised medians, traffic-calming treatments, traffic and pedestrian signals when warranted, or other substantial crossing improvement) when used at other locations. The guidelines presented in table 11 are intended to provide guidance for installing marked crosswalks and other pedestrian crossing facilities.

Note that speed limit was used in table 11 in addition to ADT, number of lanes, and presence of a median. In developing the table, roads with higher speed limits (higher than 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h)) were considered to be inappropriate for adding marked crosswalks alone. This is because virtually no uncontrolled, marked crosswalk sites where speed limits exceed 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h) were found in the 30 U.S. cities used in this study. Thus, these types of high-speed, uncontrolled marked crosswalks could not be included in the analysis. Also, high-speed roadways present added problems for pedestrians and thus require more substantial treatments in many cases. That may be why Germany, Finland, and Norway do not allow uncontrolled crosswalks on roads with high speed limits.<sup>(30)</sup>

For three-lane roads, adding marked crosswalks alone (without other substantial treatments) is generally not recommended for ADTs greater than 12,000, although exceptions may be allowed under certain conditions (e.g., lower speed limits).

If nothing else is done beyond marking crosswalks at an uncontrolled location, pedestrians will not experience increased safety (under any situations included in the analysis). This finding is in some ways consistent with the companion study by Knoblauch et al. that found that marking a crosswalk would not necessarily increase the number of motorists that will stop or yield to pedestrians.<sup>(13)</sup> Research from Europe shows the need for pedestrian improvements beyond uncontrolled crosswalks.<sup> $(17,21)$ </sup>

<b>Roadway Type</b>	<b>Vehicle ADT</b> $\leq 9,000$			<b>Vehicle ADT</b> $>9,000$ to 12,000		<b>Vehicle ADT</b> $>12,000-15,000$		<b>Vehicle ADT</b> > 15,000				
(Number of Travel Lanes	<b>Speed Limit**</b>											
and Median Type)	< 48.3 km/h (30) mi/h)	56.4 km/h (35) mi/h)	64.4 km/h (40) $\mathbf{mi}/\mathbf{h}$	< 48.3 km/h (30 mi/h)	56.4 km/h (35) $\mathbf{mi}/\mathbf{h}$	64.4 km/h (40) mi/h)	$\leq 48.3$ km/h (30) mi/h)	56.4 km/h (35) mi/h)	64.4 km/h (40) $\mathbf{mi}/\mathbf{h}$	< 48.3 km/h (30 mi/h)	56.4 km/h (35) mi/h)	64.4 km/h (40) mi/h)
Two lanes	U	$\mathcal{C}$			C				IN	$\mathcal{C}$		IN
Three lanes		$\mathcal{C}$	D		P	P	D	$\mathbf{P}$	N	P	N	IN
Multilane (four or more lanes) with raised median***	$\mathcal{C}$	$\mathcal{C}$		⌒	P	N	P	P	N	N	N	N
Multilane (four or more lanes) without raised median	$\overline{C}$	$\mathbf{P}$	N	P	P	N	N	IN	N	IN	N	N

**Table 11. Recommendations for installing marked crosswalks and other needed pedestrian improvements at uncontrolled locations.\*** 

\* These guidelines include intersection and midblock locations with no traffic signals or stop signs on the approach to the crossing. They do not apply to school crossings. A twoway center turn lane is not considered a median. Crosswalks should not be installed at locations that could present an increased safety risk to pedestrians, such as where there is poor sight distance, complex or confusing designs, a substantial volume of heavy trucks, or other dangers, without first providing adequate design features and/or traffic control devices. Adding crosswalks alone will not make crossings safer, nor will they necessarily result in more vehicles stopping for pedestrians. Whether or not marked crosswalks are installed, it is important to consider other pedestrian facility enhancements (e.g., raised median, traffic signal, roadway narrowing, enhanced overhead lighting, traffic-calming measures, curb extensions), as needed, to improve the safety of the crossing. These are general recommendations; good engineering judgment should be used in individual cases for deciding where to install crosswalks.

\*\* Where the speed limit exceeds 64.4 km/h (40 mi/h), marked crosswalks alone should not be used at unsignalized locations.

\*\*\* The raised median or crossing island must be at least 1.2 m (4 ft) wide and 1.8 m (6 ft) long to serve adequately as a refuge area for pedestrians, in accordance with MUTCD and American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) guidelines.

**C = Candidate sites for marked crosswalks**. Marked crosswalks must be installed carefully and selectively. Before installing new marked crosswalks, an engineering study is needed to determine whether the location is suitable for a marked crosswalk. For an engineering study, a site review may be sufficient at some locations, while a more indepth study of pedestrian volume, vehicle speed, sight distance, vehicle mix, and other factors may be needed at other sites. It is recommended that a minimum utilization of 20 pedestrian crossings per peak hour (or 15 or more elderly and/or child pedestrians) be confirmed at a location before placing a high priority on the installation of a marked crosswalk alone.

**P** = Possible increase in pedestrian crash risk may occur if crosswalks are added without other pedestrian facility enhancements. These locations should be closely monitored and enhanced with other pedestrian crossing improvements, if necessary, before adding a marked crosswalk.

N = Marked crosswalks alone are insufficient, since pedestrian crash risk may be increased by providing marked crosswalks alone. Consider using other treatments, such as traffic-calming treatments, traffic signals with pedestrian signals where warranted, or other substantial crossing improvement to improve crossing safety for pedestrians.

In some situations (e.g., low-speed, two-lane streets in downtown areas), installing a marked crosswalk may help consolidate multiple crossing points. Engineering judgment should be used to install crosswalks at preferred crossing locations (e.g., at a crossing location at a streetlight as opposed to an unlit crossing point nearby). While **overuse of marked crossings at uncontrolled locations should be** avoided, higher priority should be placed on providing crosswalk markings where pedestrian volume exceeds about 20 per peak hour (or 15 or more elderly pedestrians and/or children per peak hour).

Marked crosswalks and other pedestrian facilities (or lack of facilities) should be routinely monitored to determine what improvements are needed.

#### **POSSIBLE MEASURES TO HELP PEDESTRIANS**

Although simply installing marked crosswalks by themselves cannot solve pedestrian crossing problems, the safety needs of pedestrians must not be ignored. More substantial engineering and roadway treatments need to be considered, as well as enforcement and education programs and possibly new legislation to provide safer and easier crossings for pedestrians at problem locations. Transportation and safety engineers have a responsibility to consider all types of road users in roadway planning, design, and maintenance. Pedestrians must be provided with safe facilities for travel.

A variety of pedestrian facilities have been found to improve pedestrian safety and/or ability to cross the street under various conditions. (See references 16, 31, 32, 33, and 34.) Examples of pedestrian improvements include:

• Providing raised medians (figure 31) or intersection crossing islands on multilane roads, which can significantly reduce the pedestrian crash rate and also facilitate street crossing. Also, raised medians may provide aesthetic improvement and may control access to prevent unsafe turns out of driveways. Refuge islands should be at least 1.2 m (4 ft) wide (and preferably 1.8 to 2.4 m (6 to 8 ft) wide) and of adequate length to allow pedestrians to stand and wait for gaps in traffic before crossing the second half of the street. When built, the landscaping should be designed and maintained to provide good visibility between pedestrians and approaching motorists.



**Figure 31. Raised medians and crossing islands can improve pedestrian safety on multilane roads.** 

• Installing traffic signals (with pedestrian signals), where warranted (see figures 32 and 33).


**Figure 32. Pedestrian signals help accommodate pedestrian crossings on some high-volume or multilane roads.** 



**Figure 33. Traffic signals are needed to improve pedestrian crossings on some highvolume or multilane roads.** 

• Reducing the effective street crossing distance for pedestrians by narrowing the roads or by providing curb extensions (figures 34 and 35) and/or raised pedestrian islands at intersections.



**Figure 34. Curb extensions at midblock Figure 35. Curb extensions at intersections pedestrians.** 



**locations reduce crossing distance for reduce crossing distance for pedestrians.** 

Another option is to reduce four-lane undivided road sections to two through-lanes with dual left-turn lanes or left-turn bays. Reducing the width of the lanes may result in slower speeds in some situations, which can benefit pedestrians who are attempting to cross the street. This creates enough space to provide median islands. The removal of a travel lane may also allow enough space for sidewalks and/or bike lanes.

• Installing traffic-calming measures may be appropriate on certain streets to slow vehicle speeds and/or reduce cut-through traffic, as described in a 1999 report titled *Traffic Calming: State of the Practice.(*24)

Traffic-calming measures include raised crossings (raised crosswalks, raised intersections) (see figure 36), street narrowing measures (chicanes, slow points, "skinny street" designs), and intersection

designs (traffic minicircles, diagonal diverters). Note that some of these traffic-calming measures may not be appropriate on major collector or arterial streets.



**Figure 36. Raised crosswalks can control vehicle speeds on local streets at pedestrian crossings.** 

• Providing adequate nighttime lighting for pedestrians (figure 37). Adequate nighttime lighting should be provided at marked crosswalks and areas near churches, schools, and community centers with nighttime pedestrian activity.



**Figure 37. Adequate lighting can improve pedestrian safety at night.** 

- Designing safer intersections for pedestrians (e.g., crossing islands, tighter turn radii).
- Providing narrower widths and/or access management (e.g., consolidation of driveways).
- Constructing grade-separated crossings or pedestrian-only streets (see figure 38). Grade-separated crossings are very expensive and should only be considered in extreme situations, such as where pedestrian crossings are essential (e.g., school children need to cross a six-lane arterial street), streetcrossing at-grade is not feasible for pedestrians, and no other measures are considered to be

appropriate. Grade-separated crossings must also conform to Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements.



**Figure 38. Grade-separated crossings sometimes are used when other measures are not feasible to provide safe pedestrian crossings.** 

• Using various pedestrian warning signs, flashers, and other traffic control devices to supplement marked crosswalks (figure 39). However, the effects of supplemental signs and other devices at marked crosswalks are not well known under various roadway conditions. According to the MUTCD, pedestrian crossing signs should only be used at locations that are unusually hazardous, where crossing activity is unexpected, or at locations where pedestrian crossing activity is not readily apparent. $(2)$ 



**Figure 39. Pedestrian warning signs sometimes are used to supplement crosswalks.** 

- Building narrower streets in new communities to achieve desired vehicle speeds.
- Increasing the frequency of two-lane or three-lane arterials when designing new street networks so that fewer multilane arterials are required.

It is recommended that parking be eliminated on the approach to uncontrolled crosswalks to improve vision between pedestrians and motorists. The 2000 Uniform Vehicle Code specifies that parking should be prohibited within an intersection on a crosswalk, and within 6.1 m (20 ft) of a crosswalk at an intersection (which could be increased to 9.1 to 15.25 m (30 to 50 ft) in advance of a crosswalk on a highspeed road. $^{(1)}$ 

Some agencies provide fences or railings in the raised medians of multilane roads that direct pedestrians to the right; this results in a two-stage crossing and increases the likelihood of pedestrians looking for vehicles coming from their right in the second half of the street (figures 40 and 41).





**Figure 40. Fences or railings in the median direct pedestrians to the right and may reduce pedestrian crashes on the second half of the street.** 

Angled Crosswalk in Median - Plan View

**Figure 41. Angled crosswalks with barriers can direct pedestrians to face upstream and increase the pedestrian's awareness of traffic.**  Proper planning and land use practices should be applied to benefit pedestrians. For example, busy arterial streets should be used as a boundary for school attendance or school busing. Major pedestrian destinations should not be separated from each other or from their parking facilities by a wide, busy street.

The MUTCD pedestrian signal warrant should be reviewed to determine whether the warrant should be modified to more easily allow for installing a traffic signal at locations where pedestrians cannot safely cross the street (and where no alternative safe crossings exist nearby).

Consideration must always include pedestrians with disabilities and proper accommodations must be provided to meet ADA requirements.

There should be continued research, development, and testing/explanation of innovative traffic control and roadway design alternatives that could provide improved access and safety for pedestrians attempting to cross streets. For example, in-pavement warning lights, variations in pedestrian warning and regulatory signs (including signs placed in the centerline to reinforce motorists yielding to pedestrians), roadway narrowing, traffic-calming measures, and automated speed-monitoring techniques deserve further research and development to determine their feasibility under various traffic and roadway conditions.

More details about these and other pedestrian facilities are contained in the *Pedestrian Facilities User's Guide: Providing Safety and Mobility*,<sup>(22)</sup> and in the Institute for Transportation Engineers (ITE) publications *Design and Safety of Pedestrian Facilities*<sup>(35)</sup> and *The Traffic Safety Toolbox* (chapter 19, "Designing for Pedestrians"). $^{(36)}$ "

Table 11 provides initial guidance on whether an uncontrolled location might be a candidate for a marked crosswalk alone and/or whether additional geometric and/or traffic control improvements are needed. As a part of the review process for pedestrian crossings, an engineering study should be used to analyze other factors, including (but not limited to), gaps in traffic, approach speed, sight distances, illumination, the needs of special populations, and the distance to the nearest traffic signal.

The spacing of marked crosswalks should also be considered so that they are not placed too close together. Overuse of marked crosswalks may breed driver disrespect for them, and a more conservative use of crosswalks generally is preferred. Thus, it is recommended that in situations where marked crosswalks alone are acceptable (see table 11) a higher priority be placed on their use at locations having a minimum of 20 pedestrian crossings per peak hour (or 15 or more elderly and/or child pedestrians per peak hour). In all cases, good engineering judgment must be applied.

#### **OTHER CONSIDERATIONS**

#### **Distance of Marked Crosswalks from Signalized Intersections**

Marked crosswalks should not be installed in close proximity to signalized intersections (which may or may not have marked crosswalks); instead, pedestrians should be encouraged to cross at the signal in most situations. The minimum distance from a signal for installing a marked crosswalk should be determined by local traffic engineers based on pedestrian crossing demand, type of roadway, traffic volume, and other factors. The objective of adding a marked crosswalk is to channel pedestrians to safer crossing points. It should be understood, however, that pedestrian crossing behavior may be difficult to control merely by adding marked crosswalks. The new marked crosswalk should not unduly restrict platooned traffic, and also should be consistent with marked crosswalks at other unsignalized locations in the area.

#### **Alternative Treatments**

In addition to installing marked crosswalks—or in some cases, instead of installing marked crosswalks there are other treatments that should be considered to provide safer and easier crossings for pedestrians. Examples of these pedestrian improvements:

- Provide raised medians (or raised crossing islands) on multilane roads.
- Install traffic signals and pedestrian signals where warranted and where serious pedestrian crossing problems exist.
- Reduce the exposure crossing distance for pedestrians by:
	- Providing curb extensions.
	- Providing pedestrian median refuge islands.
	- Reducing four-lane undivided road sections to two through lanes with a left-turn bay (or a twoway left-turn lane), sidewalks, and bicycle lanes.
- Locate bus stops on the far side of uncontrolled marked crosswalks.
- Install traffic-calming measures to slow vehicle speeds and/or reduce cut-through traffic. Such measures may include:
	- Raised crossings (raised crosswalks, raised intersections).
	- Street-narrowing measures (chicanes, slow points, "skinny street" designs).
	- Intersection designs (traffic minicircles, diagonal diverters).
	- Other treatments are available; see *Traffic Calming: State of the Practice* for further details.<sup>(24)</sup>

Some of these traffic-calming measures are better suited to local or neighborhood streets than to arterial streets.

- Provide adequate nighttime street lighting for pedestrians in areas with nighttime pedestrian activity where illumination is inadequate.
- Design safer intersections and driveways for pedestrians (e.g., crossing islands, tighter turn radii), which take into consideration the needs of pedestrians.

In developing the proposed U.S. guidelines for marked crosswalks and other pedestrian measures, consideration was given not only to the research results in this study, but also to crosswalk guidelines and related pedestrian safety research in Sweden, England, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Hungary. (See references 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 33, and 37.) More details on pedestrian facilities are given in the 2001 *Pedestrian Facilities User's Guide: Providing Safety and Mobility*,<sup>(22)</sup> Design and Safety of Pedestrian Facilities,<sup>(35)</sup> The Traffic Safety Toolbox,<sup>(36)</sup> and *Making Streets That* Work—Neighborhood Planning Tool,<sup>(38)</sup> among others.

## **APPENDIX A. DETAILS OF DATA COLLECTION METHODS**

This study evaluated the safety of marked and unmarked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations, that is, at crossings with no traffic signals or stop signs on the approach. Therefore, the data collection activities were undertaken to: (1) select suitable marked and unmarked crosswalks, and (2) obtain pedestrian crash and exposure data. Data collection was conducted in five steps, which are discussed below.

## **STEP 1—INVENTORY CROSSWALKS AND CONTROL SITES**

Through conversations with city traffic engineers and pedestrian/bike coordinators, 28 cities and 2 counties were selected for crosswalk inventory. Either the Highway Safety Research Center (HSRC) staff or local data collectors performed the inventory by driving along selected streets in each city. These streets were in the downtown area, other commercial areas, and built-up residential areas, where marked crosswalks at uncontrolled locations were known or expected to be present. The inventory data collection form is shown in figure 41.

## **STEP 2—RECORD DATA ON INVENTORY SHEETS**

For most cities, the inventory of crosswalk and comparison sites was recorded on videotape. An HSRC staff member watched the videotapes and completed a crosswalk inventory form (see figure 42). Several local data collectors filled out the inventory form directly and mailed the completed forms to HSRC. This process was used both to select unmarked crosswalks (i.e., matched comparison sites—see step 3) and to extract relevant information about the marked crosswalks.

#### **Location Description**

For record-keeping purposes, each marked crosswalk and matching comparison site was assigned a site number. Street or route refers to the main road that the pedestrian crosses, and intersecting street is the side street that crosses or forms a "T" with the main road. The leg (east, west, north, south) where the crosswalk or comparison site exists was recorded. If there were crosswalks on both legs (east and west or north and south) of the same intersection, they were assigned two site numbers and listed separately. Midblock location was noted when appropriate, along with the intersecting streets to either side. A total of 827 intersection and 173 midblock marked crosswalks were used in the analysis, with an equal number of matched comparison sites.

#### **Number of Lanes**

The total number of lanes, including any turn lanes, that a pedestrian must cross was recorded. Figure 43 shows the distribution of the 1,000 marked crosswalks that were used in the analysis according to the number of lanes. Nearly half (45.8 percent) of the sites were on two-lane roads, with about one third of the sites on four-lane roads.

#### **Median Type**

The median type was recorded as either none, raised, or painted. Two-way left-turn lanes were considered to be traffic lanes. There was no median for about two-thirds of the 1,000 marked (and unmarked) crosswalks that were used in the analysis. Raised medians were present for 14 percent of the marked (and unmarked) crosswalks, and painted medians, about 15 percent.

# **One-Way or Two-Way**

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About 86 percent of the crosswalks were on two-way streets, with 14 percent on one-way streets. inger i

**Figure 42. Pedestrian crosswalk inventory form.**



**Figure 43. Number of lanes for marked crosswalks.** 

## **Type of Crosswalk**

Crosswalks usually had standard markings (two parallel white lines). Various types of crosswalk markings are illustrated in figure 7 (shown in chapter 2).

The presence of any signs or beacons was also noted. Types of signs and beacons included:



Only 19 of the 2,000 sites (less than 1 percent) had any of these supplemental devices. Sites were selected to minimize the number of signs or beacons.

#### **Condition of Crosswalk Markings**

The condition of the marked crosswalk was recorded as excellent (E), good (G), fair (F), or poor (P). There was no way to determine the condition of the markings over the entire study period.

#### **Area Type**

Each crosswalk was in a central business district (CBD), fringe, or residential area.



Of the 2,000 marked and unmarked crosswalks that were used in the analysis, 199 (10 percent) were in a CBD, 1,093 (54.7 percent) were in fringe areas, and 708 (35.4 percent) were in residential areas.

#### **Estimated Pedestrian ADT**

For each crosswalk and control site, the pedestrian ADT was based on expanding short-term pedestrian counts based on adjustment factors, as described below.

Pedestrians and motorists are out and about at all hours of the day and night. As a result, pedestrian crashes may happen at any hour. Therefore, to calculate crash rates, 24-hour daily pedestrian volumes are needed. It was not feasible to count pedestrians for every hour at each of the 1,000 marked crosswalks and 1,000 unmarked comparison sites. Instead, pedestrians were counted by 15-minute intervals for a total of 1 hour at each site. These counts were conducted on weekdays during daylight hours. The earliest count intervals started at 7 a.m., and the latest count intervals ended at 6 p.m.

Daily pedestrian volumes at each marked crosswalk and unmarked comparison site were then estimated from these 1-hour counts. If pedestrian activity were evenly distributed in each hour of the day, then each hour would comprise about 4.2 percent (100 percent  $\div$  24 hours) of the daily total. The 1-hour count

could simply be divided by an hourly adjustment factor of 4.2 percent (0.042) to get the all-day volume. In reality, though, hourly volumes vary throughout the day with greater pedestrian activity during certain peak periods. Suppose that 10 out of 100 (10 percent) of the day's pedestrians are counted between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. If that hour's count were divided by 0.042, the true daily volume would be overestimated  $(10/4.2 \text{ percent} = 238)$ . Likewise, if 2 out of 100 (2 percent) are counted between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m., dividing that count by 4.2 percent would underestimate the true daily volume  $(2/0.042 = 48)$ . Therefore, adjustment factors for each hour of the day are needed to obtain a more accurate estimate of the true daily volume.

The adjustment factors were derived from two data sets. First, all-day (8- to 12-hour) pedestrian counts were undertaken at 11 marked crosswalks and 11 unmarked comparison sites. Second, adjustments were calculated based on the method used by Zegeer et al. for 24-hour pedestrian counts in Seattle, WA.<sup>(39)</sup> They found that the 12-hour period from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. represented 86 percent of the 24-hour daily pedestrian volume. Separate adjustment factors were used for each area type (CBD, fringe, and residential), because the area types have different patterns of hourly pedestrian volume. It was determined that crosswalks and comparison sites had similar pedestrian volume distributions by the time of day, so the same adjustment factor was used for a crosswalk and its matched comparison site.

The adjustment factors by time of day and area type appear in table 12. The 1-hour pedestrian counts at each crosswalk and comparison site were divided by the appropriate factor to obtain the 24-hour daily pedestrian volume. For example, suppose 100 pedestrians were counted between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. at a CBD location. Then the daily pedestrian volume was estimated to be  $100 / 4.9$  percent  $= 2,041$ pedestrians. At a fringe location, the daily volume would be 100 / 8.3 percent = 1,205 pedestrians. If the count interval was spread out over two periods, such as 9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., then the adjustment factor for 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. was applied to the first part of the count, and the factor for 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. was applied to the second part of the count.

<b>Time of Day</b>	. . <b>Area Type</b>				
	CBD(%)	Fringe $(\% )$	<b>Residential</b> $(\% )$		
$7$ a.m. $-8$ a.m.	2.4	6.9	4.8		
$8$ a.m. $-9$ a.m.	2.4	6.0	3.9		
$9 a.m. - 10 a.m.$	4.9	8.3	5.7		
$10$ a.m. $-11$ a.m.	8.2	7.1	8.7		
11 a.m. $-12$ N	10.4	7.7	8.2		
$12 N - 1 p.m.$	11.4	9.0	8.4		
$1 p.m. - 2 p.m.$	11.6	6.3	6.9		
$2 p.m. - 3 p.m.$	8.5	8.5	5.9		
$3 p.m. - 4 p.m.$	16.2	8.1	7.4		
$4 p.m. - 5 p.m.$	4.4	7.9	9.3		
$5 p.m. - 6 p.m.$	3.5	8.1	11.4		
Remaining 13 hours	16.0	16.0	19.5		

**Table 12. Adjustment factors by time of day and area type used to obtain estimated pedestrian ADT.** 

At a few of the 2,000 sites, no pedestrians were observed during the crossing period. The pedestrian crash rate is computed as the number of pedestrian crashes divided by the pedestrian crossing volume. The pedestrian crossing volume is the product of the pedestrian ADT times the number of years times 365 days per year. Thus, assuming a zero hourly pedestrian volume is not only questionable, but also results in a pedestrian exposure of 0. Since it is not possible to use 0 as a value of exposure in computing pedestrian crash rates (i.e., since dividing by zero yields a rate of infinity), a count of 0.25 was substituted

for 0 as the hourly pedestrian count for computing pedestrian ADT for use in computing pedestrian crash rates.

Unmarked crosswalks (the control sites) tended to have lower pedestrian volumes than marked crosswalks. This may be the result of pedestrians being drawn to marked crosswalks and/or due to crosswalks being marked at locations with more pedestrian activity.

## **Speed Limit**

Speed limits were obtained from local traffic engineers, local data collectors in the field, and watching videotapes of the crosswalk inventory. The most common speed limits were 48.3 km/h (30 mi/h) (37.4 percent), 40.25 km/h (25 mi/h) (33.0 percent), and 56.35km/h (35 mi/h) (22.8 percent).

## **Traffic ADT**

Traffic volumes were obtained from local traffic engineers. Figure 44 shows that marked crosswalks had similar traffic volumes to the unmarked crosswalks (the comparison sites). This was to be expected, because the comparison sites were chosen to be close to, and similar to, their matching marked crosswalks.

## **STEP 3—IDENTIFY SUITABLE CONTROL SITES**

Each crosswalk was matched with a control site that was close to the crosswalk and had similar characteristics (such as number of lanes, area type, estimated traffic and pedestrian volumes, and one-way or two-way traffic flow), but which did not have crosswalk markings, stop sign, or traffic signal. This was done either by watching the video or in the field. For example, if a marked crosswalk was present on the east leg of an intersection but not on the west leg, then the west leg was often a good control site. If the east and west legs of an intersection had marked crosswalks, then the east and west legs of a nearby intersection along the same main road were often good control sites. The data items described in step 2 were recorded for the control sites.

Some marked crosswalks were excluded because suitable control sites could not be found, or they were school crossings. A total of 1,000 marked crosswalks, each matched with a control site (for a total of 1,000 control sites), was used in the analysis. The number of crosswalks by city is given in table 13.

#### **STEP 4—COUNT PEDESTRIANS**

Local data collectors were hired to count the number of pedestrians at the crosswalks and their corresponding control sites. Each location was counted in 15-minute intervals for one hour. At 11 crosswalks and 11 control sites, pedestrians were counted for 8 to 12 hours. These longer, all-day counts were used as the basis from which daily pedestrian volumes at each crosswalk and control site were estimated from the one-hour counts. All counts were done on weekdays.

## **STEP 5—OBTAIN CRASH DATA**

Local city contacts provided crash data and hard-copy police reports for vehicle-pedestrian crashes that occurred at or near the crosswalks and comparison sites, for an average of about 5 years per site. Some cities had more than 5 years of crash data available, while other cities had 6 years of data that was available for use.



**Figure 44. Marked and unmarked crosswalks had similar traffic ADT distributions.** 

69

		<b>Number of Crosswalks</b>			<b>Number of Crosswalks</b>
<b>City or County</b>	<b>Marked</b>	<b>Unmarked</b>	<b>City or County</b>	<b>Marked</b>	<b>Unmarked</b>
Austin, TX	24	24	Orlando, FL	20	20
Baltimore, MD	30	30	Phoenix, AZ	36	36
<b>Baltimore County, MD</b>	11	11	Pittsburgh, PA	18	18
Cambridge, MA	46	46	Portland, OR	32	32
Cincinnati, OH	42	42	Raleigh, NC	14	14
Cleveland, OH	55	55	Salt Lake City, UT	18	18
Durham, NC	11	11	San Francisco, CA	91	91
Fort Worth, TX	28	28	Scottsdale, AZ	8	
Gainesville, FL	45	45	Seattle, WA	102	102
Glendale, AZ	12	12	St. Louis, MO	15	15
Kansas City, MO	29	29	St. Louis County, MO	24	24
Madison, WI	29	29	Tempe, AZ		
Milwaukee, WI	68	68	Topeka, KS	25	25
New Orleans, LA	80	80	Tucson, AZ	22	22
Oakland, CA	45	45	Winter Park, FL	19	19
			Totals (all cities)	1,000	1,000

**Table 13. The number of marked crosswalks that were used in this study, by city or county.** 

Crash rates were normalized based on number of years of data. A total of 229 crashes (188 at marked crosswalks and 41 at control sites) occurred at the 2,000 sites and were used in the analysis. Local traffic engineers and police departments provided crash data and hard-copy police crash reports for the marked and unmarked crosswalks. For each marked crosswalk and matching unmarked crosswalk, data and reports were obtained for the same 3- to 5- year period. The exact years varied from one city to another, depending on the data and reports that each city had available.

The crash reports were read to determine the crash type and to obtain information on other crash variables, such as pedestrian age, injury severity, and time of day. The crash type and other information were entered into a database for analysis.

Some crashes were eliminated because they did not occur at the crosswalks (or within 3 m (10 ft) of the crosswalk) of interest. For example, if a traffic engineer included Crash #1 among the crashes at Crosswalk #1, but it was later determined that Crash #1 actually occurred somewhere else, then Crash #1 would have been eliminated. The analysis resulted in the confirmation of 229 total pedestrian crashes. Of these, 188 occurred at marked crosswalks and 41 occurred at unmarked crosswalks.

## **APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL TESTING OF THE FINAL CRASH PREDICTION MODEL**

To test the final crash prediction model in the terms of validity for the available database, several types of tests were conducted. These tests included:

- Goodness-of-fit.
- Test for functional form.
- Residuals.

## **GOODNESS-OF-FIT**

Below is as excerpt from the PROC GENMOD output (table 14). In assessing the goodness-of-fit of the negative binomial regression model for crosswalks, we can see that the scaled deviance and the Pearson chisquare are small indicating that the model fits the data well.



#### **Table 14. Criteria for assessing goodness-of-fit negative binomial regression model.**

## **TEST FOR FUNCTIONAL FORM**

We can test for overdispersion with a likelihood ratio test based on Poisson and negative binomial distributions. This test tests equality of the mean and the variance imposed by the Poisson distribution against the alternative that the variance exceeds the mean. For the negative binomial distribution, the variance = mean + k mean<sup>2</sup> (k> = 0, the negative binomial distribution reduces to Poisson when k = 0). The null hypothesis is:  $H_0$ :  $k = 0$  and the alternative hypothesis is:  $H_a$ :  $k > 0$ .

To test the functional form, we used the likelihood ratio test, that is, compute LR statistic, -2 (LL (Poisson) – LL (negative binomial)). The asymptotic distribution of the LR statistic has probability mass of one half at zero and one half – chi-square distribution with 1 df.<sup>(40)</sup> To test the null hypothesis at the significance level α, use the critical value of chi-square distribution corresponding to significance level 2α, that is reject H<sub>0</sub> if LR statistic  $>\chi^2$  (1-2α, 1 df).

Table 15 is an excerpt from the PROC GENMOD output for a Poisson regression model with the same independent variables are is the final negative binomial model.

	00	$\epsilon$	
Criteria	DF	Value	Value/DF
Deviance	1990	881.5022	0.4430
<b>Scaled Deviance</b>	1990	881.5022	0.4430
Pearson Chi-Square	1990	3432.5818	1.7249
Scaled Pearson X2	1990	3432.5818	1.7249
Log Likelihood		$-568.4558$	
$-2$ (LL (Poisson) - LL (negative binomial))			

**Table 15. Criteria for assessing goodness-of-fit Poisson regression model.** 

 $-2$  (LL (Poisson) - LL (negative binomial)) =  $-2*(-568.4558 - (-548.7469)) =$ 

 $2*(568.4558 - 548.7469) = 39.4178$ 

Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected for  $\alpha = 0.01$ , and we conclude that the Poisson distribution is inadequate for this model.<sup>(40)</sup>

## **RESIDUALS**

Because generalized estimating equations (GEE) were used, the interpretation of residuals is problematic and no residual analysis was undertaken.

## **MULTICOLLINEARITY**

Certainly multicollinearity is an issue, because the marked crosswalk and the unmarked crosswalk were matched on geographic terms, thus the number of lanes, median type, and traffic ADT are distributed very similarly in the marked and the unmarked crosswalks.

Multicollinearity was explored using the regression diagnostics suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch.<sup>(41)</sup> They suggest two different measures: variance inflation factor (VIF) and the proportion of variation. VIF gauges the influence potential near dependencies may have on the estimation of the standard error of the estimate of the regression parameters. The proportion of variation is a diagnostic which permits the detection of morel complex dependencies. For the final model with predictor variables, the values were: an indicator for marked versus unmarked, pedestrian ADT, and traffic ADT; two indicators for number of lanes; two indicators for type of median; an interaction between the indicator for marked versus unmarked and pedestrian ADT; and an interaction between indicator for marked versus unmarked and traffic ADT. The largest VIF was 4.0; this is not high (VIF  $\leq$  10), however, it is more than the suggested criterion of VIF  $> 1.55$ . Thus, the VIF for indicator for marked versus unmarked VIF = 3.5, traffic ADT, VIF = 2.5, and the interaction of these two predictor variables  $VIF = 4.0$ . There is some variance inflation in this model. Since none of the VIF are greater than 10, we can conclude that the model has not been degraded by collinearity. We should interpret the results with some care, because three predictors have VIFs greater than 1.55.

The proportion of variation suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch with a condition index of 9.4 suggests a weak dependency between the three predictors: indicator for marked versus unmarked, traffic ADT, and the interaction of these two predictor variables. It is not surprising that an interaction is correlated with the main factors.

In conclusion, the model does have a weak dependency among the predictor variables. This does not inflate the variance too much; thus, reasonable tests may be conducted. The mild nature of the collinearity does not present a threat to the interpretability of the model. $(41)$ 

## **APPENDIX C. PLOTS OF EXPECTED PEDESTRIAN CRASHES BASED ON THE FINAL NEGATIVE BINOMIAL PREDICTION MODEL**



**Figure 45. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 10,000.** 



**Figure 46. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 100.** 



**Figure 47. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 15,000.** 



**Figure 48. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 2,000.** 



**Figure 49 Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 50.** 



**Figure 50. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, two lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 800.** 



**Figure 51. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 10,000.** 



**Figure 52. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 100.** 



**Figure 53. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 15,000.** 



**Figure 54. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 150.** 



**Figure 55. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 200.** 



**Figure 56. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily pedestrian volume = 50.** 



**Figure 57. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with no median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 7,500.** 



**Figure 58. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily pedestrian volume = 100.** 



**Figure 59. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 15,000.** 



**Figure 60. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily pedestrian volume = 150.** 



**Figure 61. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily pedestrian volume = 200.** 



**Figure 62. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 22,500.** 



**Figure 63. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 32,000.** 



**Figure 64. Response curves with 95 percent confidence intervals based on negative binomial regression model, five lanes with median, average daily motor vehicle traffic = 7,500.** 

## **APPENDIX D. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PEDESTRIAN CRASHES (IN 5 YEARS) BASED ON THE FINAL NEGATIVE BINOMIAL PREDICTION MODEL**

#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 1 Based on Negative Binominal Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Two Lanes with No Median











Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 4

 500 2000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.07 500 3000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08

#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 5 Based on Negative Binominal Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Two Lanes with No Median

 Average Average Daily Daily Traffic Pedestrian (Motor Unmarked Unmarked Unmarked Marked Marked Marked Volume Vehicle) Lower 95% Predicted Upper 95% Lower 95% Predicted Upper 95% 500 4000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 500 5000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 500 6000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.09 500 7000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 500 8000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 500 9000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.11 500 10000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.12 500 11000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.12 500 12000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.13 500 13000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 500 14000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.15 500 15000 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.16 550 2000 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.07 550 3000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 550 4000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.08 550 5000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 550 6000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 550 7000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.10 550 8000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.10 550 9000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.11 550 10000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.12 550 11000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.13  $\begin{array}{cccccccc} 550 & & 12000 & 0.03 & & 0.05 & & 0.07 & & 0.07 & & 0.10 & & 0.13 \\ 550 & & 13000 & 0.03 & & 0.05 & & 0.07 & & 0.07 & & 0.10 & & 0.14 \\ 550 & & 14000 & 0.03 & & 0.05 & & 0.07 & & 0.08 & & 0.11 & & 0.15 \\ 550 & & 15000 & 0.03 & & 0.05 & & 0.07 & & 0.08 & & 0.12 & & 0$ 550 13000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14<br>550 14000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.15<br>550 15000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.17<br>600 2000 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07<br>0.08 0.12 550 14000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.15 550 15000 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.17 600 2000 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 600 3000 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.08 600 4000 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.08 600 5000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 600 6000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 600 7000 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.10

#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 6 Based on Negative Binominal Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Two Lanes with No Median



#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 7 Based on Negative Binominal Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Two Lanes with No Median





# Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 1 Based on Negative Binomial Model



# Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 2 Based on Negative Binomial Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003


 Average Average Daily Daily Traffic Pedestrian (Motor Unmarked Unmarked Unmarked Marked Marked Marked Volume Vehicle) Lower 95% Predicted Upper 95% Lower 95% Predicted Upper 95% 100 23000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.23 100 24000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.25 100 25000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.26 100 26000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.28 100 27000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.18 0.29 100 28000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.31 100 29000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.33 100 30000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.35 100 31000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.37 100 32000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.39 100 33000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.27 0.42 100 34000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.44 100 35000 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.31 0.47 100 36000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.33 0.50  $\begin{array}{cccccccc} 100 & & 37000 & 0.01 & & 0.02 & & 0.06 & & 0.23 & & 0.35 & & 0.54 \\ 100 & & 38000 & 0.01 & & 0.02 & & 0.06 & & 0.25 & & 0.37 & & 0.57 \\ 100 & & 39000 & 0.01 & & 0.02 & & 0.06 & & 0.26 & & 0.40 & & 0.61 \\ 100 & & 40000 & 0.01 & & 0.02 & & 0.06 & & 0.28 & & 0.43 & & 0$  100 38000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.25 0.37 0.57 100 39000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.40 0.61 100 40000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.28 0.43 0.65 100 41000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.30 0.46 0.70 100 42000 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.32 0.49 0.74 100 43000 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.34 0.52 0.80 100 44000 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.36 0.55 0.85 100 45000 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.38 0.59 0.92 100 46000 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.40 0.63 0.98 100 47000 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.43 0.67 1.05 100 48000 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.46 0.72 1.13 100 49000 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.48 0.77 1.22 100 50000 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.51 0.82 1.31 150 5000 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.09 150 6000 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05<br>150 7000 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 150 7000 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 150 8000 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.11



150 40000 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.28 0.43 0.66



#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 5 Based on Negative Binomial Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003



#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 6 Based on Negative Binomial Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003



Based on Negative Binomial Model

Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 7

#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 8 Based on Negative Binomial Model 18:02 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Five Lanes with Median





### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 1 Based on Negative Binominal Model



#### Estimated Number of Pedestrian Crashes in Five Years 2 Based on Negative Binominal Model 17:25 Tuesday, September 16, 2003

99



Based on Negative Binominal Model



 Based on Negative Binominal Model 17:25 Tuesday, September 16, 2003 Five Lanes with No Median



5

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Document: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Crash Rate Maps\2022 Crash Rate Maps\2022 Crash Rates - 11x17.mxd



Total Number: 2,648





Produced by Sandy Public Works Date: 6/20/2023 Path: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Yearly Projects\2000accidents.mxd



Total Number: 2,819 2006: 2,662

1 0.5 0 1



Produced by Sandy Public Works Date: 6/20/2023

Path: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Yearly Projects\2007accidents.mxd



Total Number: 1,754 2011: 1,916



1 0.5 0 1

Date: 6/20/2023 Path: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Yearly Projects\2012accidents.mxd

Produced by Sandy Public Works



Total Number: 2,112 2017: 2,091



1 0.5 0 1

Produced by Sandy Public Works Date: 1/14/2020 Path: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Yearly Projects\2019accidents.mxd



Total Number: 1,682 2021: 1,841



1 0.5 0 1

Produced by Sandy Public Works Date: 1/26/2023 Path: G:\GIS\Projects\Accidents\Yearly Projects\2022accidents.mxd